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B i b l i o g r a p h y 
A b s t r a c t of the T h e s i s . 
The t h e s i s w i l l commence with a b r i e f study of the h i s t o r i c a l 
1 
background to the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r w i t h a view to c o n s i d e r i n g 
the extent to which Blackburn J . ' s statement of the r u l e was the e x p o s i -
t i o n of a completely new p r i n c i p l e of law. 
A d e t a i l e d examination w i l l be then made of the v a r i o u s component 
p a r t s of the r u l e w i t h chapters d i s c u s s i n g the need f o r an escape, whether 
th e r e i s l i a b i l i t y f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y and the concepts of non-natural 
u s e r and dangerous o b j e c t . L i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e w i l l a l s o 
be c o n s i d e r e d . 
Having c l a r i f i e d the p r e c i s e nature and scope of the t o r t we v / i l l 
then c o n s i d e r to what degree the general c l a i m t h a t the t o r t i s one of 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s j u s t i f i a b l e . An important aspect of t h i s p a r t of 
the t h e s i s v / i l l be the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the e f f e c t which the f i v e defences 
to the t o r t and the need f o r t h e r e to be a non-natural u s e r of land have 
on'the s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y . 
N o t i c e w i l l a l s o be taken of the f a c t t h a t doubts about;the 
s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r together with the modern 
tendency of ..the t o r t of negligence to form i t s b a s i s of l i a b i l i t y more 
on a concept of r i s k than of f a u l t means t h a t we are moving towards an 
equation of the two t o r t s . 
F i n a l l y we must look to the f u t u r e and c o n s i d e r the d i r e c t i o n 
i n which the t o r t may go. W i l l the gap between negligence and Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r d i m i n i s h f u r t h e r u n t i l the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s surrounding Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r r e s u l t i n i t s disappearance as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y i n t o a wider 
p r i n c i p l e of negligence or w i l l some completely new system of compensation 
fo r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y supersede a l l the present r u l e s and make both negligenc 
and Rylands v F l e t c h e r redundant? 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The O r i g i n s of the Rule i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . 
The r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r had i t s g e n e s i s as a s e p a r a t e 
head of t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y i n the second h a l f of the n i n e t e e n t h century 
although i t s h i s t o r i c a l antecedents a r e of f a r g r e a t e r a n t i q u i t y . I n 
order to f u l l y understand the nature and scope of the r u l e i t i s neces-
s a r y i n i t i a l l y to make a d e t a i l e d study of the c a s e of Rylands v F l e t c h e r 
i t s e l f and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , of the judgment of Blackburn J . i n the c o u r t 
of Exchequer Chamber. 
The f a c t s of the case were, b r i e f l y , t h a t Messrs. Rylands and 
Horrocks, the defendants a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e , caused a r e s e r v o i r f o r the 
holding of r a i n water to be c o n s t r u c t e d on t h e i r own l a n d . To t h i s end 
they employed a competent engineer and c o n t r a c t o r . The d i s t r i c t v/as a 
mining area and i t so happened t h a t a t the s e l e c t e d s i t e t h e r e were some 
ol d v e r t i c a l s h a f t s which, as i t t r a n s p i r e d , l e d down to abandoned c o a l 
workings. These v e r t i c a l s h a f t s , which were h a l f f i l l e d with e a r t h , 
were d i s c o v e r e d by the workmen while c o n s t r u c t i n g the r e s e r v o i r but they 
f i l l e d them up and blocked them with such c a r e as v/as deemed n e c e s s a r y . 
Subsequently, the r e s e r v o i r being f i l l e d , the water forced i t s way down 
these s h a f t s and, escaping i n t o the o l d workings, flowed through them 
and flooded the c o a l mine of F l e t c h e r , the p l a i n t i f f . On these f a c t s 
the case' came before the Court of Exchequer which comprised S i r F r e d e r i c k 
2 
P o l l o c k C.B. and Barons Brarawell, Martin and C h a n n e l l . 
There were two p o i n t s a t i s s u e . The f i r s t v/as whether the defen-
dants were l i a b l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of negligence on the p a r t of themselves or 
those who c o n s t r u c t e d the r e s e r v o i r and the second was whether, although 
not themselves n e g l i g e n t , the defendants were l i a b l e f o r the negligence of the 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
2. 3 H. and C. 77^. 
1. 
independent c o n t r a c t o r they had employed. On t h i s second point- the court 
decided i n favour of the defendants. The q u e s t i o n was not f u r t h e r c o n sidered 
on appeal i n view of the d e c i s i o n t h a t the dei'endents v/ere l i a b l e on the 
f i r s t point but the weight of a u t h o r i t y would suggest t h a t the court was 
wrong f o r , no., matter how competent an independent c o n t r a c t o r i s , a p l a i n -
t i f f cannot r e l i e v e h i m s e l f of l i a b i l i t y by e n t r u s t i n g to him work which i s 
3 
p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous to a d j a c e n t property. 
On the f i r s t p o int the Court of Exchequer gave judgment i n favour 
of the defendants on the ground t h a t they were not l i a b l e f o r damage 
r e s u l t i n g from the l a w f u l u s e r of t h e i r own l a n d i n the absence both of 
i n t e n t and of n e g l i g e n c e . Bramwell B. d i s s e n t e d on the ground t h a t the 
p l a i n t i f f had the r i g h t to enjoy h i s land f r e e from f o r e i g n water and t h a t 
the defendants' a c t was both a t r e s p a s s and a n u i s a n c e . 
E r r o r was brought to the Court of Exchequer Chamber which c o n s i s t e d 
of W i l l e s , Blackburn, K e a t i n g , M e l l o r , Montague Smith and Lush J . J , They 
unanimously h e l d the defendants l i a b l e ; the judgment of the court being 
d e l i v e r e d by Blackburn J . The l e a r n e d judge began by s a y i n g t h a t i t was an 
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e of law t h a t a person who b r i n g s something onto h i s l a n d s 
and keeps i t t h e r e i s under a duty to see t h a t i t does not escape and cause 
damage to h i s neighbours. He saw the question a t i s s u e as being "whether 
the duty which the law c a s t s upon him under such circumstances i s an 
absolute duty to keep i t i n a t h i s p e r i l or i s , as the m a j o r i t y of the 
Court of Exchequer have thought, merely a duty to take a l l reasonable and 
if 
prudent p r e c a u t i o n s to keep i t i n , but no more": i n other words d i d the 
p l a i n t i f f have to e s t a b l i s h t h a t the defendant had been n e g l i g e n t ? 
I n answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n Blackburn J . gave what has come to be 
regarded as the standard pronouncement of the r u l e i n Bylands v F l e t c h e r . 
k 
He s a i d : "We t h i n k t h a t the t r u e r u l e of law i s , t h a t the person who f o r 
h i s own purposes b r i n g s on h i s lands and c o l l e c t s and keeps there anything 
3. T a r r y v AshtqnJ [8?6 1 Q.3.D.314. 
k. At pages 
2. 
l i k e l y to do m i s c h i e f i t i s escapes, must keep i t i n a t h i s p e r i l , and i f 
he does not do so, i s prima f a c i e answerable f o r a l l the damage which i s the 
n a t u r a l consequence of i t s escape. He can excuse h i m s e l f by showing t h a t the 
escape was owing .to the p l a i n t i f f ' s d e f a u l t ; or perhaps t h a t the escape was 
the consequence of v i s major, or the a c t of God; but as nothing of t h i s s o r t 
e x i s t s here, i t i s unnecessary to enquire what excuse would be s u f f i c i e n t . The 
ge n e r a l r u l e , as s t a t e d above, seems on p r i n c i p l e j u s t . The person whose g r a s s 
o T corn i s eaten down by the escaping c a t t l e of h i s neighbour or whose mine i s 
flooded by the water from h i s neighbour's r e s e r v o i r , or whose c e l l a r i s invaded 
by the f i l t h of t h i s neighbour's p r i v y , or whose h a b i t a t i o n i s made unhealthy 
by the fumes and noisome vapours of h i s neighbour's a l k a l i works, i s damnified 
without any f a u l t of h i s own; and i t seems but reasonable and j u s t t h a t the 
neighbour, who has brought something on h i s own property which was not n a t u r a l l y 
t h e r e , harmless to others so long a s i t i s confined to h i s own property, but 
which he knows w i l l be mischievous i f i t gets on h i s neighbour's, should be 
obliged to make good the damage which ensues, i f he does not succeed i n con-
f i n i n g i t to h i s own property. But f o r h i s a c t i n b r i n g i n g i t t h e r e no m i s c h i e f 
could have accrued and i t seems but j u s t t h a t he should a t h i s p e r i l keep i t 
t h e r e , so t h a t no m i s c h i e f may accrue, or answer f o r the n a t u r a l and a n t i c i p a t e d 
consequences. And upon a u t h o r i t y , we think t h i s i s e s t a b l i s h e d to be the lav/, 
whether the t h i n g s so brought be b e a s t s , or water, or f i l t h , or s t e n c h e s . 
We must now examine the a u t h o r i t i e s on which t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was 
based. Blackburn J . remarked t h a t a s e a r l y as the Year Book 20 Ed. k - 11 
P l a c i t u m 10 B r i a n C.J. l a i d down a d o c t r i n e very much resembling the l a t e r 
judgement of Lord Holt C . J . i n Tenant v Goldwin^ on which Blackburn J . p l a c e d 
much r e l i a n c e . The e a r l i e r c a s e was concerned w i t h c a t t l e t r e s p a s s . The defen-
dant's c a t t l e had s t r a y e d on to the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d and the defendant drove them 
back as soon as p o s s i b l e . B r i a n C . J . held t h a t t h i s was not s u f f i c i e n t 
5 . 2 Ld. Raym. 1089. ( 1?04) 
3. 
excuse to avoid l i a b i l i t y and s a i d " : " I t behoves him to use h i s common 
so t h a t he s h a l l do no hurt to another man, and i f the land i n which he 
has common be not enclosed, i t behoves him to keep the b e a s t s i n the 
common and out of the la n d of any other . " He f u r t h e r emphasised t h i s 
by adding, when i t was proposed t h a t the pleading should be amended so 
as to cl a i m t h a t the c a t t l e were d r i v e n out of the common by dogs, t h a t 
t h i s excuse would not c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d defence to the a c t i o n . 
7 
Blackburn J . then c i t e d the case of Cox v Jjurbridge where the 
defendant's horse t r e s p a s s e d on t o the highway and t h e r e k i c k e d a young 
c h i l d . The c h i l d had no p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n the highway and so no 
question of c a t t l e t r e s p a s s a r o s e . I t was h e l d t h a t i n the absence of 
negligence or s c i e n t e r the defendant was not l i a b l e . W i l l i a m s J . d i d 
g 
however say o b i t e r : " I apprehend the general r u l e of lav/ to be p e r f e c t l y 
p l a i n . I f I am the owner of an animal i n which by lav; the r i g h t of 
property can e x i s t , I am bound to take c a r e t h a t i t does not s t r a y i n t o 
the l a n d of my neighbour, and I am l i a b l e f o r any t r e s p a s s i t may commit, 
and f o r the or d i n a r y consequences of th a t t r e s p a s s . Whether or not the 
escape of the animal i s due to my negligence i s a l t o g e t h e r i m m a t e r i a l . " 
q 
Again i n Hay v Bu r d e t t ' where the p l a i n t i f f was b i t t e n by the defendant's 
monkey the court concluded t h a t "a person keeping a mischievous animal, 
w i t h knowledge of i t s p r o p e n s i t i e s , i s bound to keep i t s e c u r e a t h i s 
p e r i l . " 
An e a r l i e r a u t h o r i t y r e l i e d on f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n was Lord Hale 
10 
who, i n h i s F l e a s of the Crown , s a i d t h a t where one keeps a beas t , 
knowing i t s nature or h a b i t s are such t h a t the natur<?.l consequence of h i s 
being l o o s e i s t h a t he w i l l harm men, the owner "must a t h i s p e r i l keep 
him s a f e from doing h u r t f o r , though he use h i s d i l i g e n c e to keep him up, 
6. Pages 1089 and 1090. 
7. 13 C B . (N.S.) a t page 4.38 (1863) 
8 . Page 438 
9. 1846 9 Q.B. 101 
10. At page 430. 
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i f he escape and do harm the owner i s l i a b l e to answer damages" although, 
as Lord Hale goes on to show, he w i l l not be l i a b l e c r i m i n a l l y without 
proof of want of c a r e . 
The c a s e on which Blackburn J , p l a c e d most r e l i a n c e , Tenant v 
Goldwin , v/as concerned not with the escape of animals but w i t h the escape 
of f i l t h . T h i s c a s e v/as a motion i n a r r e s t of judgment a f t e r judgment by 
d e f a u l t and thus e v e r y t h i n g t h a t was c o r r e c t l y pleaded i n the d e c l a r a t i o n 
was admitted to be t r u e . The d e c l a r a t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had a 
c e l l a r which l a y contiguous to a messuage of the defendant and used ( S o l e b a t ) 
to be separated and fenced from a p r i v y house of o f f i c e , p a r c e l of the s a i d 
messuage of the defendant, and by the defendant of r i g h t ought to have been 
r e p a i r e d . Yet he d i d not r e p a i r i t and. f o r want of r e p a i r f i l t h flowed i n t o 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s c e l l a r . The o b j e c t i o n taken v/as t h a t there was nothing to 
show that the defendant was under any o b l i g a t i o n to r e p a i r the w a l l ; t h a t , 
i t v/as s a i d , being a charge not of common r i g h t , and the a l l e g a t i o n t h a t 
the w a l l de i u r e debuit r e p a r a r i by the defendant being an i n f e r e n c e of law 
which did not a r i s e from the f a c t s a l l e g e d . 
Lord Holt C . J . h e l d t h a t there was a s u f f i c i e n t cause of a c t i o n . 
He did not decide t h i s on the s o l e b a t or the de i u r e debuit r e p a r a r i s i n c e 
i t v/as enough to say t h a t the p l a i n t i f f had a house and the defendant had 
11 
a w a l l and he ought to have r e p a i r e d the w a l l . Lord Raymond commented: 
"The reason of t h i s case i s upon t h i s account, t h a t everyone must so use h i s 
own as not to do damage to another; and as every man i s bound so to look to 
h i s c a t t l e as to keep them out of h i s neighbour's ground, t h a t so he may 
r e c e i v e no damage; so he must keep i n the f i l t h of h i s house of o f f i c e t h a t 
i t may not flow i n upon and damnify h i s neighbour." Lord H o l t ' s reasoning-
can be seen to correspond very c l o s e l y w i t h t h a t of B r i a n C . J . 
11. 2 Ld. Raym. 1089 a t page 1092. 
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The reason f o r the e x i s t e n c e of such d u t i e s as t h i s duty to 
r e p a i r was t h a t they e i t h e r a f forded p r o t e c t i o n or provided a b e n e f i t . 
The defendant had e i t h e r to deny the duty or to plead t h a t he had per-
formed i t ; to deny f a u l t was not a proper p l e a . That t h i s was Lord 
H o l t ' s conception of the duty would appear from the f a c t t h a t he l i k e n e d 
the defendant's o b l i g a t i o n to r e p a i r the w a l l to the duty to r e s t r a i n 
c a t t l e i n which i t was i m m a t e r i a l how d i l i g e n t l y the defendant had t r i e d 
t o prevent t h e i r escape. Nor i s t h e r e any a l l e g a t i o n t h a t the defendant 
knew of the bad c o n d i t i o n of the w a l l , t h a t i t was obvious or t h a t he 
was remiss i n not d i s c o v e r i n g i t . I t was evident to Lord Holt t h a t the 
duty of r e p a i r r e q u i r e d the w a l l to be a c t u a l l y i n good order, s o t h a t i t 
should i n f a c t be s u f f i c i e n t to keep the f i l t h i n . The defendant's conduct 
i s important only as a means of accomplishing t h i s r e q u i r e d r e s u l t and not 
as a t h i n g which i n i t s e l f determines h i s l i a b i l i t y . We are l o o k i n g a t the 
matter i n a wholly o b j e c t i v e f a s h i o n , p u r e l y e x t e r n a l to the defendant. H i s 
conduct i s judged s o l e l y by i t s r e s u l t and not by h i s s u b j e c t i v e a t t i t u d e , 
h i s d e l i b e r a t e d i s r e g a r d of h i s neighbour's s a f e t y nor even by h i s omission 
to d i l i g e n t l y take those s t e p s n e c e s s a r y to s e c u r e t h a t s a f e t y . 
12 
Blackburn J . next r e f e r r e d to the escape of noxious vapours. He 
was unable to quote any d e c i s i o n s on the p r e c i s e point but gave an i l l u s t r a -
t i o n from a c a s e a few y e a r s before Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n which t h r e e 
a c t i o n s were brought a g a i n s t the owners of some a l k a l i works f o r a l l e g e d 
damage caused by fumes. I t was shown t h a t a l l p o s s i b l e p r e c a u t i o n s had 
been taken'but the j u r y decided t h a t the fumes must have escaped, somehow, 
and i t was thus h e l d t h a t the defendant was l i a b l e . The v e r d i c t , Blackburn 
J . s t a t e d , was not disputed by the defendant on the ground th a t a l l proper 
c a r e had been taken. 
Blackburn J . thus d e r i v e d the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r from c a s e s 
12. At page 285. 
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concerned w i t h the escape of c a t t l e and f i l t h and a n o t i o n a l case concerned 
on 
with the escape of fumes. T h i s p r o c e s s of reading has a marked s i m i l a r i t y 
to the i n d u c t i v e p r o c e s s . I n d u c t i v e reasoning i s a p r o c e s s whereby we argue 
from the observed to the unobserved, concluding t h a t some q u a l i t y found to 
r e s i d e i n a l l observed members of a c l a s s must t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y r e s i d e 
i n a l l other members. Thus i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r we see the court s t a r t i n g 
from the f a c t t h a t t h e r e were r u l e s concerning the escape of c a t t l e and of 
v a r i o u s other t h i n g s and ending by p o s i t i n g a r u l e f o r a l l t h i n g s whose 
escape i s l i a b l e to cause damage. T h i s i t w i l l be seen i s not a t r u e c a s e 
of i n d u c t i o n . There would be a genuine example of i n d u c t i v e reasoning i f , . 
f o r example, a non-lawyer, having d i s c o v e r e d a r u l e about the escape of c a t t l e 
and v a r i o u s other s i m i l a r r u l e s went on to i n f e r t h a t E n g l i s h lav; has a s t r i c t 
r u l e r e garding a l l those t h i n g s whose escape might cause harm. I n p r a c t i c e 
t h i s may be t r u e but i t does not, n e v e r t h e l e s s , n e c e s s a r i l y follow from the 
b a s i c premise t h a t i t w i l l be t r u e . On the other hand i n Eylands v F l e t c h e r 
the court d i d not i n f e r t h a t E n g l i s h law contained such a r u l e , i t decided 
t h a t i t d i d . 
Whether i n d e c i d i n g Rylands v F l e t c h e r the court e s t a b l i s h e d a new-
r u l e of law or merely r e i t e r a t e d a j s r e - e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e w i l l be d i s c u s s e d 
s h o r t l y but i t i s now n e c e s s a r y to look a t the a t t i t u d e taken by the House 
13 1 if of Lords to Blackburn J . s judgment on appeal. Doubts have been expressed 
as to whether the House of Lords c o n s i s t e d of the n e c e s s a r y three judges a t 
the h e a r i n g but t h i s i s not germane to the i s s u e f o r Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s 
f a r too w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d a case to founder on such a t e c h n i c a l i t y . What we 
a r e s u r e of i s t h a t two judgments were d e l i v e r e d i n the House, by the Lord 
C h a n c e l l o r , Lord C a i r n s j a n d by Lord Cranworth. 
The Lord C h a n c e l l o r based h i s judgment a f f i r m i n g the d e c i s i o n of 
the Court of Exchequer Chamber on two p r o p o s i t i o n s of law. F i r s t , Lord 
Cairns s t a t e d t h a t i n c a s e s such as t h i s the defendant could l a w f u l l y have 
used the l a n d f o r any purpose f o r which i t might i n the o r d i n a r y course of 
13. L.R. 3 I I . L . 330 and 19 L.T . 2 2 0 
Ik. See 19 L.T. 220 a t page 221. 7. 
the enjoyment of l a n d , be used, and i f i n such ' n a t u r a l u s e r ' of t h a t 
l a n d , as he termed i t , t h e r e was any accumulation of water whether on the 
s u r f a c e or underground and i f by the operation of the laws of nature t h a t 
accumulation of water had passed i n t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , then the p l a i n t i f f 
c o uld not complain a t law. The Lord C h a n c e l l o r c i t e d as h i s a u t h o r i t y f o r 
t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n the c a s e of Smith v K e n r i c k . I n t h a t case the owner of 
a c o a l mine v/orked out a l l of h i s c o a l and so l e f t no b a r r i e r between h i s 
mine and the mine on the lower l e v e l so t h a t the water p e r c o l a t e d through 
the upper mine, flowed i n t o the lower mine and o b s t r u c t e d the owner of i t i n 
g e t t i n g i n h i s c o a l . I t was h e l d t h a t on the f a c t s t h e r e was no l i a b i l i t y 
s i n c e the defendant had a r i g h t to remove a l l h i s c o a l and the damage was 
caused by the n a t u r a l flow or p e r c o l a t i o n of the water . 
Secondly Lord C a i r n s s a i d t h a t i f the defendant, not being s a t i s f i e d 
w i t h a merely n a t u r a l u s e r of h i s l a n d , wanted to use i t f o r any non-natural 
u s e r i n order to b r i n g i n t o or on the l a n d t h a t which, i n i t s n a t u r a l c o ndi-
t i o n , was not i n or on the l a n d , and i f i n consequence of h i s doing so or 
i n consequence of any i m p e r f e c t i o n i n the mode of h i s doing so the water 
happened to escape and to pass i n t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , then the defendant 
i n so behaving i s a c t i n g at h i s own p e r i l and i f i n the course of t h i s the 
water escaped and passed on to the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d and i n j u r e d the p l a i n t i f f 
then f o r the consequences t h e r e o f the defendant i s l i a b l e . For t h i s second 
p r i n c i p l e Lord C a i r n s quoted as h i s a u t h o r i t y the case of Btjrd v Williamson?^ 
I n t h a t case the defendant, the owner of the upper mine, di d not 
merely s u f f e r the water to flow through h i s mine without l e a v i n g a b a r r i e r 
between i t and the mine below but, i n order to work h i s own mine more 
b e n e f i c i a l l y , he pumped up l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of water which passed i n t o the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s mine i n a d d i t i o n to t h a t which would n a t u r a l l y have reached i t 
and so occasioned the p l a i n t i f f damage. He was h e l d to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
15. ? C.B. 515 
16. 15 C.B. (N.5.) 376 
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the damage so occasioned although t h i s was done without negligence. I t was 
i n consequence of h i s a c t , whether s k i l f u l l y or c a r e l e s s l y performed, t h a t 
the p l a i n t i f f had been damaged and the defendant was t h e r e f o r e h e l d l i a b l e 
f o r the consequences. The damage i n the former case (Smith v Kenrick) may 
be t r e a t e d as having a r i s e n from the act of God, i n t h i s case from the act 
of the defendant. 
The Lord Chancellor expressly s t a t e d i n h i s judgment t h a t he concurred 
w i t h a l l t h a t Blackburn J. had s a i d . A l l t h a t Lord Cairns d i d was t o put 
s t r e s s on an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r , t h a t of the non-natural user of land; so 
modifying the e f f e c t of Blackburn J.'s judgment. This a d d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n 
17 
l e d McDonald J. i n Porter v B e l l t o say t h a t "the t r u e s i t u a t i o n seems t o 
me t o be t h a t there i s not one r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r but two; and t h a t 
Blackburn J.'s version or Lord Cairns ;-. more f l e x i b l e one i s invoked according 
t o the circumstances o f the case i n hand." This, i t i s submitted, i s not 
the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the case. There are not two r u l e s but one, 
although t h a t p a r t of the one r u l e which i s concerned w i t h non-natural user 
i s the more f l e x i b l e p a r t and may vary according t o s o c i a l and economic 
expedience and general matters of p o l i c y - i t i s t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y e l a s t i c 
p a r t of any r u l e which can be v a r i e d so as t o represent the opinion of the 
c o u r t . The statement of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r which thus r e s u l t s 
from the opinions of Blackburn J. and Lord Cairns can be put as f o l l o w s : a 
person who, i n the course of the non-natural user of land, i s held t o be 
responsible f o r the accumulation on i t of anything l i k e l y t o do harm i f i t 
escapes i s l i a b l e f o r the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the use of land of another 
which r e s u l t s from the escape of the t h i n g from h i s land. 
The second judgment i n the House of LorriP d i d nothing t o a l t e r t h i s . 
Lord Cranworth endorsed the Lord Chancellor's opinions and s a i d t h a t i n 
18 
cases of t h i s nature " i n considering whether a defendant i s l i a b l e t o a 
p l a i n t i f f f o r damage which the p l a i n t i f f may have sustained the question i n 
general i s not whether the defendant has acted w i t h due care and caution but 
17 1955 1 D.L.R. 62 
18 19 LT 220 a t page 222. 9 
whether h i s acts have occasioned the damage". He c i t e d as h i s a u t h o r i t y 
19 
the case of Lambert v Bessey. 
V/e must now t u r n our minds t o the question 6f whether t h i s p r i n -
c i p l e was indeed a v a l i d general p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r i n g one who c o l l e c t s 
upon h i s land f o r e i g n substances l i k e l y t o escape t o confine them a t h i s 
p e r i l . The opinions denying the existence of such a p r i n c i p l e were urged 
20 
by M a r t i n B. i n the Court of Exchequer. These b r i e f l y were t h a t the 
defendent's act i s not a trespass f o r the damage i s not d i r e c t but con-
s e q u e n t i a l ; nor i s i t a nuisance f o r there i s no continuous o f f e n s i v e or 
i n j u r i o u s c o n d i t i o n . Further the a c t i o n on the case f o r the spread of 
f i r e i s an anomalous exception and f i n a l l y "there i s no-reason why damage 
t o r e a l p r o p e r t y should be governed by a d i f f e r e n t r u l e and p r i n c i p l e than 
damage t o personal property where pro6f of negligence i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
recovery." 
These ob j e c t i o n s are taken f u r t h e r by Professor W i n f i e l d i n h i s 
22 
a r t i c l e "The Myth of Absolute L i a b i l i t y " . Professor W i n f i e l d takes about 
150 examples of trespass from Brooke's Abridgement Cases of the f o u r t e e n t h 
century. These cases show t h a t i t was no trespass t o hunt on your land 
w i t h your l i c e n c e or t o take goods by the Sheriff's agency when judgement 
has been made or t o rescue your goods which have been thrown overboerd i n 
a storm or t o act i n s e l f defence. I n nuisance i t was l i k e w i s e i n many 
cases a v a l i d defence f o r the defendant t o show t h a t he was i n e f f e c t 
without f a u l t . 
As f a r as f i r e was concerned we are u s u a l l y t o l d t h a t at common law 
a man must keep h i s f i r e a t h i s p e r i l . Most w r i t e r s on the t o p i c seem t o 
consider t h a t apart from a s t a t u t e of 177^ which came r e l a t i v e l y l a t e i n 
23 
the development of the lav/ t h i s has always been so. W i n f i e l d argues t h a t 
there i s l i t t l e evidence f o r t h i s a s s e r t i o n . Only one case on f i r e appears 
i n the R o l l s Series e d i t i o n s of the Year Books and none i n the Selden 
Society s e r i e s . Cases quoted i n the Year Books are g e n e r a l l y i n c l u s i v e . 
19 1681. T. Raym. 421. 
20 3 Hand C. 791 (1865) 21 At fage 791 2 k2 L.Q.R. 37 (1926) 10 t: n irfl
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Further, i n the important esse of T u r b e r v i l l e v Stampe three judges 
t o one held t h a t the l i a b i l i t y extended t o a f i r e o r i g i n a t i n g i n a 
f i e l d j u s t as much as i n a house but t h a t i f a sudden storm had arisen 
which l e f t the defendant helpless t h i s could be shown in evidence. I t 
was also s a i d t h a t what are now known as acts of a strango* and i n e v i t a b l e 
accident would i n a d d i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e v a l i d defences. 
To determine the v a l i d i t y o f these o b j e c t i o n s we must go back t o 
25 
the e a r l i e s t days of the common Law. As Bohlen says we cannot expect 
t o f i n d any general p r i n c i p l e expounded i n the e a r l i e s t cases. The 
common law as enforced by the King's courts o r i g i n a t e d i n a s e r i e s of 
s p e c i f i c actions which were r i g i d and gave redress only i n c e r t a i n 
s i t u a t i o n s . I t was not u n t i l the S t a t u t e of Westminster I I , i n consimiDjt 
casu, created the a c t i o n of trespass on the case t h a t the law began t o 
expand. Even then i t expanded sl o w l y and by analogy. 
There were several e a r l y actions which gave a remedy t o landowners 
whose land was i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by an act done or c o n d i t i o n created by 
an adjacent owner on h i s own land or as a consequence of the use t o which 
26 
the l a t t e r put i t . These actions are explained by Salmond. and at greater 
27 
len g t h by Bohlen. 
F i r s t , there was the a c t i o n of trespass, where the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
land was d i r e c t l y invaded as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the defendant's a c t . 
Then there was the assize o f nuisance i n which the object of the remedy 
was s p e c i f i c r e l i e f and i n which the recovery of damages v/as not the 
primary object of the a c t i o n but merely an i n c i d e n t t o the s p e c i f i c 
r e l i e f . T h i r d l y there was the a c t i o n of trespass f o r the escape of 
c a t t l e and f o u r t h l y there was the a c t i o n on the case f o r harm done by 
the spread of f i r e s t a r t e d on the defendant's premises. Bohlen, t a k i n g 
a differene^yview t o t h a t which W i n f i e l d was l a t e r t o take, says t h a t 
each of these a c t i o n s l a y i r r e s p e c t i v e of f a u l t . 2k. 1697 1 Ld. Raym. 26k. 
25. At page 353 
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27 At page 35k 
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He then p o i n t s out t h a t these a c t i o n s cover a l l the s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which harm would be l i k e l y t o r e s u l t t o one man's land by reason of 
simple s t a t e of s o c i e t y . From t h i s the conclusion i s drawn t h a t "these 
are a l l but a p p l i c a t i o n s t o the various s i t u a t i o n s of some underlying-
general p r i n c i p l e imposing l i a b i l i t y f o r harm t o land without regard t o 
the f a u l t of i t s author". Bohlen c i t e s the case i n Y.B. 6 Ed. 1, 7 Pl« 
18, 1*f6 which i s somewhat inadequately reported i n Lambert v Bessey. 
Thesquestion was whether a man had the r i g h t t o enter the land of 
another t o retake thorns which had f a l l e n upon h i s neighbour's land when 
he c l i p p e d h i s hedge. The defendant i n s i s t e d t h a t he could not be l i a b l e 
because h i s c u t t i n g was l a w f u l and he d i d not i n t e n t i o n a l l y cast them upon 
h i s neighbour's land:- t h a t the harm done was damnum absque i n i v r i a . B r i a n 
and L i t t l e t o n J.J. asserted the o l d conception t h a t "where any man.: does a 
t h i n g , he i s h e l d t o do i t i n such a way t h a t through h i s act no p r e j u d i c e , 
or damage, s h a l l happen t o others" (per Brian J.) "and t h a t i f a man has 
been damaged, he ought t o be recompensed" ( L i t t l e t o n J.) The case was one 
of trespass t o r e a l p r o p e r t y but the p r i n c i p l e was s t a t e d broadly and not 
l i m i t e d i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o such cases. 
There i s t h e r e f o r e every reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t the o r i g i n a l con-
ception was t h a t l e g a l l i a b i l i t y f o r i n j u r y o f a l l kinds depended not upon 
the actor's f a u l t but upon the f a c t t h a t h i s act had c l e a r l y caused harm t o 
the p l a i n t i f f . Bohlen takes the orthodox view eschewed by Professor W i n f i e l d 
t h a t i n trespass t o r e a l p r o p e r t y , i n nuisance and i n actions on the case f o r 
the spread of f i r e the defendant who i s witho u t f a u l t i s as l i a b l e today as 
he was i n 1'+61. I t i s c l e a r then, says Bohlen, t h a t Blackburn J. d i d not 
make new lav; but merely a p p l i e d t o a novel s i t u a t i o n , c l o s i n g analogous t o 
those redressed i n e x i s t i n g a c t i o n s , a p r i n c i p l e p l a i n l y deducible from the 
decisions t h e r e i n and i n doing so was f o l l o w i n g the time-honoured custom of 
12 
English courts of e s t a b l i s h i n g a new remedy upon f a c t s c l o s e l y cognate t o 
those covered by the former a c t i o n s . 
This conception of l e g a l l i a b i l i t y has, however, come i n f o r st r o n g 
c r i t i c i s m i n Milsom.'s recent book ' H i s t o r i c a l Foundations of the Common Law.' 
""Milsom p o i n t s out t h a t i n the whole of the Year Books there i s no s p e c i a l 
plea of accident i n trespass and t h a t t h i s has l e d most h i s t o r i a n s t o t h i n k 
t h a t l i a b i l i t y was s t r i c t or absolute. I t seems l i k e l y , he says, t h a t •-
accident v/as not i r r e l e v a n t i n the Year Book period but had been pushed back 
i n t o the general d e n i a l i n trespass. I t would then be discussed before the 
j u r y at n i s i p r i u s and was of no i n t e r e s t t o pleaders or t h e i r r e p o r t e r s . 
I n the l a t e r Year Books there are two discussions of accident, both 
r a i s e d i n c i d e n t a l l y by pleas concerning d e l i b e r a t e a c t s . Both are amateurish 
and t h i s confirms t h a t the matter was not a subject of professiorajdiscussion. 
But t h i s , he says, i s also c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t j u r i e s were 
l e f t t o s t r u g g l e w i t h the question as best they could. The same i s suggested 
by a case of 1695 where i n an a c t i o n f o r b a t t e r y the defendant pleaded t h a t 
he v/as r i d i n g on h i s horse, the horse b o l t e d , he shouted a warning but the 
p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o jump c l e a r , and so he ran him down by accident. He was 
held l i a b l e because t h i s was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A l l the r e p o r t s note-an 
observatibn by the court t h a t he should have pleaded the general issue and 
given these f a c t s i n evidence. I f they V7ere t r u e , he had not committed a 
b a t t e r y . 
He goes on t o say t h a t f a u l t i n trespass v i et armis seems t o be 
one of those areas which were long protected from systematic l e g a l thought 
by the primacy of the general issue. But, although t h i s may seem a more 
acceptable conclusion tha;t i t s only r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e which i s t o b e l i e v e 
i n an almost absolute l i a b i l i t y , we must not assume t h a t j u r i e s were e a s i l y 
moved by hard l u c k s t o r i e s . The l a t e Year Book discussions and the Seven-
teenth Century r e p o r t s a l l suggest t h a t the defendant had t o be so f r e e of 
28. Page 25^. 
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f a u l t t h a t i n some sense he d i d not do the harm. A horse could b o l t 
because of a stranger's a c t , a clap of thunder, or i t s own fancy; and 
i t v/ss easier t o f i n d i t s r i d e r not g u i l t y the3:*! th*1* vjh^ v-r—s Vsol^ivig 
the gun when i t went o f f . 
Milsom i s thus showing not t h a t negligence was an e s s e n t i a l 
p a r t of e a r l y lav/ but r a t h e r t h a t l i a b i l i t y then was f a r from absolute. 
He does recognise t h a t t h i s l i a b i l i t y was s t r i c t e r than ordinary n e g l i -
gence -and so, i t i s suggested, h i s view i s not r e a l l y as d i f f e r e n t from 
t h a t of W i n f i e l d as might appear at f i r s t s i g h t . Any d i f f e r e n c e i s one 
of degree of s t r i c t n e s s r a t h e r than one of p r i n c i p l e . 
Bohlen c r i t i c i s e d the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r on the basis 
t h a t i t was too narrow r a t h e r than too broad i n i t s f o r m u l a t i o n - t h a t 
Blackburn J. d i d not include the actions of trespass f o r harm d i r e c t l y 
done by one land-owner t o another. He seems t o give a b a s i c a l l y economic 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o the r u l e , saying t h a t i t was the r e s u l t of the English 
judges' i n c l i n a t i o n t o p r o t e c t landowners against the i n v a s i o n of t h e i r 
p r o p e r t y by the newer class of people engaged i n the e x p l o r a t i o n of 
n a t u r a l resources, a view r e s t a t e d by Professor Horsrisin h i s a r t i c l e 
29 
'Hazardous e n t e r p r i s e s and Risk-Bearing Capacity.' 
30 
As:.is pointed out by Fridman and by Prosser i n h i s 'Selected 
Topics on the Law of T o r t s ' there i s l i t t l e i n the judgment of Blackburn 
J. t o support t h i s view. The language of h i s judgement i s concerned w i t h 
the assessment of l i a b i l i t y f o r causing harm and not w i t h the importance 
of p r o t e c t i n g landowners. The simple explanation f o r the judgment i s 
based upon the understandable c o n t i n u a t i o n of pre-Common Law Procedure 
Act 1852 ideas about l i a b i l i t y i n t o a p e r i o d when some of the judges were 
beginning t o f e e l l e ss r e s t r i c t e d i n t h e i r outlook. The p r i n c i p l e i n 
Bylands v F l e t c h e r was not d e l i b e r a t e l y produced f o r the purpose of 
29. 1952 61 Yale L.J. page 1172. 
30. 1956 Canadian Bar Review page 810. 
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r e s t r i c t i n g i n d u s t r i a l growth although t h a t purpose may have been a 
supplementary f a c t o r i n the d e c i s i o n . I t was founded p r i m a r i l y on the 
medieval moral idea t h a t a man acts a t h i s p e r i l . 
The Common Law Procedure Act 1852 free d the common law of the 
bonds p r e v i o u s l y imposed upon the development of i t s p r i n c i p l e s by 
the medieval forms of a c t i o n . Throughout the remaining p a r t of the 
nineteenth century the courts were b e t t e r able t o adapt the lav/ t o 
the needs of a changing community. Adaptation was necessary^for the law ^ 
s u i t a b l e t o a predominantly a g r i c u l t u r a l s o c i e t y was unsuited t o an 
expanding i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e . This was seen by at l e a s t some of the 
judges who began t o t u r n the law of nuisance and trespass away from 
the f ormerly dominating n o t i o n of l i a b i l i t y based on the idea t h a t a man 
acts at h i s p e r i l . The change of d i r e c t i o n was achieved by the grad u a l l y 
more extended use of the concepts of negligence and unreasonable con-
duct i n f i e l d s of law from which h i t h e r t o those ideas had been l a r g e l y 
excluded. The law of negligence was a l l the time growing i n scope and 
i n importance. 
I n t o the c r u c i b l e where a l l these ideas were i n t e r a c t i n g , Blackburn 
J. threw an idea which had a hardening e f f e c t . I n d e l i v e r i n g h i s judge-
ment he-seems t o have t r i e d t o put a stop t o or at l e a s t t o l i m i t the 
freedom of change and development which the common law had begun t o 
enjoy. At a time when the courts were making the law of t o r t i n t o a more 
f l e x i b l e and reasonable instrument f o r the balancing of c o n f l i c t i n g 
s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s he returned t o the medieval p e r i o d w i t h i t s ideas of 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . 
We have up t o now st u d i e d the h i s t o r i c a l background of the deci s i o n 
and attempted t o place i t i n i t s c o r r e c t p o s i t i o n i n the development of 
our law. We must now consider the extent t o which Blackburn J.'s judge-
ment i n v o l v e d novel ideas. 
15 s 
Bohlen, as we have seen, regarded the r u l e i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r 
31 
as merely a l o g i c a l extension of preyious law. Ames , on the other 
hand, regarded the judgment as i n v o l v i n g completely new thoughts. I t 
was i n h i s view a judgment t h a t caught up and r e c o n c i l e d the absolute 
l i a b i l i t i e s already predicated as w e l l i n the r u l e s j u s t above;; mentioned 
(consequential damage of an un l a w f u l a c t , and 'So use your own as not 
to i n j u r e another's) as i n the remaining r u l e s f o r trespass by acts 
done at p e r i l ; i t furnished a general category i n which a l l such r u l e s , 
32 
whenever formulated, could be placed. Holdsworth also regarded the 
p r i n c i p l e i n the case as new; i n scope and d i r e c t i o n i f not i n language. 
He pointed out t h a t i n medieval laiv l i t t l e or no attempt was made t o 
t r y the i n t e n t o f a man and the conception of negligence had as yet 
ha r d l y a r i s e n . These ideas, according t o Holdsworth, were c a r r i e d over 
and adapted f o r modern law by Rylands v Fl e t c h e r v/hich l a i d the foundation 
stone f o r the modern r u l e s on dangerous acts. 
One p o i n t on v/hich there can be no dispute i s t h a t the eminent 
judges who decided the case were unconscious of any r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r i n -
c i p l e i m p l i c i t i n t h e i r own d e c i s i o n . Thus Blackburn 0. sai d " I wasted 
much time i n the prepara t i o n of the judgment i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r i f I 
d i d not succeed i n showing t h a t the law held t o govern i t had been law 
f o r a t l e a s t three hundred years." It.was t o the judges nothing more 
than a restatement of established p r i n c i p l e s , p r i n c i p l e s dubiously 
described by Lord Cairns as 'extremely s i m p l e . ' ^ 
5k 
Newark i n h i s a r t i c l e 'The Boundaries of Nuisance' agrees w i t h 
Lord Cairns as t o the s i m p l i c i t y o f the p r i n c i p l e i n the case but the 
p r i n c i p l e i n Newark's mind i s t h a t negligence i s not an element i n the 
31-f' R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r T o r t i o u s Acts: I t s H i s t o r y , 3 Select Essays i n 
Anglo-American Legal H i s t o r y (1909) page W?h at pp.516-520. 
32. H i s t o r y of English Law Vo l . 8 page ^68. 
33. 19 LT. 220 at page 221. 
3k. 65 L.Q.R. (19^+9) page ^ 0 . 
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t o r t of nuisance. Blackburn J., he sdmits, never used the word nuisance 
i n h i s judgment nor d i d he r e l y on cases of nuisance, but he d i d c i t e 
i n h i s judgment the case of fumes escaping from an a l k a l i works as an 
instance of l i a b i l i t y under the general p r i n c i p l e he claimed he v/as 
r e i t e r a t i n g ; t h i s being a c l e a r example of nuisance. 
35 
Newark goes on t o say: "the p r o f e s s i o n as a whole f a i l e d t o see 
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r a simple case of nuisance. They regarded i t as an 
exceptional case and the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r as a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n 
of exceptional cases. They t h e r e f o r e jumped r a s h l y t o two conclusions: 
f i r s t , t h a t the r u l e i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r could be extended beyond the 
case of neighbouring occupiers and asecondly t h e t the r u l e could be used 
t o a f f o r d a remedy i n cases of personal i n j u r y . Both these conclusions 
were denied by Lord MacMillan i n Read v Lyon's but i t remains t o be seen 
v/hether the House of Lords w i l l support h i s opinion when the precise 
p o i n t comes up f o r d e c i s i o n . " 
This paragraph exposes the flaw i n Newark's argument f o r by h i s 
c r i t e r i a of 19^9 i t i s now i n 1973 not only the profession but also the 
j u d i c i a r y who do not see Rylands v F l e t c h e r as a c l e a r case of nuisance 
37 
i f indeed the j u d i c i a r y ever d i d see i t as such. Lord MacMillan was 
the only Lord i n Read v Lyons t o express a d e f i n i t e view on whether 
negligence i s e s s e n t i a l f o r there t o be l i a b i l i t y f o r personal i n j u r i e s . 
Other judges expressly l e f t the p o i n t open and Lord MacMillan's view v/as 
38 
not accepted subsequently by the Court of Appeal i n Hale v Jennings or 
39 
Perry v Kendricks. Doubts must also be expressed on the p o i n t r e l a t i n g 
t o neighbouring occupiers. The lands of the p l a i n t i f f and the defendants 
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r were not i n f a c t a d j o i n i n g , and i n Read v Lyons 
Lord P o r t e r s a i d t h a t what v/as r e q u i r e d was "escape from the place i n 
which the dangerous object has been mained by the defendant t o some place 
t a i n 
35. At page k8&. 
36. 19^ +7 A.C.156 
37. At page 173 
38. 1938 I.A.E.R. 579 
39- 1956 I.A.E.R. 15*t 17 
not subject t o h i s c o n t r o l " . 
The f a c t i s t h a t the courts were faced -with a set of f a c t s f o r 
which the t h e n - e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s could not provide an adequate 
s o l u t i o n . The t o r t of nuisance could not apply because i t had s t i l l 
t o be decided t h a t a person was l i a b l e f o r the nuisances committed by 
h i s independent c o n t r a c t o r ; the defendant was not n e g l i g e n t and the 
negligence on the p a r t of the independent c o n t r a c t o r s was not m a t e r i a l 
t o the d e c i s i o n (Lord Sinpn said, i n Read v Lyons; "the case was t r e a t e d 
as determining the r i g h t s o f the p a r t i e s independently of any question 
of negligence.") Trespass, as Lord Si/non pointed out, could not apply-
since the damage was not d i r e c t but consequential. The c o u r t , then, 
had t o f i n d some f r e s h p r i n c i p l e of law or at l e a s t an extension of 
already e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s . Previous cases were l i m i t e d t o the escapes 
of animals and of f i l t h ; the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i s a general r u l e 
which i s a p p l i c a b l e t o the escape of any dangerous o b j e c t . I t was the 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t of a l i a b i l i t y , now w e l l developed, which was i n i t s own 
f i e l d more embracing than any form of t o r t i o u s l i a b i l i t y which preceded 
i t . 
kO. At page 178 
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CHAPTER I I 
Escape 
1 
Blackburn J. spoke i n h i s judgment i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r of 
"anything l i k e l y t o do mischief i t escapes". This need f o r an escape 
has always been one of the e s s e n t i a l elements of the r u l e i n Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r . The n o t i o n of an escape was considered by the courts on several 
occasions between 1868 and 19^7 but i t was not u n t i l the decision of the 
2 ' House of Lords i n Read v Lyons t h a t i t s precised scope was c l a r i f i e d . 
The concept i s now a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d one than i t was a hundred years 
ago but i t remains i n essence the same. 
I n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i t s e l f Blackburn J. considered the examples 
of c a t t l e escaping on t o a p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d , water escaping from the 
defendant's r e s e r v o i r on t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s l and, and the escape of f i l t h 
and of fumes from the defendant's land on t o t h a t of the p l a i n t i f f . I t 
seems c l e a r from the tenor of h i s judgment and from the examples he gave 
t h a t Blackburn J. regarded escepe as meaning the escape of some t a n g i b l e 
object from the land of the defendant t o the land of the p l a i n t i f f . The 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Cairns, seems t o have been of the same opinion i n 
the House of Lords f o r the escape was also of t h a t nature i n the two 
3 
cases on which he placed most r e l i a n c e i n h i s judgment, Smith v Kenrick 
4 
and Bayd v Williamson . 
Subsequent cases d i d n o t h i n g t o a l t e r t h i s impression. I n Ponting 
5 
v Noakes a horse was poisoned when i t ate the leaves of the defendant's 
yew t r e e by reaching over t o h i s land; the t r e e not having extended over 
the boundary between t h e i r r e spective p r o p e r t i e s . I t was held t h a t there 
was no l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r because the leaves had not escaped 
from the defendant's l a n d . I n Midwood & Co. v Manchester Corporation 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 a t pages 279. 280. 
2. 1947 A.C. 156. 
3 . 1849 7 C.B. 515. 
4. 1863 15C.B. (N.S .)576. 
5 . 1894 2 Q.B. 281. 
6. 1905 2K.B. 597- 19. 
the r u l e was held a p p l i c a b l e where, a f t e r an explosion i n a cable 
belonging t o and l a i d by the defendant i n the highway, inflammable gas 
escaped i n t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s nearby house and set f i r e t o i t s contents 
7 
and the r u l e also a p p l i e d i n West _v B r i s t o l Tramways Co. when fumes given 
o f f by the defendant's creosote escaped and i n j u r e d the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
p l a n t s and shrubs. The Midwood case was r e l i e d on by the Court of Appeal 
8 
i n Charing Cross E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co. when i t 
' held t h a t there was a s u f f i c i e n t escape where water from a main l a i d by 
the defendant company under the highway escaped and damaged the p l a i n t i f f 
e l e c t r i c cable which was near t o i t and under the same highway. S i m i l a r l y 
9 
i n Howard v Furness Houlder L t d . 'where there was an escape of steam due 
to an explosion on board s h i p and the p l a i n t i f f , a welder on the s h i p , 
was i n j u r e d $ i t was held t h a t the r u l e i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r could not A 
apply since there had been no escape of steam from the premises of the 
defendant shipowner. 
A s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n t o the n o t i o n of an escape was then seen when 
i n two cases i t was decided t h a t , provided there was an escape from the 
defendant's land, i t d i d not ne c e s s a r i l y need t o be on t o land owned by 
10 
the p l a i n t i f f . I n Shiffman v Grand P r i o r y of the Order of St. John, 
the defendants, a t the request of the l o c a l constabulary, erected a 
casualty t e n t . Nearby they erected a f l a g - p o l e which was supported by 
four guy ropes. A man was l e f t i n charge of the t e n t ; i t also being h i s 
duty t o prevent i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the f l a g p o l e . Children who came t o 
play around the pole and t o swing on the ropes were repeatedly ordered 
by the attendant t o keep away. While the attendent was a s s i s t i n g a 
casualty i n s i d e the t e n t the c h i l d r e n caused the pole t o f a l l and i n j u r e 
the p l a i n t i f f on land of which the defendant was not i n occupation but 
which the p l a i n t i f f d i d not own. Atkinson J. s a i d o b i t e r t h a t there was 
7. 1908 2 K.B. ^ 
8. 1914 3 K.B. 772 
9. 1936 2 A.E.R. 781. 
10. 1936 1 A.E.R. 557. 20. 
l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . Likewise i n Hale v Jennings the 
p l a i n t i f f was tenant of a stand orja f a i r ground belonging t o the defendant. 
A c h a i r w i t h i t s occupant became detached from a chair-o-plane, the p r o p e r t y 
of and operated by the defendant, anc i n j u r e d the p l a i n t i f f . I t was found 
as a question of f a c t t h a t t h i s was due t o the recklessness of the occupant 
of the car. The Court of Appeal, c o n s i s t i n g of Slesser, Scott and Clauson 
L.J.J, held t h a t the r u l e i n Rvlands v F l e t c h e r applied where there had 
been an escape from land w i t h i n the p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l of the defendant. 
I t must however be conceded t h a t although t h i s p o i n t was v i t a l t o the 
decision i t does not appear t o have been f u l l y argued. 
Thus i n 1 9 ^ the p o s i t i o n seemed t o be c l e a r : f o r the r u l e i n 
Rylands v F l e t c h e r t o apply there had t o be an escape from the defendant's 
land or at l e a s t from the p a r t i c u l a r area w i t h i n h i s c o n t r o l . This apparent 
s t a t e of the law was now s e r i o u s l y questioned f o r the f i r s t time by CasEels 
J. i n Read v J. Lyons L t d . ~* 
I n t h a t case the defendant was i n 19^2 i n the employment of the 
M i n i s t r y of Munitions as an in s p e c t o r a t a f a c t o r y where high explosive 
s h e l l s f o r use i n the v/ar were f i l l e d . Against her w i l l she had been 
d i r e c t e d t o v/ork there by the M i n i s t r y of Labour and Na t i o n a l Service. The 
defendants were the occupiers of the f a c t o r y and conducted i t s operations 
under an agreement w i t h the M i n i s t r y of Supply. That agreement made the 
defendant undertake the operation, management and maintenance of the f a c t o r y 
and made them g e n e r a l l y responsible f o r the p r o v i s i o n of a l l the m a t e r i a l s 
r e q u i r e d . By the agreement they were deemed t o be the employers of employees 
working at the f a c t o r y although the p l a i n t i f f , as an in s p e c t o r , was d i r e c t l y 
i n the employment of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions. 
I n the re l e v a n t i n c i d e n t the p l a i n t i f f was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d by the 
explosion of a s h e l l i n the course of f i l l i n g i t . The cause of the exTxLo-
sion was unknown and was never adequately explained. The p l a i n t i f f brought 
11. At page 561. 
12. 1958 1.A..E.R. 579. 
13. 1 9 ^ 60. T.L.R. 363. 
21. 
t h i s a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r the i n j u r i e s t o her person and based 
her claim s o l e l y on the ground t h a t the defendants c a r r i e d on the rnanu-
f a c t u r e of h i g h l y explosive s h e l l s whihto t h e i r knowledge were dangerous 
t h i n g s and t h a t she, while employed t h e r e , s u f f e r e d i n j u r y , l o ss and 
damage through the explosion of one of the s h e l l s . Two defences were 
r a i s e d ; t h a t the statement of claim disclosed no cause of a c t i o n and t h a t 
the p l a i n t i f f was v o l e n t i . The second p o i n t was decided i n favour of the 
p l a i n t i f f but i t v/as the f i r s t which was of fundamental importance i n the 
development of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . 
The case came before Cassels J. i n the King's Bench D i v i s i o n . He 
considered t h a t , f o l l o w i n g Rylands v F l e t c h e r , " l i a b i l i t y f o r damage a r i s i n g 
from mischievous and dangerous animals or from explosives on a man's land 
1 if 
are merely instances of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . " He demonstrated t h a t i n the 
case of animals l i a b i l i t y attaches even where there i s no escape - r e l y i n g 
15 
on Besogzi,v H a r r i s (where a bear on a c h a i r mauled the p l a i n t i f f and 
Crowder J. s a i d : " I f i t be so kept t h a t a person passing i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
16 ' 
p r o t e c t e d , the owner i s l i a b l e " ) and on F i l b u r n v People's Palace where 
i t was held t h a t the defendants were l i a b l e f o r i n j u r i e s i n f l i c t e d by an 
elephant which they were e x h i b i t i n g p u b l i c l y and which ran at him. From 
these cases Gassels J. reached the r a t h e r dubious conclusion, t h a t "the 
keeping of manufacturing of explosives comes under the same d o c t r i n e of 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y when they cause damage. The l i a b i l i t y under such a 
heading i s not l i m i t e d t o those who s u f f e r i n j u r y on adjacent land or 
18 
outside the premises." He dismissed two cases which seem con t r a r y t o 
19 20 t h i s view, Ponting v Noakes and Howard v Furness Houlder, by saying t h a t 
the former r e a l l y turned on the f a c t t h a t the p l a i n t i f f ' s horse was a 
trespasser and th a t i n the l a t t e r the f a c t s wier e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and the 
p o i n t arose only i n c i d e n t a l l y . 
The learned judge was helped t o h i s conclusion by the seemingly 
strange r e s u l t s t h a t would otherwise ensue. For, though the p l a i n t i f f 
h e r s e l f would be without a remedy, i f she had had a f r i e n d w a i t i n g f o r her 
Hf. At page J6k 20. 1936 2 A.E.R. ?81 17. 1890 25 Q.B.25& 
15. l858 l F a n d F 9 2 22. f9\ 1OWPQ?B?281 . 
outside the premises when the explosion occured, t h a t f r i e n d i f i n j u r e d 
would have Deen able t o b r i n g an a c t i o n t o which s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y would 
have been a p p l i c a b l e and indeed she h e r s e l f would have had a remedy i f she 
had been approaching the f a c t o r y but had not reached i t a t the time of the 
explosions. 
2*1 
But, asks S t a l l y b r a s s , are the r e s u l t s i n f a c t as strange as 
they seemed t o the judge? I s i t unreasonable t h a t a man engaged upon 
dangerous operations should be l i a b l e even i n the absence of negligence 
t o anyone i n j u r e d as a r e s u l t of them who i s outside h i s premises but should 
not be l i a b l e t o those who come upon h i s premises of t h e i r own f r e e w i l l ? 
Mr. S t a l l y b r a s s considers t h a t the f a c t t h a t someone i s ordered by a t h i r d 
p a r t y t o enter the premises should not i n v o l v e the occupier i n any greater 
l i a b i l i t y . Surely, he says, the occupier of premises w i t h a dangerous 
c h a t t e l upon them i s not l i a b l e t o a s o l d i e r who i s damaged by the c h a t t e l 
when he has entered the land under the order of h i s supervisors? ( i n the 
absence of negligence). I t i s , he claims, unnecessary and undesirable t o 
extend the a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r t o cases where 
there has been no escape of the t h i n g l i k e l y t o do mischief i f i t escapes. 
Mr. S t a l l y b r a s s goes or. t o p o i n t out a f u r t h e r i m p r e c i s i o n i n the judgment: 
Cassels J. d i d not make i t c l e a r whether he regarded the r u l e i n Rylands v 
Fl e t c h e r as a r u l e governing l i a b i l i t y f o r damage caused by dangerous 
t h i n g s i n general or as one sub-head under a wider r u l e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y ; 
22 
other sub-heads being l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of animals, explosives e t c . 
He seemed t o p r e f e r the l a t t e r view which i s p l a i n l y c o n t r a r y t o the i n t e n -
t i o n of Blackburn J. 
Cassels J. had thus shattered some f i r m l y entrenched b e l i e f s as t o 
the t r u e nature of the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . Orthodoxy however was 
23 
t o reassert i t s e l f i n the hands of the Court of Appeal c o n s i s t i n g of 
21. 60.L.Q.R. 207 
22. At page 208 
23. 19^5 1 K.B.216 
23. 
S c o t t , Mackinnon and Du Parcq LJJ and t o be f i r m l y r e i n s t a t e d i n the 
subsequent judgments of the House of Lords. 
2k 
Scott L.J. took as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t Cassels J.'s view t h a t 
only escape from f u l l c o n t r o l was needed and t h a t whether the harm i s 
done i n s i d e or outside the defendant's land i s i m m a t e r i a l . This was 
indeed the case w i t h regard t o the s i m i l a r causes of a c t i o n grouped 
together i n Blackburn J.'s judgment. But i t does not f o l l o w , the Lord 
J u s t i c e s a i d , t h a t t h a t f e a t u r e was i n each case the r a t i o deedJderidfior 
t h a t no other concomitant f a c t was needed t o e n t i t l e the p l a i n t i f f t o 
judgment. Escape from c o n t r o l was a l i n k i n the chain of causation. 
I t was one m a t e r i a l f a c t but not the r e a l ground of the defendant's 
l i a b i l i t y . Some f u r t h e r i n g r e d i e n t i s r e q u i r e d . 
Scott L.J. then considered each t o r t i n Blackburn J.'s l i s t 
25 
separately. I n c a t t l e trespass i t was, he s a i d , the i n j u r y t o the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s land f o r which the court gave r e l i e f and the basis of the 
r e l i e f was t h a t the defendant's act was an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the p l a i n -
t i f f ' s r i g h t of p r o p e r t y . I n cases concerned w i t h the escape of fumes 
or f i l t h i t was a breach of the duty of vicinage because there was an 
escape from the defendant's land which damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s l a n d . The 
breach and damage were ac t i o n a b l e because i t was-the p l a i n t i f f ' s land 
which was damaged. With regard t o animals a s p e c i a l r u l e of p u b l i c p o l i c y 
had, he s a i d , been enforced f o r so long t h a t i t was now p a r t of the 
substantive lav;. " I have l i t t l e doubt" remarked Scott L.J., " t h a t i t i s 
the p r a c t i c a l c e r t a i n t y of harm which h i s t o r i c a l l y was the j u d i c i a l basis 
26 
f o r t h a t l i a b i l i t y . " Rylands v F l e t c h e r actions i n h i s view resemble 
c a t t l e trespass and the escape of f i l t h and fumes much more c l o s e l y than 
they resemble l i a b i l i t y f o r dangerous animals. 2k. At page 22*t 
2 5 . At page 236 
2 6 . At page 237 
2k. 
He thus saw Rylands v Fl e t c h e r as l i m i t e d t o an escape from the 
defendant's l a n d t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s land which there causes damage. 
Escape from c o n t r o l i s a pu r e l y n e u t r a l f a c t except e v i d e n t i a l l y as a 
l i n k between f i r s t cause and l a s t e f f e c t and t o extend the r u l e t o a 
case l i k e t h i s on grounds of p u b l i c p o l i c y was beyond the power of a 
judge. 
27 
He c i t e d L i n d l e y L.J. who sa i d i n Green v Chelsea Waterworks: 
" t h a t case (Rylands v F l e t c h e r ) i s not t o be extended beyond the l e g i t i -
mate p r i n c i p l e on which the House of Lords decided i t . I f i t were extended 
as f a r as s t r i c t l o g i c might r e q u i r e i t would be a very oppressive d e c i s i o n . " 
Mackinnon and Du Parcq LJJ. concurred i n a l l o w i n g the appeal. Du 
Parcq LJ. agreed w i t h Lord J u s t i c e L i n d l e y and sa i d t h a t the r u l e i n Rylands 
v_ Flet c h e r i s an exception t o the general p r i n c i p l e t h a t there i s no 
l i a b i l i t y w i t h o u t f a u l t and i t ought not be r e a d i l y extended even i f the 
28 
extension appeared t o be l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . He considered t h a t Cassels 
J. was unduly impressed by the apparent anomalies i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r and 
sai d t h a t these were a necessary consequence of the d i s t i n c t i o n s which the 
law i s compelled t o draw i n determining r i g h t s which must vary according t o 
the circumstances i n which the person c l a i m i n g the r i g h t i s placed. 
29 
T h e i r d e c i s i o n was unanimously concurred i n by the House of Lords. 
Viscount Simon sai d t h a t "escape f o r the purposes of applying the p r o p o s i t i o n 
i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r means escape from a place where the defendant has . 
occupation of or c o n t r o l over land t o a place which i s outside h i s occupation 
or c o n t r o l " " ^ v/hile Lord MacMillan t a l k e d of an escape "from one man's close 
31 32 t o another man's close" and Lord Porter of an escape t o property over 
which the defendant had no c o n t r o l . 
Professor Lloyd, ^ t a l k i n g of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l o g i c and the 
law, had s a i d : "on the one hand, there i s the appeal t o l o g i c a l consistency 
27. 189^ 70 L.T. 5^7 a t page 5^9. 
28. At page 246. 
29. 19^7 A.C.156. 
30. At page 168. 
31. At pages 173, 17^. 
32. At page 178. 3 64 L.G.H. 468 25. 
and the r a t i o n a l development of the law: on the other, the a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t the matter must be considered p r a g m a t i c a l l y and w i t h regard only 
t o p r a c t i c a l consequences. Stated i n t h i s form, the whole course of the 
common law p o i n t s unswervingly t o the viewpoint t o which English judges 
may be expected t o adhere." The judges of" the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords, u n l i k e Cassels J., d i d so adhere. 
Professor Goodhart considers• the conclusion a reasonable one 
because there i s a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the p o s i t i o n of a person 
who, e i t h e r as an i n v i t e e or as a lice n s e e , comes on t o the defendant's 
lands and a person who has no connection w i t h t h a t l a n d . There i s no 
ground f o r p l a c i n g the onerous duty of what i s p r a c t i c a l l y insurance on 
the occupier and the person who comes on t o the land can a t most r e q u i r e 
t h a t the occupier s h a l l take reasonable care t o make i t safe or warn him 
of any known dangers. The d i s t i n c t i o n between what happens w i t h i n and 
what happens outside a landowner's boundaries i s , he says, a v a l i d one. 
Professor Goodhart would agree t h a t t h i s v a l i d i t y r e s t s more on p r a c t i c a l 
consequences than on l o g i c . The l i n e , as Du Parcq L.J. suggested, must 
28 
be drawn somewhere and t h i s i s perhaps the best place t o draw i t . 
I t should be remarked t h a t , as w e l l as dealing c o n c l u s i v e l y w i t h 
the question of the need f o r an escape, Read v Lyons was an important 
. landmark i n the development of the law of t o r t i n t h a t i t denied the 
existence of any general theory of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r ultra-hazardous 
a c t i v i t i e s ; a theory such as t h a t found i n the American Restatement of 
36 
the Law of Torts and which P a u l l K.C. suggested i n argument was equally 
37 - 38 
v a l i d i n English Law. Scott L . i J . condemned as not being i n confor-
mity w i t h English Law the d e c l a r a t i o n by the Restatement t h a t "one who 
c a r r i e d on an ultrahazardous a c t i v i t y i s l i a b l e t o another whose person, 
l a n d or c h a t t e l s the actor should recognise as l i k e l y t o be harmed by 
the unpreventable miscarriage of the a c t i v i t y f o r harm r e s u l t i n g t h e r e t o 
from t h a t which makes the a c t i v i t y ultrahazardous, although the utmost 
3>h. At page V71. 37. 19zi5 1K.B.216 a t page 219-
35. 63. L.Q.R. 160 38. At page 228ff . 36. Paragraph 519 26. 
care i s exercised t o prevent the harm." I f t h a t p r i n c i p l e had been 
accepted English law would have possessed a general r u l e of s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y but the d e c i s i o n was taken t h a t the Scope of the r u l e i n 
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was t o be l i m i t e d and not expanded; t h a t i n English 
law there i s t o be l i a b i l i t y f o r non-negligent conduct only i n c e r t a i n 
s t r i c t l y defined circumstances. 
Viscount Simon t a l k e d of "an escape from a place where the defen-
dant has occupation of or c o n t r o l over land t o a place which i s outside 
3° 
h i s occupation or c o n t r o l " . This would suggest t h a t the escape need 
not be from the defendant's land but may be from any land over which he 
has e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l provided t h a t i t i s t o somewhere outside h i s 
occupation or c o n t r o l . Thus i n Mdwood and Go. y Manchester Corp. 
Rylands v F l e t c h e r was held t o be apv>licable where there was an explosion 
i n a cable belonging t o and l a i d by the defendant i n the highway. That 
case was r e l i e d on by the Court of Appeal i n Charing Cross E l e c t r i c i t y 
Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co. when i t was held t h a t there was a 
s u f f i c i e n t escape where water from a main l a i d by the defendant underthe 
highway escaped and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s e l e c t r i c cable which was near 
t o i t and under the same highway. Further, i n West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co.*t 
the basis of l i a b i l i t y was the escape of creosote from wood blocks l a i d i n 
the highway. 
Lord Simonds was the only judge t o discuss t h i s p o i n t at any l e n g t h 
^3 
i n Read v Lyons and he expressly l e f t i t open. Nevertheless the f a c t i s 
t h a t the House of Lords d i d not o v e r r u l e the Midwood and Charing Cross 
cases and Lord Simonds d i d p o i n t out t h a t i n each there was an escape i n t o 
p r o p e r t y over which the defendant had no c o n t r o l from a container which 
kk 
the defendant had a l i c e n c e t o put i n the highway. The Rule i n Rylands 
v F l e t c h e r was f a i r l y r e c e n t l y h e l d t o apply i n s i m i l a r circumstances i n 
39. 19^7 A.C. 156 at page 168 
hO. 1905 2 K.B. 597 
V I . 191^ 3 K.B. 772 
k2. 1908 2 K.B. 14 h3. At page 183. 2 7 * kU r re "3. 
45 H i l l i e r v A i r M i n i s t r y where the p l a i n t i f f ' s cows were e l e c t r o c u t e d by 
an escape of e l e c t r i c i t y from the high voltage cables l a i d under the 
defendant's f i e l d . 
We must also consider the question of whether the escape needs 
t o be a c t u a l l y on t o the land of the p l a i n t i f f . Viscount Simon t a l k e d 
only of an escape " t o a place which i s outside h i s occupation or c o n t r o l " 
although i t does seem from the general tenor of the judgments i n the 
House of Lords thaat they considered t h a t a guest or i n v i t e e upon a d j o i n i n g 
p r o p e r t y could not sue. This view was merely o b i t e r and seems con t r a r y 
t o a u t h o r i t y . I n the Charing Cross case Bray J. s a i d t h a t what was r e q u i r e d 
was "not n e c e s s a r i l y mischief occasioned t o the owner of a d j o i n i n g l a n d , 
46 
but any mischief thereby occasioned". More s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the recent 
47 
case of Hunt v B r i t i s h Gelanese ' Lawton J. s a i d t h a t once there has been 
an escape from occupation or c o n t r o l those damnified may claim and they 
need not be the occupiers of a d j o i n i n g land or indeed of any land. 
More d i f f i c u l t i s the question of whether the r u l e i n Rylands v 
Flet c h e r extends t o an escape from land adjacent t o the highway causing 
damage t o a user of the highway. Statements t o the e f f e c t t h a t i t does 
48 
were made by Fl e t c h e r Moulton L.J. i n "wing v London General Omnibus Co. 
49 
and by Swinfen Eady M.R. i n Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co. Lawton J. 
also seemed t o take t h i s view i n the Hunt case. Further i n Halsey v 
50 
Esso Petroleum there was held t o be l i a b i l i t y i n Hylands v Fl e t c h e r where 
an escape from the defendant's land caused damage t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s car 
cn the adjacent highway. This extension too appears i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
51 
d i c t a i n Read v Lyons and Lord Sumner i n the Charing Cross case was at 
pains t o d i s t i n g u i s h licensees from co-users of the highway. He s a i d : " I 
45. 1962 C.L.Y. 2084 
46. 1914 3K.B. 772 at page 785 
47. 1969 2 A.E.R. 1252 
43. 1°09 2 K.B. 652 at page 665 
49. 34 T.L.R. 500 at page 501 
50. 1961 2 A.E.R. 145 
51. 1914 3 K.B. 772. 
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d i f f e r from S c r u t t o n J. ( a t f i r s t instance) because he c l e a r l y was disposed 
t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s was a case of j o i n t user of highways. These cables and 
mains were l a i d under the highway but the l a y i n g and using of them are no 
52 
p a r t of the use of trie highway." He also pointed out t h a t the statements 
i n both Wing and Miles were o b i t e r . 
53 
T y l o r , i n h i s a r t i c l e "The R e s t r i c t i o n of S t r i c t L i a b i l i t y " , argues 
t h a t as the highway i s dedicated f o r the use of the p u b l i c i t i s reasonable 
t h a t an occupier of adjoining: land should be l i a b l e only f o r c r e a t i n g a 
p u b l i c nuisance or f o r c o n t i n u i n g a nuisance. Thus a f o r t u i t o u s explosion 
on adjacent land would not be actionable by a user of the highway. A case 
such as M i l e s , he considered, would remain actionable i n nuisance since 
the b l a s t i n g operations were i n t e n t i o n a l . There would seem t o be no basis 
f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n T y l o r draws here and. i t i s submitted t h a t the highway 
should be t r e a t e d no d i f f e r e n t l y from p r i v a t e property t o which the escape 
has taken place. 
Blackburn J. t a l k e d of the escape of a substance which had been 
brought on t o land and i t has o f t e n been sa i d t h a t t h i s i s necessary f o r 
the r u l e t o apply. A more s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has p r e v a i l e d , 
however, and i t seems t h a t i t i s enough t h a t the t h i n g accumulated caused 
the escape; i t need not escape i t s e l f . Thus i n Miles v Forest Rock Granite 
54 
Co. Rylands v F l e t c h e r was held t o apply where explosives were Drought on 
t o land and as a r e s u l t rocks escaped. A s i m i l a r p r i n c i p l e can be seen i n 
52. At page 780. 
53. 1947 IGM.L.H. 396 
54. 1918 34 T.L.R. 500 29. 
55 cases concerned w i t h l i a b i l i t y f o r the escape of f i r e . 
A f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e extension of the r u l e was seen i n Hoare v 
HcAlpine where p i l e d r i v i n g caused v i b r a t i o n s t o escape and damage a 
b u i l d i n g . This case would suggest t h a t the matter which escapes need not 
be of a t a n g i b l e nature. The de c i s i o n has not met w i t h approval however. 
57 
Pollock has termed i t a f a l l a c i o u s extension and has p o i n t e d out t h a t 
a v i b r a t i o n i s not something one can c o l l e c t or s t o r e . There i s , he says, 
no r e a l analogy w i t h sewage or explosives or high tension c u r r e n t s or water 
store d i n a r e s e r v o i r and there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the a u t h o r i t i e s f o r 
i n v e n t i n g one. "Why, he asks, when the o l d lav/ of nuisance i s enough do we 
go about d e v i s i n g " f a n t a s t i c extensions" of the law of trespass? I n the 
58 
Ontario High Court case of Barette v Franki Compressed P i l e Co. of Canada 
Schroeder J. held t h a t p i l e d r i v i n g operations s e t t i n g up v i b r a t i o n s which 
damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s b u i l d i n g were a-nuisance and not w i t h i n t i e ambit of 
Rylands v F l e t c h e r . The a u t h o r i t y of Hoare v He.Alpine must thus be i n 
doubt. This apparent need f o r t a n g i b l e matter does not exclude such t h i n g s 
as gas and e l e c t r i c i t y from the r u l e ; l i k e water and u n l i k e v i b r a t i o n s they 
are t h i n g s which can be c o l l e c t e d on land and sto r e d t h e r e . 
We can thus agree w i t h Viscount Simon's statement i n Read v Lyons 
59 
t h a t f "escape f o r the purposes of applying the p r o p o s i t i o n in Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r means escape from a place where the defendant has occupation of 
or c o n t r o l over land t o a place which i s outside h i s occupation or c o n t r o l . " 
55- See Chapter VI 
56. 1923 1 Ch.167 
57. 39 L.Q.R. 145 
58. 1955 2.D. :£v.'R;-665. 
59. 1947 A.C.156 at page 168 
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I t seems from t h i s and i n the l i g h t of Hunt v B r i t i s h Celanese t h a t i t 
i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t the escape i s from any land under the p l a i n t i f f ' s con-
t r o l ; even i t seems escape on t o the highway, although here at l e a s t 
there i s an element of doubt. The concept of escape has been modified 
so t h a t i t i s now enough t h a t i t was caused by the dangerous thing-
brought on t o the land; the t h i n g brought on need not i t s e l f have escaped. 
I t remains t r u e , however, t h a t the t h i n g escaping must have some t a n g i b l e 
q u a l i t y . 
60. 1969 1 W.L.R. 959-
31. 
CHAPTER I I I 
Personal I n j u r i e s * 
We must now t u r n our minds t o the important question of whether 
1 
there can be any l i a b i l i t y under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r where 
the r e s u l t of the escape i s the i n f l i c t i o n of i n j u r y t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
person. This question, l i k e t h a t of the need f o r an escape, was given 
2 
d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the House of Lords i n Read v Lyons . 
I n Read v Lyons personal i n j u r i e s were caused f o r which the 
damages were assessed at f i r s t instance at £525* A strong attempt was 
made by Lord KacMillan t o r e s t r i c t Rylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y t o pro-
p r i e t a r y as opposed t o personal i n j u r i e s . A f t e r remarking t h a t "the process 
of e v o l u t i o n has been from the p r i n c i p l e t h a t every man acts a t h i s p e r i l 
and i s l i a b l e f o r a l l the consequences of h i s acts t o the p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
a man's freedom of a c t i o n i s subject only t o the o b l i g a t i o n not t o i n f r i n g e 
3 
any duty of care which he owes t o others" he continued: "Cassels J., i n 
h i s judgment, records t h a t i t was not denied t h a t i f a person outside the 
premises had been i n j u r e d i n the explosion the defendant would have been 
if 
l i a b l e w ithout proof of negligence." I do not agree w i t h t h i s view. I n 
my op i n i o n , persons i n j u r e d by the explosion i n s i d e or outside the defend-
ant's premises would a l i k e r e q u i r e t o aver and prove negligence t o render 
5 
the defendant l i a b l e . " 
T y l o r sees these d i c t a as r e v i v i n g the o l d confusion between 
c u l p a b i l i t y and compensation. I f a l l t h a t they are intended t o mean i s 
t h a t the escape from the defendant's land of something l i k e l y t o do 
mischief, r e s u l t i n g i n personal i n j u r y t o the p l a i n t i f f , of i t s e l f 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
2 . 19^7 A.C. 156. 
J. At page 171 
k. 1 9 H 60 T.L.R. 363 at page 36k. 
5 . At page 172. 
6. 19V7 10 H.L.R. page 396. 32. 
discloses no cause of a c t i o n i n the absence of negligence, then the d i c t a 
are t o him unexceptionable. I f , on the other hand, they are intended t o 
l a y down t h a t , a cause of a c t i o n having been established under the r u l e i n 
Rylands v F l e t c h e r , d i r e c t personal i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g i s i r r e c o v e r a b l e , so 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y a conclusion does not appear t o accord w i t h the modern theory 
which would compensate f o r d i r e c t personal i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from the v i o l a -
t i o n of a r i g h t , and. appears devoid of a u t h o r i t y . 
7 
T y l e r goes on t o remark t h a t the f a l l a c y i n confusing cause of 
a c t i o n w i t h k i n d of damage appears from Lord l»SacMillan's judgment when he 
g 
says : "The d o c t r i n e of Rylands v F l e t c h e r , as I understand i t , derives from 
a. conception of the mutual d u t i e s of a d j o i n i n g or neighbourning Landowner and 
i t s congeners are trespass and nuisance. I f i t s foundation i s t o be found i n 
the i n j u n c t i o n s i c u t e r e tuo u t alienum non laedas; then i t i s manifest t h a t 
i t has nothing t o do w i t h personal i n j u r i e s . The duty i s t o r e f r a i n from 
i n j u r i n g not alium but alienum." 
The o r i g i n a l form of t h i s i n j u n t i o n i n the I n s t i t u t e s was alterum non 
laedere and, t o the t r a n s l a t i o n i n Broom's Legal Maxins, "Enjoy your own 
property i n such a manner as not t o i n j u r e t h a t of another person', i s 
9 
appended the note : "Such i s the l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n of the above maxim; 
i t s . ; t r u e l e g a l meaning would r a t h e r be: 'So use your own property as not t o 
i n j u r e the r i g h t s of a n o t h e r I " I t i s i n any event inconceivable, i t i s 
submitted, t h a t so important a question as whether negligence must be 
proved f o r there t o be l i a b i l i t y f o r causing personal i n j u r i e s , r e s t i n g 
as i t must p r i m a r i l y on matters of p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y , should be decided on 
the precise t r a n s l a t i o n of an old i n j u n c t i o n . 
10 
Tylor ends: "the suggestion t h a t I can recover f o r an explosion 
wrecking my conservatory or a horse trespassing on my rose bed, but not 
f o r an explosion blowing me out of my deck c h a i r i n my own garden, or a 
7. At pa,ge 400. 
8. At page 173-
9. At page 289. 
TO. At page kOO. 
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horse t r e a d i n g on my face as I sleep on my lawn, has l i t t l e t o commend i t " . 
The f a c t t h a t he regards such a r u l e as having l i t t l e t o commend i t i s on 
the face of i t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s previous statement t h a t he regards the 
view t h a t an escape r e s u l t i n g i n personal i n j u r y i s not act i o n a b l e i n 
negligence as unexceptionable unless we are t o assume t h a t by unexceptionable 
he means unexceptionable i n law r a t h e r than merely d e s i r a b l e . 
T y l o r does c l e a r l y say, as we have noted, t h a t i f l i a b i l i t y has 
already been established i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r f o r another form of i n j u r y 
•such as i n j u r y t o property then damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s must be o b t a i n -
able i n a d d i t i o n t o those other damages. I t seems d o u b t f u l whether Lord 
MacMillan was t h i n k i n g of t h i s example when he gave h i s judgment f o r he seems 
t o have regarded himself as propounding a general r u l e of Law and i t i s 
f u r t h e r the case t h a t when personal i n j u r i e s are in v o l v e d i n a Rylands v 
Fle t c h e r a c t i o n i t i s i n general personal i n j u r i e s only t h a t are i n v o l v e d . 
This view i s r e i n f o r c e d by the f a c t t h a t i n Read v Lyons the r e l e v a n t 
damage was s o l e l y t o the person of the p l a i n t i f f . 
I t appears then t h a t Lord I-'acMillan considered t h a t where there 
are i n j u r i e s s o l e l y t o the person Rylands v Fletc h e r does not l i e . He was 
however the only member of the House of Lords who s t a t e d h i s opinion 
d e f i n i t i v e l y on t h i s aspect of the t o r t . Lord Simonds, i n Read v Lyons, 
11 
reserved h i s opinion on the p o i n t when he s a i d : "But I would not be 
f o r example 
-taken as assenti-ng t o the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i f <ag»/ the p l a i n t i f f i n Rain ham1 s 
case had been a n a t u r a l person who had s u f f e r e d personal i n j u r i e s the r e s u l t 
would n e c e s s a r i l y be the same." Viscount Si-flpn L.C. also reserved h i s opinion 
although he seemed t o tend towards Lord MacKillari's view. The Lord. 
Chancellor c i t e d Blackburn J.'s judgment i n C a t t l e v Stockton Waterworks 
13 
Co. as r e f e r r i n g t o workmen's c l o t h s , t o o l s or wages but not personal 
i n j u r i e s . Yet the p o i n t of t h a t case was whether a sub-contractor not i n 
occupation could sue and the n a t u r a l i nference from Blackburn J.'s language 
11. At page 180. 
12. See pages 168 and 169* 
13. 1875 L.R. 10Q.B. 453. 
34. 
would seem t o be t h a t he recognised other damage than t h a t t o land e.g. 
damage t o c h a t t e l s or damage due t o loss of employment. The escape of 
water, from a main as i n C a t t l e ' s case, so delaying operations, would not 
suggest any persons! i n j u r y and hence no s i g n i f i c a n c e can be attached t o 
i t s omission. Lord Porter seemed t o p r e f e r the opposing view although 
he reached no decision on the question. He r e s t r i c t e d himself t o saying 
t h a t opinions expressed supporting it's a p p l i c a t i o n t o personal i n j u r i e s 
undoubtedly extend the a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e 1 and may some day r e q u i r e 
examination.' 
The f a c t i s t h a t i n both C a t t l e ' s case and i n Read V Lyons, as i n 
several recent cases on aspects of negligence, the courts were f e a r f u l of 
a m u l t i p l i c i t y of a c t i o n s . The courts o f t e n p r e f e r , i t seems, t o allow 
damages f o r personal i n j u r y only i n the form of p a r a s i t i c damages where 
they can be tacked on t o damages obtained f o r i n j u r y t o pr o p e r t y . This 
r a i s e s important questions which w i l l be considered at greater l e n g t h i n 
Chapter V I I I when the importance of j u d i c a l p o l i c y views^on the development 
of t h i s area of the law of t o r t v / i l l be c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i s e d . 
I n order t o solve the r e s u l t i n g d i f f i c u l t y the text-book w r i t e r s 
have c a l l e d i n t o play the d i s t i n c t i o n between p l a i n t i f f s on t h e i r own 
land and p l a i n t i f f s who are non-occupiers of the land on which they are 
i n j u r e d . I n Read v Lyons the p l a i n t i f f was a non-occupier of the- land on 
which she was i n j u r e d and so Lord KacHillan's judgement has been i n t e r -
preted as meaning t h a t only a non-occupier need e s t a b l i s h negligence i n " 
order t o recover damages f o r i n j u r y t o the person. 
Whether or not Lord KacMillan was r e f e r r i n g t o a l l personal 
i n j u r i e s or only t o those t o non-occupiers i t i s submitted t h a t h i s d i c t a are 
not good law. A non-occupier recovered damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s i n 
15 
K i l e s v Forest Rock Granite Co. and also i n Shiffman v Grand P r i o r y of the 
Order of S t . J o h n ; ^ n e i t h e r of which was mentioned i n the judgments of the 
Ik. At page 178. 
15. 1918 34 T.L.R. 500. 
16. 1936 I.A.E.R. 557. 
House of Lords i n Read v Ly_ons_. Further, the decision of the Court of 
17 
Appeal m Hale v Jennings Bros. , also not r e f e r r e d t o by the Lords, i s 
a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a non-occupier of land i s e n t i t l e d t o 
damages f o r personal i n j u r y under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . I n t h a t 
18 
case Scott L.J. s a i d : " I t was i n h e r e n t l y dangerous, and the defendants 
have t o take the r i s k of any damage which may r e s u l t from i t , " I n the 
19 
Canadian case of Aldridge v Van P a t t e r Rylands v Fle t c h e r was held t o 
apply i n such circumstances, Spence J. t a k i n g the view t h a t the f o u r 
remaining Lords expressly r e f r a i n e d from assenting t o Lord MacMillan's 
d i c t a . I n Perry v Kendricks Transport L t d . ^ the p l a i n t i f f , a boy of t e n , 
was r e t u r n i n g home from school by crossing some waste land, and was 
approaching land used by the defendant as parking ground when he saw two 
other boys standing on a bank at the Southern end of the defendant's 
parking ground near the side of the coach-. As he approached them the two 
boys ran away and immediately there was an explosion i n the p e t r o l tank of 
the coach r e s u l t i n g i n the p l a i n t i f f beinr-' badly burned and i n j u r e d . I n 
the Court of Appeal Singleton L.J. sa i d he would 'assume' the r u l e a p p l i e d 
21 
t o i n j u r i e s t o the person; Jenkins L.o. did not r e f e r t o the p o i n t but 
Parker L.J. mentioned the doubts expressed i n Read v Lyons as t o whether 
the r u l e covered personal i n j u r i e s and s t a t e d t h a t "the f i n a l d ecision on 
22 
the matter was expressly l e f t over." He was c l e a r l y of the opinion however 
t h a t an a c t i o n f o r damages f o r personal I n j u r i e s would l i e i n such a case 
without proof of negligence. This view was i m p l i e d l y accepted by Lawton 
J. i n A.H. Hunt (Capacitors) L t d . , v B r i t i s h Celanese Ltd^when he said 
t h a t once there has been an escape i n Viscount Simon's sense those who 
2k 
are damnified may cla i m . 17- 1938 1 A'.E.R. 579-
18. At page 585. 
19. 1952 k D.L.R. 93. 
20. 1956 1 W.L.E. 85. 
21. At page 87. 
22. At page 92. 
23- 1969 2 A.E.R.1252. 
2k. At page 1257. 3 g 
Nor, i t i s submitted, i s Lord MacMillan's view s a t i s f a c t o r y i n 
other respects f o r , as we have seen, h i s opinions would serve merely t o 
increase the l o g i c a l anomalies i n a t o r t already amply provided f o r i n 
th a t respect. Lord MacMillsn's an t i p a t h y t o the r u l e i n Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r i s c l e a r throughout h i s judgment. His views w i t h regard t o 
l i a b i l i t y f o r personal i n j u r y are c o n t r a r y t o both precedent and common 
sense. Precedent and l o g i c can be overidden but only f o r powerful 
reasons; reasons which Lord KacMillan d i d not f u r n i s h . I t i s submitted 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t , although the question remains t o be f i n a l l y resolved, 
the p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t there i s always l i a b i l i t y f o r i n j u r y t o the 
person i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r circumstances. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Non-Natural User of Land 
The need f o r there t o be a non-natural user of land i n order t o 
e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y under the Rule i n Rylands v "Fletcher d i d not manifest 
i t s e l f i n the judgment of Blackburn J. i n the Court of Exchequer Chamber. 
I t i n f a c t has i t s o r i g i n i n the judgment of Lord Cairns L.C. i n the House 
2 
o f Lords where the Lord Chancellor s a i d : "The defendants, t r e a t i n g them 
as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the r e s e r v o i r was cons-
t r u c t e d , might l a v / f u l l y have used t h a t close f o r any purpose f o r which i t 
might i n the o r d i n a r y course of the enjoyment of land be used; and i f , i n 
what I may term the n a t u r a l user of t h a t land, there had been any accumula-
t i o n of water, e i t h e r on the surface or underground, and i f , by the operation 
of the laws of nature, t h a t accumulation of water had passed, o f f i n t o the 
close occupied by the p l a i n t i f f , the p l a i n t i f f could not have complained 
t h a t the r e s u l t had taken place. 
"On the other hand, i f the defendants, not stopping at the n a t u r a l 
user of t h e i r close, had desired t o use i t f o r any purpose which I may term 
a' non-natural use, f o r the purpose of i n t r o d u c i n g i n t o the close t h a t which 
i n i t s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n was not i n or upon i t , f o r the purpose of i n t r o -
ducing water e i t h e r above or below ground i n q u a n t i t i e s and i n a manner not 
the r e s u l t of any work or operation on or under the land t h a t which 
the defendants were doing, they were doing at t h e i r own p e r i l . " 
The c r e d i t f o r t h i s conception of the r u l e must be given t o Maniety 
i^.C. who based h i s argu.nient i n a l l t h r e e courts on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the n a t u r a l and non-natural user o f land. From the beginning of the Rylands 
v F l e t c h e r l i t i g a t i o n i t was evident t h a t i f the p l a i n t i f f was t o succeed • 
1. See i n general S t a l l y b r a s s 30.L.J.376. 
2 . 19 L.T. 220 at page 221. 
38. 
he must d i s t i n g u i s h Smith v Kenrick" and i t was t h i s which l e d Manisty, the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel, t o fasten on t o the f a c t t h a t the water i n the defen-
dant's r e s e r v o i r was an a r t i f i c i a l accumulation. He was not however the 
f i r s t t o see t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n - i n 1860 Bramwell B. i n h i s judgment i n 
Bamford v T'urnley had s a i d : "What has been done was not the using of 
land i n a common and or d i n a r y way, but i n an exceptional manner - not 
5 
unnatural or unusual, but not the common and ordinary use o f l a n d . " 
The e n t i r e v a l i d i t y of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has been doubted. Thus 
S i r John Salrnond s a i d : "Such a d i s t i n c t i o n has l i t t l e i n p r i n c i p l e t o 
recommend i t . What i s the n a t u r a l use., of land? I s i t n a t u r a l t o b u i l d 
a house on i t , or t o l i g h t a f i r e ? Almost a l l use of land i n v o l v e s some 
a l t e r a t i o n of i t s n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n , and i t seems impossible t o say how 
f a r t h i s a l t e r a t i o n may go before the use of the land becomes non-nstural 
or e x t r a o r d i n a r y , so as t o b r i n g the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n t o 
o p e r a t i o n . " 
Charlesworth observes t h a t Lord Cairns gives Smith v Kenrick as 
7 
an example of n a t u r a l , and B a i r d v Williamson ss an example of non-
n a t u r a l user of l a n d . "The explanation given of a non-natural user of 
land shows t h a t what Lord Cairris had i n mind," Charlesworth says, "was 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and a r t i f i c i a l water as f a r as the 
a c t u a l user of the land i s concerned, i t i s impossible t o d e f i n e w i t h 
g 
p r e c i s i o n what i s a n a t u r a l , and what a non-natural, user of l a n d . " As 
9 
S t a l l y b r a s s p o i n t s out , Lord Cairns* use of the words " i n the ordinary 
course of the enjoyment of the l a n d " prevents us accepting Charlesworth's 
views as adequate although i t i s t r u e nevertheless t h a t Lord Cairns d i d 
not seem to note the c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between th i n g s n a t u r a l l y on the 
land and t h i n g s brought upon the land i n the course of n a t u r a l user. 
3. 1849 7 c.B. 515. 
* k. 1862 3MHgpfiHK B. and S.62 
5. At page 83. 
6. P.3^7 (7th Ed. ' T o r t s ' ) . 
7. 1863 15 C.B. (N.3.) 376. 
8 . ' L i a b i l i t y f o r Dangerous Things' page 148 
9. 3 C.L.J. 376 s t page 39"1 • 
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The f a c t i s t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the -natural and non-
n a t u r a l user of land has been accepted i n subsequent cases and has remained 
an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the Rule i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . I t i s equally t r u e , 
though, t h a t the judges have recognised the r e a l d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l ved i n 
10 
drawing t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . Kekewich J. i n N a t i o n a l Telephone Co. v Baker , 
a case concerned w i t h the escape of e l e c t r i c i t y , expressed the opinion 
t h a t f o r 'non-natural' t h ere should be s u b s t i t u t e d the word ' e x t r a o r d i n a r y ' . 
This term was l a t e r used by Lord Alverstone C.J. and F a r w e l l L.J. i n 
11 12 West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co. and by Wright J. i n Noble v Harrison. 
Other words, such as 'unusual' and 'abnormal' have been used but t h e i r 
import appears t o be the same. 
13 
Bramwell B. i n Nichols v Marsland regarded "the reasonable use 
of property i n the way most b e n e f i c i a l t o the community" as outside the 
scope of the r u l e , the words ' n a t u r a l ' and 'ordinary' being absent from the 
14 
judgment, and statements of Lord Moulton i n Rickards v Lothian come close 
15 
t o l a y i n g down t h i s c r i t e r i o n of reasonableness. Thus at one p o i n t he 
s a i d t h a t "the p r o v i s i o n of a proper supply of water t o the various p a r t s 
of a house i s not only reasonable, but has become, i n accordance w i t h 
modern s a n i t a r y views, an almost necessary f e a t u r e of town l i f e i n 
some form or other i t i s u s u a l l y made o b l i g a t o r y i n c i v i l i s e d c o u n t r i e s . 
Such a supply ccnnot be i n s t a l l e d without causing some concurrent danger of 
leakage or overflow. I t would be unreasonable f o r the law t o regard those 
who i n s t a l or maintain such a system of supply as doing so at t h e i r own 
p e r i l . " 
This however i s incomplete; the user must not only be reasonable 
but ordinary or n a t u r a l . This p r i n c i p l e can be seen i n the judgment of 
Bramwell B. i n Bamford v Turnley v/hen he says: "those acts necessary f o r 
the common and or d i n a r y use and occupation of l a n d and houses may be done, 
10. 1893 2 Ch. 186. 
11. 1908 2 K.B. 1'+. 
12. 1926 2 K.B. 332. 
13. 1875 L.R. 10 Ex. 255 s t page 259. 
14. 1913 A.C. 263. 15. At page 280. 6. 1860 3 B.,cand -.S.62 40. 
i f conveniently done, without s u b j e c t i n g those who do them t o an a c t i o n . . . . 
17 
there i s an obvious necessity f o r such a p r i n c i p l e " and i n t h a t of Jones 
J. who said i n an old e r case: "where there i s an ordinary use of sea coal 
no a c t i o n l i e s because i t i s a matter of necessity and there i s mutual 
sufferance." 
Whatever a d j e c t i v e may be used the best explanation of the concept 
o f non-natural user of land was t h a t given by Lord Moultori i n d e l i v e r i n g the 
1 
advice of the J u d i c i a l Committee of the Frivwy Council i n Rickards v Loth i a n . 
He s a i d t h a t t o come w i t h i n the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r the use t o which 
the defendant's land i s put must be "some s p e c i a l use b r i n g i n g w i t h i t 
in c r e a s i n g danger t o others, and must not merely be the ord i n a r y use of the 
20 
land or such a use as i s proper f o r the general b e n e f i t of the community". 
The r u l e i n Rylands v Fl e t c h e r i s h i s t o r i c a l l y derived from the law 
r e l a t i n g t o the working of mines and i t i s a v/ell e s tablished p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
i f you work mines so as t o cause damage t o your neighbour you w i l l be l i a b l e 
unless you work them i n an ordinary manner. This r u l e was s t a t e d by Lord 
21 
Blackburn i n Wilson v Waddell and by Cotton L.J. i n Hurdman v K.E. Railway 
22 
Co. where he sai d t h a t the excavation and r a i s i n g of minerals so t h a t 
water g r a v i t a t e s on t o a neighbour's property i s an exception t o the general 
r u l e of l i a b i l i t y , because i t " i s considered the n a t u r a l use of mineral 
l a n d , and these decisions (various cases c i t e d ) are r e f e r a b l e t o t h i s p r i n -
c i p l e , t h a t the owner of lands holds h i s r i g h t t o the enjoyment, t h e r e o f , 
subject t o such annoyance as i s the consequence o f what i s c a l l e d the n a t u r a l 
user by h i s neighbour of h i s land, and t h a t when an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the 
enjoyment by something i n the nature of nuisance i s the cause of com-
p l a i n t , no a c t i o n can be maintained i f t h i s i s the r e s u l t of the n a t u r a l 
23 
user by a neighbour of h i s l a n d . " 
1? . At pages 83, 84 . 
18. 1628 Palm. 536 a t page 533. 
19- 1913 A.C. 263. 
20. At page 281. 
21. 1876 2 App. Cas. 95. 
22. 1878 3 CP.D. 168. 3. At page 174. 
V I . 
I t i s t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i d e n t i c a l t o Lord fioulton's 'special use', 
25 
which has been extended t o f i e l d s other than t h a t of the working of mines. 
2k 
Thus i n B a t c h e l l e r v Tunbridge Wells Gas. Co. F s r w e l l L.J. extended the 
concept of non-natural user t o gas - " i t was c l e a r l y a non-natural use of 
the land t o put gas pipes t h e r e . " The l a y i n g o f a submarine cable was 
held by the J u d i c i a l Committee of the P r i v y Council t o be a non-natural 
user of land i n Eastern and South A f r i c a n Telegraph Co. v Cape Town Tramways 
as was held the l a y i n g of creosote blocks as road paving by the Court of 
26 27 Appeal i n West v B r i s t o l Tramways Co. I n Stearn v Prentice Bros. a 
D i v i s i o n a l Court regarded a l a r g e heap of bones at a manure f a c t o r y as 
something a r i s i n g i n the ord i n a r y course of business and bones as a n a t u r a l 
waste, product from r e a r i n g sheep or c a t t l e f o r slaughter. A r e t a i n i n g 
w a l l was held t o i n v o l v e the occupiers i n no l i a b i l i t y because i t was erected 
i n the ordinary and normal use of the defendant's land i n both I l f o r d U.D.C. 
23 29 v Seal and Judd and St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v Roberts while i n Noble 
30 
v Harrison a D i v i s i o n a l Court h e l d t h a t non-poisonous t r e e s came i n the 
same category. A f i r e i n a domestic grate (Sochacki v Sas ) and e l e c t r i c 
32 
w i r i n g (Collingwood v Home and C o l o n i a l Stores L t d . ) have both been he l d 
t o be n a t u r a l users of land. 
Cases i n which non-natural user of land as a requirement of l i a b i l i t y 
i n Kylands v F l e t c h e r i s i n v o l v e d have three times come before the f i n a l 
appeal courts of t h i s country. The f i r s t of these cases, Rickards v Lothian 
was an appeal from the High Court of A u s t r a l i a and was heard by the J u d i c a l 
Committee of the Pr i v y Council comprising Viscount Haldane L.C.,-; Lord 
MacNagbten, Lord Atkinson and Lord Moulton. The defendant was the lessee of 
a b u i l d i n g and the p l a i n t i f f was tenant under him of p a r t of the second 
f l o o r . On the f o u r t h f l o o r there was a room i n which a wash hand basin was 
f i x e d . One ni g h t a stranger blocked up the basin and turned on the taps w i t h 
33 
2k. 1901 8k L.T. 765 at page 766. 
25. 1902 A.C. 381. 
26. 1908 2 K.B.H. 
27. 1919 1K.B. 3?^. 
28. 1925 1 K.B. 671. 
k2. 
29. 1928 1*f0 L.T .1. 
30; 1926 2 K.B.332. 
31. 19'+7 1 A.E.R.3Mt. 
32. 1936 3 A.E.R. 200. 
33. 1913 A.C. 263. 
the r e s u l t t h a t a considerable q u a n t i t y of water overflowed and the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s stock i n trade was damaged. The defendant was unable t o 
e s t a b l i s h negligence. 
Lord Moulton, who d e l i v e r e d the judgment of the J u d i c a l Committee, 
remarked t h a t i t i s not every use t o which land i s put t h a t b rings the 
r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i n t o play - " i t must, be some s p e c i a l use 
b r i n g i n g w i t h i t increased danger t o others, and must not merely be the 
ordinary use of the land' 1. He c i t e d Wright, J. who s a i d i n Blake v 'W'oolf 
"^"the b r i n g i n g of water on t o such premises as these and the maintaining 
a c i s t e r n i n the usual way seems t o me t o be an o r d i n a r y and reasonable 
user of such premises as these were: and t h e r e f o r e , i f the water escapes 
without any negligence or d e f a u l t on the p a r t of the person b r i n g i n g the 
water i n and owning the c i s t e r n , I do not t h i n k t h a t he is l i a b l e f o r any 
37 
damage t h a t may ensue"; and also Blackburn J. i n Ross v Fedden , a s i m i l a r 
case i n which there was no l i a b i l i t y v/hen pipes overflowed since negligence 
could not be proved. 
The J u d i c i a l Committee shared these views. The court had regard t o 
the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a proper supply of water t o the various p a r t s of the 
house and considered t h a t " i t would be unreasonable f o r the law t o regard 
those who i n s t a l or maintain such a system of supply as doing so at t h e i r 
own p e r i l , w i t h an absolute l i a b i l i t y f o r any damage r e s u l t i n g from i t s 
presence i n having on h i s premises such means of supply he i s only 
using those premises i n an ordinary and proper manner." 
The importance of t h i s case cannot be overestimated. I t was the 
f i r s t time since Rylands v Fletcher" i t s e l f , '+5 years e a r l i e r , t h a t t h i s 
question had been considered by a f i n a l aj/peal c o u r t . The need f o r a non-
3^. See also the defence of act of a stranger. Chapter V I I . Part I I ' 
35> At page 281. 
36. 1898 2 Q.B. *t26 at page hZ8. 
37. 1872 L.R. 7 Q.B. 661. 
38. 1913 A.C. 263 a t page 282. 
39. 1868 19 L.T. 220. 
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n a t u r a l user o f land t o e s t a b l i s h Rylends_v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y was ignored 
as o f t e n as i t was r e l i e d upon between 1868 and 1913 and Rickards v L o t h i a n 
as w e l l as p r o v i d i n g the now standard d e f i n i t i o n of non-natural user of land 
f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s concept, as a requirement of l i a b i l i t y under the r u l 
^ n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . 
The House of Lords was c a l l e d on t o consider the matter eight years 
40 .. 
l a t e r i n Rainham Chemical Works L t d . , v Belvedere Fish Guano Co. L t d . I n 
t h i s case the appellant company c a r r i e d on the manufacture of explosives. 
Large q u a n t i t i e s of dinetro-phenol were d e l i v e r e d at the f a c t o r y and were 
stored there close t o other inflammable m a t e r i a l s . As a r e s u l t an explosion 
41 
occurred which caused damage t o neighbouring p r o p e r t y . Lord Buckmaster 
t a l k e d of usinti: land i n an exceptional manner' and s a i d t h a t use f o r the 
purpose of making munitions was c e r t a i n l y not the common and o r d i n a r y use 
of the land. The other members of the House of Lords seemed t o assume t h a t 
there vise a non-natural user of land. 
42 
The t h i r d and most recent of the cases was Read v J. Lyons L t d . , 
1+3 
the f a c t s of which have already been given and which bear a marked s i m i -
l a r i t y t o those of the Rainham case. Viscount Simon confessed t o f i n d i n g 
44 
the t e s t of non-natural user of land d i f f i c u l t t o apply. Since he decided 
the appeal on the ground t h a t there had been no escape he contented himself 
w i t h saying t h a t i n analysing the concept he. attached f i r s t importance t o 
the judgment of Lord Moulton i n Rickards v L o t h i a n . The remaining Lords 
di d not f e e l i t riecessr.ry t o consider thennature of the t e s t and r e s t r i c t e d 
themselves t o some i n t e r e s t i n g comments on the d e c i s i o n of the House of 
45 
Lords i n the Rainham Chemicals v Belvedere Fish Guano case, \fiscount 
Simon remarked t h a t Scrutton L.J., s i t t i n g as an a d d i t i o n a l judge of the 
King's Bench D i v i s i o n , had understood i t t o be admitted before him t h a t the 
40. 1021 2 A-.C. 465-
41. At page 471. 
42. 1947 A.C. 156. 
43. See page 19- Chapter I I . 
44. At page 169. 
45. 1921 2 A.C. 465. ^ 
c o n s t i t u e n t elements of Rylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y were present. The 
Lord Chancellor f u r t h e r pointed out t h a t Lords Carson and Buckmaster 
were almost e n t i r e l y concerned w i t h the l i a b i l i t y of the d i r e c t o r s of the 
appellant company and s a i d t h a t he d i d not consider the House t o be bound 
by Rainham on the question of whether munitions i n a f a c t o r y f o r the 
46 
purpose of h e l p i n g t o defeat the enemy was a non-natural user of land. 
Lord Kact'.illan s a i d t h a t Lord Buckmaster's d e c i s i o n was a f i n d i n g of f a c t 
r a t h e r than of law and c l e a r l y a f f o r d e d no precedent f o r the claim i n 
47 
Read v Lyons. 
I n r e f u s i n g t o accept Lord Buckmaster 1v view the House of Lords 
showed a c l e a r desire t o r e s t r i c t the scope of the r u l e i n Rylands v 
F l e t c h e r . There were several a l l u s i o n s i n the Read v Lyons judgments t o 
the p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s (war time) and these f a c t o r s combine t o i n d i c a t e 
the extent t o which the requirement of non-natural user of land can be 
modified at w i l l so as t o give e f f e c t t o p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thus 
g i v i n g the r u l e a measure of e l a s t i c i t y which would not otherwise be 
present. This f a c i l i t y of the judges f o r applying the concept of non-
n a t u r a l user of land according t o l o c a l c o n d i t i o n s and t o f a c t o r s of 
general p o l i c y was seen again i n the recent case of B r i t i s h Celanese v 
48 
Hunt where Lawton J. a p p l i e d Lord Koulton's t e s t of 'some s p e c i a l use 
b r i n g i n g w i t h i t increased danger t o others' ar.d s a i d ; "the manufacturing 
of e l e c t r i c a l and e l e c t r o n i c components i n the year 1964 cannot 
be adjudged t o be a s p e c i a l use nor can the b r i n g i n g and s t o r i n g on the 
premises of metal f o i l be a s p e c i a l use i n i t s e l f . The way the metal 
f o i l was s t o r e d may have been a negligent one; but the use of the premises 
f o r s t o r i n g such f o i l d i d not by i t s e l f create s p e c i a l r i s k s . The metal 
f o i l was there f o r use i n the manufacture of goods of a common type which 
at a l l m a t e r i a l times were needed f o r the general b e n e f i t of the community. 
46. At page 169-
47. At page 175. 
48. 1969 2 A.E.H. 1252. 
49. At page 1257-
45. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n which we have considered between the n a t u r a l and 
non-natural user of land i s o f t e n confused w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
those t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y on the land and those which are brought 
on t o the land or are a r t i f i c i a l l y created t h e r e . These d i f f e r e n t 
conceptions do not appear t o have been c l e a r t o Lord Cairns but i n f a c t 
they are q u i t e d i s t i n c t and so, having considered the f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n 
we must t u r n out minds t o the question of whether there can be any l i a b i l i t y 
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r f o r t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on the l a n d . 
50 
Professor Salmond has s a i d : "the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r 
applies t o t h i n g s which are a r t i f i c i a l l y brought or kept upon the defendant's 
la n d , and i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y t h e r e , howsoever 
dangerous they may be - e.g. noxious weeds, vermin or water, oo f a r from 
being a b s o l u t e l y l i a b l e f o r the escape of these t h i n g s , the occupier of 
land i s not even under any duty of care t o prevent t h e i r escape." Salmond 
1^ 
c i t e d three cases - G i l e s v Walker,^ H i e l d v London and North Western 52 53 Ra±lwa2_Co. and Stearn v P r e n t i c e Bros. and also the I r i s h case of 
5k 
Brady v Warren - i n each of which the land had been a r t i f i c i a l l y a l t e r e d 
so t h a t the r e s u l t complained of was i n d i r e c t l y due t o a human a c t . This, 
55 
Goodhart says, i s t r u e as f a r as i t goes but misleading f o r Salmond f a i l e d 
t o draw the v i t a l d i s t i n c t i o n between th i n g s n a t u r a l l y present on land which 
has been a r t i f i c i a l l y a l t e r e d so as t o cause the harm complained of and'things 
n a t u r a l l y on land which has not been so a l t e r e d by human a c t . I t i s suggested 
however t h a t the r e c o g n i t i o n of such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n what 
Salmond s a i d . I n considering the v a l i d i t y of the d i s t i n c t i o n between th i n g s 
n a t u r a l l y on land and t h i n g s a r t i f i c i a l l y brought on or created there we w i l l 
f i r s t examine the cases concerned w i t h t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on land which has 
50. Page 351 (7th e d i t i o n ) 
51. T89O 2k Q.B.D. 656. 
52. 187^ L.R. 10 Ex. i f . 
53. 1919 1 K.B. 35k. 
5if. 1900 I r i s h Reports 632. 
55. if C.L.J. 13 at page Ik. 
if 6. 
been a l t e r e d , bearing i n mind the v i r t u a l equation i n many of these cases 
of l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance and under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r . 
For a case which was subsequently t o assume considerable importance 
Giles v W a l k e r ^ was handled at a l l l e v e l s i n a most haphazard f a s h i o n . 
Counsel f o r the p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o c i t e the one case which was s t r o n g l y 
57 
i n h i s favour - P r o p r i e t o r s of Margate P i e r and Harbour v Town--of Margate 
- and of the two judges i n the D i v i s i o n a l Court one d e l i v e r e d a judgment 
of two sentences and the other merely concurred w i t h him. The f a c t s were 
t h a t the defendant occupied land which had o r i g i n a l l y been f o r e s t land but 
which h i s predecessor had c u l t i v a t e d . The f o r e s t land d i d not bear t h i s t l e s 
p r i o r t o c u l t i v a t i o n but on i t s being c u l t i v a t e d t h i s t l e s sprang up a l l over 
i t . The defendant d i d not n-ow the t h i s t l e s and as a r e s u l t the t h i s t l e seeds 
were blown on t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s land where they caused damage. Lord Coleridge 
disposed of the case thus: "there can be no duty as between a d j o i n i n g occupiers 
58 
t o cut the t h i s t l e s , which are the n a t u r a l growth of the s o i l . " 
The t h i s t l e s , however, were not the n a t u r a l growth of the s o i l i n i t s 
n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n f o r they d i d not appear u n t i l the land had been c u l t i v a t e d . 
The decision can thus not be accepted as a u t h o r i t y f o r the view t h a t an 
occupier of land i s never l i a b l e f o r "th i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y t h e r e , 
howsoever dangerous they may be." As f a r as Kylands v F l e t c h e r l i a b i l i t y i s 
59 
concerned, i n the words of Clerk and L i n d s e l l , " t h i s d e c i s i o n must be 
regarded as t u r n i n g upon the f a c t t h a t the operation which caused the 
t h i s t l e s t o s p r i n g up was a n a t u r a l use of the s o i l . " There would i n c i d e n -
t a l l y be l i a b i l i t y today i n nuisance on these f a c t s f o r there can be l i a b i l i t y 
i n nuisance f o r c o n t i n u i n g an act which one d i d not s t a r t and, although the 
defendant was not responsible f o r the f i r s t year's growth, he ought t o have 
taken steps t o prevent the damage i n the second year as was decided i n Davey 
v Harrow Corporation and approved i n Morgan v Khyatt. 
56. 1890 2k Q.B.D. 656. 
57. 1869 20 L.T. (M.S.) 56k. 
58. At page 657. 
59. Page 389. 60. 1958 1 Q.B. 60. 1 64 tf.L R. ^75. un 
* n Crowhurst v Amersham B u r i a l Board the defendants planted two 
yew trees about f o u r f e e t i n s i d e t h e i r land but the trees grew through and 
beyond the boundary r a i l i n g s . C a t t l e l a w f u l l y on adjacent land ate the 
f o l i a g e and were poisoned by i t . Although there was hel d t o be l i a b i l i t y 
i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r the question under discussion d i d not a r i s e f o r the 
tre e s were not n a t u r a l l y on the land. I t does seem though t h a t any d i s t i n c -
t i o n between self-grown and planted trees i s im m a t e r i a l ; thus Rowlatt J. 
s a i d i n Noble v H a r r i s o n " T o grow a t r e e i s one of the n a t u r a l uses of 
the s o i l , and i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e , i n my judgment, whether the t r e e was 
planted or self-sown 1'. To grow a poisonous t r e e , Crov/hurst v Amersham 
B u r i a l Board t e l l s us, i s not a n a t u r a l use of land. 
I t w i l l now be u s e f u l t o consider the complicated question of 
whether the occupier i s l i a b l e f o r the presence of animals n a t u r a l l y on h i s 
64 
land. The e a r l i e s t r e l e v a n t decision was Boulston's caseein which the 
defendant constructed several coney-boroughs w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t the 
coneys ( r a b b i t s ) increased t o such an extent t h a t they caused damage t o 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s adjacent l a n d . I t was held t h a t " h i s neighbours cannot 
have an a c t i o n on the case against him who makes the sai d coney-boroughs; 
f o r as soon as the coneys come on h i s neighbour's land he (the neighbour) 
may k i l l them, f o r they are ferae naturae, and he who makes the coney-
boroughs has no property i n them, and he s h a l l not be punished f o r the 
damage which the coneys do i n which he has no pro p e r t y , and which the 
other may l a w f u l l y k i l l . " I n t h i s case the coneys were d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o -
duced on t o the land and can not be s a i d t o have been n a t u r a l l y t h e r e . 
Pollock B. refused t o f o l l o w the p r i n c i p l e of Boulston's case i n 
65 
F a r r e r v Nelson where he s a i d : "The moment he brings on game t o an 
unreasonable amount or causes i t t o increase t o an unreasonable extent he 
i s doing t h a t which i s u n l a w f u l , and an a c t i o n may be maintained by h i s 
62. 1878 4 Ex. D .5. 
63. 1926 2 K.B. 332 at page 336. 
64. 5 Co. Rep. 104b. 
65. 1885 15 Q.B.D. 258. 
43. 
neighbour f o r the damage which he has sustained." 
66 
I n Bland v Yates Worthington J. granted an i n j u n c t i o n against a 
defendant who used an excessive q u a n t i t y of manure i n which f l i e s bred. 
The f l i e s bred every b i t as spontaneously as d i d the t h i s t l e s i n Giles v 
67 
Walker but the defendant was h e l d l i a b l e . I n Stearn v P r e n t i c e Bros. 
68 
L t d . ,the defendants, who.-were bone manufacturers, kept on t h e i r premises 
a heap of bones which caused r a t s t o assemble t h e r e . The r a t s then made 
t h e i r way on t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s land and ate h i s corn. Bray J., p u r p o r t i n g 
t o f o l l o w Boulston's case, s a i d t h a t he was not aware t h a t t h a t decision had 
ever been overruled or questioned and t h a t the defendants were not l i a b l e 
since they had no property i n the r a t s . With reference t o t h i s strange 
gq 
conclusion Salmond says: ' "Probably t h i s case (Boulston 1s case) i s no 
longer law, though approved and followed i n Stearn v P r e n t i c e Bros." This 
makes i t strange t h a t Salmond should have c i t e d Stearn as a u t h o r i t y f o r h i s 
statement t h a t an occupier of land i s never under a duty of care t o prevent 
the escape of t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on h i s land. 
70 
Goodhart takes the view t h a t the c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n was t h a t of 
66 
Warrington J. i n Bland y Yates. He says t h a t "an occupier of land i s 
e n t i t l e d t o keep a reasonable number of animals on h i s land, whether they 
are there n a t u r a l l y or have been s p e c i f i c a l l y introduced, but i f they 
increase t o an unreasonable ex t e n t , then he i s under a duty t o abate h i s 
nuisance." 
I t i s submitted then t h a t the cases concerned w i t h animals demons-
t r a t e t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n must be drawn betv/een animals n a t u r a l l y on the 
land and those unreasonably introduced or helped t o remain t h e r e . On t h i s 
basis Bland v Yates can be explained on the ground t h a t the defendant 
encouraged the f l i e s t o breed there by using an excessive q u a n t i t y of manure. 
66. 191^ 58 S o l , J. 612. 
67. 1890 2k Q.B.D. 656. 
68. 1919 1 K.B. 39k. 
69. Page 351 note (m). 
76. At page 21. 
^9. 
Equally t h i s enables us t o draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between two f a i r l y s i m i l a r and 
71 72 i n s t r u c t i v e cases, Fa r r e r v Nelson and Seligman v Docker. I n the former 
case a tenant brought an unreasonable number of pheasants on t o h i s land and 
was h e l d l i a b l e f o r the damage they caused t o neighbouring land; i n Seligman 
v Docker the defendant d i d not b r i n g the pheasants on t o h i s land or unreason-
ably cause them t o increase there and v/as held not t o be l i a b l e . 
Thus although many of the cases are i n c o n c l u s i v e i t i s submitted t h a t 
the p r e f e r a b l e view i s t h a t the rule.-i i n Rylands v Fletch e r does not apply t o 
t h i n g s which are n a t u r a l l y on land unless i t can be said t h a t the defendant, 
e i t h e r by making some a l t e r a t i o n t o the land or by encouraging the t h i n g s t o 
remain or increase i n number t h e r e , has a r t i f i c i a l l y i n t e r f e r e d i n some way 
w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l presence on the land. This view seems t o be i n accord 
both w i t h the e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s and w i t h p r i n c i p l e . 
We must now see t o what extent t h i s i s v a l i d having regard t o the 
a u t h o r i t i e s concerning t h i n g s on unaltered land. Seligman v Docker, as we 
have noted, supports the view t h a t there w i l l be no l i a b i l i t y where the 
land i s unaltered and the presence of the t h i n g has not been encouraged by 
the defendant. I t was said t h a t the defendant i s under a duty t o remove 
the substance i n P r o p r i e t o r s of Margate P i e r and Harbour v Town Council of 
73 74 Margate but i n Pontardawe R.D.C. v Moore-G-wyn Eve <J. he l d t h a t an 
occupier of land need take no steps t o prevent rocks which have been loosened 
by weathering from f a l l i n g . Goodhart p r e f e r s the view taken i n the Margate 
case but i t i s submitted t h a t the Pontardawe dec i s i o n i s the b e t t e r one and 
t h a t t h i s , a l l i e d w i t h Selijgrn,gn v Docker, shows t h a t there i s no l i a b i l i t y 
f o r t h i n g s n a t u r a l l y on una l t e r e d land unless the defendant has brought them 
on t o the land or encouraged t h e i r continued presence th e r e . 
I t should be f u r t h e r remarked t h a t , even i f i t i s shown t h a t the 
71. 1885 15 Q.B.D. 258. 
72. 1949 Ch. 53. 
73. 1869 20 L.T. (K.S.) 564. 
74. 1929 1 Ch. 656. 
50. 
defendant brought the dangerous t h i n g bh t o h i s own land, the defendant w i l l 
only be l i a b l e under the r u l e i n Rylands v F l e t c h e r i f i t can be shown t h a t , 
i n Blackburn J.'s own words, he brought i t on t o the land, ' f o r h i s own 
75 
purposes.' This phrase has u s u a l l y been widely i n t e r p r e t e d and thus i t 
i s g e n e r a l l y s a i d t h a t the defendant w i l l be l i a b l e even where he gains no 
b e n e f i t from the accumulation on h i s land. I f t h i s were not the case bodies 
such as l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s could never be l i a b l e i n the t o r t of ^lands__v 
F l e t c h e r ; i t being decided t h a t they can be i n Charing- Cross E l e c t r i c i t y 
76 
Supply Co. v Hydraulic Power Co., a decision agreed w i t h by Upjohn J. i n 
78 
Smeaton v I l f o r d Corp.77 where he s a i d : " I can see no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
applying a d i f f e r e n t lav/ t o a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y merely because i t i s a l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t y , or t h a t i t i s c a r r y i n g out something b e n e f i c i a l t o the community, 
or even t h a t i t i s doing so pursuant t o a s t a t u t o r y duty." A d i f f e r e n t and 
7Q 
as yet unsupported view was expressed i n Dunne v H. Western Gas Board ' where 
S e l l e r s L.J. g i v i n g the judgment of the Court of Appeal, pointed out t h a t gas 
and water are brought on t o the land f o r the general b e n e f i t of the the p u b l i c 
and went on t o say t h a t " i t would seem odd t h a t f a c i l i t i e s so much sought 
a f t e r by the community and approved by t h e i r l e g i s l a t o r s should be ac t i o n a b l e 
a t common law because they have been brought t o the places where they are 
r e q u i r e d and have escaped without negligence by an unforseen sequence of 
mishaps." 
75. 1S66 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 at page 279-
76. 1914 3 K.B. 772. 
77- 1954 ch. 45C. 
78. At page 478. 
79. 1964 2 Q.B. 806. 




As o r i g i n a l l y formulated, the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher applied 
1 
to 'anything l i k e l y to do mischief i f i t escapes'. This concept appears 
in several different branches of the law of tort - for example the l i a b i l i t y 
of the vendor, manufacturer, h i r e r , consigner or donor of dangerous chat t e l s , 
the l i a b i l i t y of the occupier of land to persons coming upon h i s land, 
l i a b i l i t y for public nuisance and l i a b i l i t y under certain statutes - as 
well as^a component part of the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. I n spite 
of the use of the concept i n these various branches of the law the phrase 
i s a highly uncertain one for i t can t r u t h f u l l y be said that there are few 
objects which do not i n some circumstances present a r i s k of harm i f they 
escape* Almost anything i s potentially dangerous. 
Blackburn J.'s expression 'anything l i k e l y to do mischief i f i t 
escapes', has come to be equated with 'dangerous things'. (Blackburn J . 
himself explained the rule as applying to a 'thing of a dangerous nature* 
i n Jones v Festinpjg Railway Co.) . I n order to discover the es s e n t i a l / 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a dangerous thing we must examine those things which, i n 
the context of the ru l e i n Rylands v Fletcher, have been held to come 
within the ambit of t h i s phrase. 
Rylands v Fletcher i t s e l f was concerned with the escape of water 
and water has ever since been generally regarded as coming within the 
r u l e . Thus Eve J . i n Whitmores Ltd. v Stanford^ spoke of Water, or any 
other dangerous element'. But Stephen J . appears not to have regarded 
water c o l l e c t i n g i n a c i s t e r n as f a l l i n g within the rule i n h i s judgment 
if 5 
i n Blake v Land and House Property Corp. F i r e and things l i k e l y to 
cause a f i r e come within the 'dangerous category*. This includes also 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 E.X. 265 at page 279. 
2 . 1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733 at page 736. 
3 . 1909 1 Ch. *+27 at page ^38. 
k. 1887 3 T.L.R.667. 
5 . E.G. Job Edwards v Birmingham Cflnal Navigations 1921* 1 K.B. 3^1. 
6 7 8 gas , railway engines emitting sparks and cars with f u l l petrol tanks. 
q 
Equally explosives are within the rule (Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co., 
10 11 12 13 the Rainham case and Read v Lyons ) as are e l e c t r i c i t y , chemicals, 
14 15 16 sewage , wire rope and, i t seems, poisonous trees . Motor cars have 
17 
been held not to come within the rule (unless t h e i r petrol tanks are 
f u l l and they are i n a garage) although t h i s i s not because they lack 
the 'dangerous' quality but because t h e i r use i s a natural user of land. 
18 
S t a l l y b r a s s concludes from the authorities that chemicals, 
explosives, f i r e and e l e c t r i c i t y w i l l always be dangerous things but that 
other things such as water, trees and unloaded guns are sometimes regarded 
as dangerous i n themselves and sometimes not. The essence of the matter, 
he says, l i e s i n the r e l a t i v i t y of danger and here we have to agree with 
19 
Darling J . who said i n Chichester Corp. v Foster: " I very much doubt 
whether anything whatever can, s t r i c t l y speaking, be-called a 'dangerous 
t h i n g 1 . That depends on i t s use - on environment. Water i s 
only dangerous under certain conditions and so i s f i r e . " Just as there 
i s nothing which i s at a l l times and i n a l l circumstances dangerous, so 
i t seems that there i s nothing which i s i n a l l circumstances safe; a view 
20 
taken by Kay J . i n Snow v Whitehead when he said that "anyone who c o l l e c t s 
upon h i s land water, or anything e l s e , which would not i n the natural 
condition of the land be collected there, ought to keep i t i n at h i s p e r i l . " 
21 22 
Sheep and dogs have been held not to come within the rule but i t i s 
6. Batcheller v Tunbridge Wells Gas Co. 1901 84 L.T. 765. 
7. Jones v Festinoig Railway Co. 1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733« 
8 . Musgrove v Pandelis 1919 2 K.B. 43. 
9 . 1918 34 T.L.R. 500. 
10> 1921 2 A.C. 465. 
11. 1947 A.C. 156. 
12. National Telephone Co. v Baker 1893 2 CH. 186. 
13. e.g. Smith v Great Western Railway Co. 1926 135 L.T. 112. 
14. Humphries v Cousins 18?7 2 CTP.D. 239^ 
15. F i r t h v Bowling Iron Co. 1878 3 C.P.D. 254. 
16. Crowhurst v Amersham B u r i a l Board 1878 4 Ex. D . 5 . 
17. P h i l l i p s v Britannic Hygienic Laundry Co. 1923 1 K.B. 539-
18. 3 C.L.J. 376 at page 385-
19. 1906 1 K.B. 167 at pages 177, 178. 
20. 1884 27 Ch. D. 588 at page 591. 
21. Heath's Garage v Hodges 1916 2 K.B. 370. 
22. Hines v Tousley 192695 L.J.K.B. 773-
53. 
submitted that, as with a l l other things, circumstances are conceivable 
i n which they could come to be regarded as 'dangerous things'. The true 
d i s t i n c t i o n therefore i s not between the dangerous or non-dangerous 
character of the thing but between those circumstances where the defen-
dant w i l l be allowed to deny the dangerous character of h i s act and those 
where he w i l l not. 
I t can thus be seen that the category of Rylands v Fletcher 
objects has never become narrowed to that of 'inherently dangerous* 
things which have attracted a stringent duty of care elsewhere i n the 
law of t o r t . I t i s to that other adaptable c r i t e r i o n , non-natural user 
of land, that the task of confining the s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y i n 
Rylands v Fletcher to extra-hazardous conditions has f a l l e n . I t i s , i t 
i s submitted, because the use of motor cars i s nowadays normal and usual 
that they do not generally incur s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y and not because they 
are not regarded as objects l i k e l y to do mischief. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n s between natural and non-natural user of land 
and between dangerous and non-dangerous things have on occasions been 
23 
confused. Thus i n Barker v Herbert Fletcher Moulton L . J . s a i d : " t h i s 
i s not a case where a landowner has erected or brought upon h i s land 
something of an unusual nature, which i s e s s e n t i a l l y dangerous of i t s e l f . 
There i s nothing unusual or necessarily dangerous i n an area protected 
2k 
by r a i l i n g s , " and i n Latham v Johnson Farwell L . J . spoke of "the i n t r o -
duction into the land of something out of the normal user of 
25 
land, known to the owners to be dangerous." The two questions are i n 
fact e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t although they are functionally related i n that 
both make room for j u d i c a l discretion in applying or withholding s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y . Many Rylands v Fletcher objects, including water, gas and 
e l e c t r i c i t y , are perfectly usual, and i n such order that the;rule should 
apply i t i s necessary both that there must be an extraordinary user of 
the land and that the object must i n the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances be 
dangerous. 
23. 1911 2 K.B. 633 at page 642. k. 913 1 398. 5. At page k0$. 5k. 
CHAPTER VI 
F i r e 1 
The law governing l i a b i l i t y for the escape of f i r e has had a 
long history during which i t has undergone many changes; changes which 
have frequently coincided v/ith developments within society i t s e l f . For 
reasons of s o c i a l policy i t has developed i n a different way to the tort 
of Rylands v Fletcher and because of t h i s , although the rule i n Rylands 
v Fletcher plays a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n l i a b i l i t y for the escape of f i r e , 
f i r e must be regarded i n the law of tort as much more than merely some-
thing l i a b l e to do mischief i f i t escapes. I n t h i s chapter we w i l l 
study the h i s t o r i c a l origins of l i a b i l i t y for the escape of f i r e , the 
relevant statutory provisions and the manner i n which the l i a b i l i t y has 
developed i n recent times, culminating i n the decisions i n Mason v Levy 
2 3 Auto Parts of England and Emanuel v Greater London Council. 
I n the early common law the action brought for damage caused by 
the escape of f i r e was an action on the case pur negligent garder son 
few. The duty imposed to keep one's f i r e safe was but one example of a 
number of sp e c i a l duties imposed on such persons as innkeepers and common 
c a r r i e r s who had a pa r t i c u l a r status i n the eyes of the law. A p a r a l l e l 
with Rylands v Fletcher can be seen from the need from e a r l i e s t times for 
the1 f i r e to be within the control of the defendant. Thus i n Anon. 1582 
the court suggested that an action on the custom of the realm was not 
well brought where the defendant, by f i r i n g a gun at a fowl, set f i r e 
to h i s own and an adjoining house. The f i r e had never been within the 
defendant's control. The defendant was held to be l i a b l e for a f i r e l i t 
5 6 i n h i s own f i e l d i n Turberville v Stampe and i n Beautieu v Finglam a 
1. See generally Cgus 1 a r t i c l e i n 1969 C.L.J. P .1C4. 
2 . 1967 2 Q.B. 530. 
3 . 1971 2 A.E.R. 835. 
k, Cro. E l i z . 10. 
5 . 1697 Salk. 647. 1 Ld. Raym. 264. 
6 . 1401 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, f . 1 8 . 
55-
f i r e l i t by the defendant's servant or guest was held to be the defendant's 
own f i r e for the acts of those persons were within h i s control. 
For there to be l i a b i l i t y the f i r e had to be l i t 'tam negligenter 
ac improvide 1. The significance of the word negligenter has been the 
7 
subject of much discussion, Braeton , i n discussing criminal l i a b i l i t y 
for f i r e , says that a c i v i l action l i e s for 'incendia f o r t u i t a , vel per 
negligentiam facta' which would seem to favour absolute l i a b i l i t y . There 
i s a remarkable absence from the Year Books of cases concerned with the 
escape of F i r e . The f i r s t reported case of trespass on the case for the 
escape of f i r e i s Beaulieu v Finglam and that case i s singularly incon-
c l u s i v e . Thirning C.J. said that a man s h a l l answer for h i s f i r e which 
by misfortune burns the goods of another. Markham J . said that the 
l i a b i l i t y extended to acts done by a neighbour entering the defendant's 
house with h i s leave or knowledge, and also by a guest, but not by a 
stranger, because the f i r e was not due to e v i l on the defendant's part, 
g 
but was against his w i l l . Winfield concludes, j u s t i f i a b l y , i n view of 
the authorities, that negligence i n t h i s action did not have the technical 
meaning which i t now bears i n t o r t . I t c e r t a i n l y excluded l i a b i l i t y for 
the act of a stranger and for misadventure' or as we would now c a l l i t 
•inevitable accident.' As Winfield concludes: "we cannot be sure that 
at any period i n the history of the English common law a man was absolutely 
l i a b l e for the escape of his f i r e . " 
Having established that there was a f i r e within the defendant's 
control the p l a i n t i f f must show that i t was that f i r e which escaped and 
9 
caused damage to his property. Ogus examines three hypothetical s i t u a -
t i o n s . F i r s t due to act of God or of a stranger the f i r e breaks out on 
the defendant's land, Here the defendant i s not l i a b l e . Secondly the 
defendant l i g h t s a candle in h i s house and due to an act of God i t i s 
knocked over, sets f i r e to the defendant's house and then spreads to the 
7. F o l . 1lf66. 
8 . k2 L.Q.R. 37 at P .^9. 
9 . At page 106. 56. 
p l a i n t i f f ' s house. The position i s uncertain but i t seems probable that 
the defendant would have been l i a b l e on these f a c t s . Thus Markham J . 
s a i d : " I f my servant or my guest puts a candle by a wall and the candle 
10 
f a l l s into the straw I s h a l l answer to my neighbour" and i n 
11 
Bacon's Abridgement, written af t e r the Act of 1774, appears the statement: 
" I t was formerly holden, that i f a f i r e broke out accidentally i n a man's 
house, and raged to that degree as to hurt h i s neighbour's, that he i n 
whose house the f i r e f i r s t happened was l i a b l e to an action on the case 
on the general custom of the realm, quod quilibet ignem suum salvo." 
Thirdly the defendant l i g h t s a f i r e i n h i s f i e l d and due to an act of God 
or of a stranger sparks are blown on to leaves which i g n i t e . The f i r e 
spreads to the p l a i n t i f f ' s property. Again there i s uncertainty but i t 
seems that the defendant would not have been l i a b l e . The majority i n 
Turberville v Stampe said of t h i s : " I f he kindle i t at a proper time and 
place, and the violence of the wind carry i t into h i s neighbour's ground 
12 
and prejudice him, t h i s i s f i t to be given i n evidence." 
At t h i s point i n time s o c i a l considerations began to play t h e i r 
part i n the development of the law. With wooden houses multiplying the 
r i s k s were much greater as was demonstrated by the Great F i r e of London 
i n 1666. E i r e insurance was on the increase and Parliament became obsessed 
with preventing the outbreak of f i r e s . Many regulations were enacted 
among which were two major clauses r e l a t i n g to c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . The f i r s t 
17> 
i s ^6 of an Act of 1707 'for the better preventing the mischiefs that 
may happen by f i r e . ' The f i r s t f i v e sections of the Act imposed penal 
14 
sanctions and §6 was added, Ogus argues, i n order to resolve the doubt 
outlined i n h i s second hypothetical s i t u a t i o n . §6 provides that 'no 
action, s u i t or process, whatever, s h a l l be had, maintained or prosecuted 
10. 1401 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, f . 1 8 . 
11. (5th ed. 1798 I . 8 5 . ) 
12. 1 Ld. Eaym. 264. 
13. 6 i&nne, c . 31 . 
14. At page 108. 
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against any person i n whose house or chamber any f i r e s h a l l 
accidentally begin, or any recompense be made by such person for any 
damage suffered or occasioned thereby; any law, usage, or custom to the 
contrary notwithstanding*. Ogus concludes that as far as Parliament 
was concerned "the problems of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y were i n s i g n i f i c a n t compared 
with the fundamental aim of preventing and controlling f i r e s . " This 
information i s gained from the preamble to the statute which says: "Whereas 
many F i r e s have l a t e l y broken out i n several places i n and about the c i t i e s 
of London and Westminster, and other Parishes and Places comprised within 
the weekly B i l l s of Mortality, and many Houses have frequently been burnt 
and consumed before such F i r e s could be extinguished, to the Impoverishing 
and utter ruin of many of Her Majesty's Subjects, the Rage and Violence 
whereof might have been in great Part prevented, i f a s u f f i c i e n t quantity 
of water had been provided i n the Pipes lying i n the Streets, and i f 
Party Walls of Brick had been b u i l t between House and House, from the 
Foundation to the Top of the Roofs, and l e s s Timber in the Front of Houses," 
I f we accept Ogus's point i t means that when insured property had 
been damaged insurance companies were never concerned with the l i a b i l i t y of 
the owner of neighbouring property from which the f i r e had spread. Further 
t h i r d party r i s k s were not covered i n f i r e insurance p o l i c i e s u n t i l the 
nineteenth century. Additional evidence that §6 was enacted i n order to 
resolve doubts as to the need for negligence i n such cases i s supplied by 
Holdsworth who, i n h i s History of English Law Volume XI at page 6'07, points 
out that the form of action i n which the l i a b i l i t y for damage caused by 
f i r e was asserted was case and .that i t was in connection with actions on 
the case that lawyers were coming to be fa m i l i a r with the idea that c i v i l 
l i a b i l i t y was based on negligence. I t was generally alleged, as was seen 
i n Turberville v Stampe, that the'defendant had negligently kept h i s f i r e 
whereby damage had been caused to the p l a i n t i f f and t h i s tended to make 
58. 
lawyers think that i t was anomalous that a man should be l i a b l e for 
damage caused by a f i r e which was not occasioned by his negligence. 
This Act of 1707 was repealed i n 1772-Section 6 was re-
enacted. The new Act was i t s e l f repealed i n 177^ but S .6 was again 
reenacted i n S.86 of the F i r e s Prevention (Metropolis) Act 177*+ 15 
and was extended from f i r e s originating in buildings to those, such as 
the f i r e i n Turberville v Stampe, which originated 'on estates'. This 
widened the scope of the section and resolved remaining doubts on the 
third of Ogus's Hypothetical s i t u a t i o n s . 
The f i r s t reported case i n which the Act was pleaded was Canterbury 
16 
v Attorney-General i n 18^2. By t h i s time negligence had begun to assert 
17 
i t s e l f as was demonstrated i n Vaughan v Menlove where the direction to 
the jury was to consider whether i n the circumstances the defendant had 
conducted himself with the "caution such as a man of ordinary prudence 
would observe.' With the advent of the tort of negligence the courts had 
to reconcile t h i s part of the common Law v/ith S .86. 
17 
I n Vaughan v Menlove the statutory section was ignored. This 
may have been because the court considered that the provision applied 
only to London ( i t was c l e a r l y established to have general application i n 
18 19 Richards v Easto 1846) . Lord Denman C.J. i n F i l l i t e r v Phippard 
suggested that i t was ignored because the court assumed the provision 
did not apply where the defendant v/as negligent but what i s most l i k e l y 
i s that the court considered the statutory provision to have no relevance 
to the modern tort of negligence. 
There i s also the view that S.86 i s a good defence even where the 
defendant i s negligent; that the word 'accidentally' i n the Statute 
embraces the common Law on t h i s point. This view i s based upon a passage 
20 
i n Blackstone's Commentaries: "By the Common Law, i f a servant kept 
h i s master's f i r e negligently, so that h i s neighbour's house was burned 
15. 12* Geo. 3, c 78 
16 . 18^3 1 P h i l . 306. 
17. 1837 3 Bing. N.C. if68. 
18. 15 M. and W. 251. 
19. 18V? 11 Q.B. 3^7 at page 357. 
20:. Vol. 1, p. ^31. 
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down thereby, an action l a y against his master; because t h i s negligence 
happened i n h i s service But now the common Law i s altered by 
Statute which ordains that no action s h a l l be maintained against any, i n 
whose house or chamber any f i r e s h a l l accidentally begin, for t h e i r own 
loss i s s u f f i c i e n t punishment for t h e i r own or t h e i r servant's c a r e l e s s -
ness.' 1 I t must be said however that the meaning Blackstone attaches to 
the word 'negligence' i s uncertain, no statement i s made on l i a b i l i t y 
a f t e r the statute, and i t involves a misreading of l i a b i l i t y before 
1707. This view further seems contrary to the policy behind the eighteenth 
century statutes for i t would v i r t u a l l y abolish c i v i l l i a b i l i t y for the 
19 
escape of f i r e . The passage was used i n argument i n F i l l i t e r v Phippard 
but decisively rejected. 
Having discounted that p o s s i b i l i t y Lord Denman had to find h i s 
own way of reconciling S86 with the principles of negligence. He did t h i s 
by holding that 'accidentally' meant not only unintentionally but also 
without negligence i n spite of the fact that the concept of negligence 
did not e x i s t i n t h i s sense i n 177^« This was nevertheless an effective 
way of disposing of $6. 
S o c i a l policy reared i t s head again i n the mid eighteenth century 
when the escaping of sparks from railway engines and t h e i r s e t t i n g f i r e 
to property became a common occurence. Negligence was considered to be 
an adequate remedy for a time as was seen i n the judgments i n Piggot v 
21" 
Eastern Counties Railway . Other judges who saw a greater danger from 
mechanised industries tended to favour a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y as 
i l l u s t r a t e d by Branwell B.'s judgment i n Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway 
22 
where he said: "railway companies, by using f i r e , are responsible for 
any accident which may r e s u l t from i t s use, although they have taken 
every precaution i n t h e i r power." 
21. 1846 3 C.B. 229. 
22. 1860 5 H. and N. 679 at page 685. 
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I t can thus be seen that with a situ a t i o n i n which the judges were 
divided over the s t r i c t n e s s of l i a b i l i t y i n cases of t h i s nature the impact 
of the decision in Rylands v Fletcher was considerable. F i r e was readily 
accepted as a Rylands v Fletcher object following Blackburn J.'s own 
23 
judgment two years l a t e r i n Jones v Festinbg Railway . As we have seen 
L . 
l i a b i l i t y for the escape i n Rylands v Fletcher was modified to include 
not only the escape of the dangerous thing i t s e l f but any escape caused 
by bringing i t on to the land. A s i m i l a r rule was quickly developed i n 
the case of f i r e and thus for the purposes of l i a b i l i t y for the escape 
of f i r e a traction engine was held to be the dangerous thing i n Gunter v 
Zk 25 James, paraffin i n Mulholland and Tedd v Baker, petrol fumes i n a 
26 
car's petrol tank in Perry v Kendricks Transport and a motor car with 
27 
petrol i n i t s tank i n Musgrove v Pandelis. 
I t should be noted however that i n the caflse of other Rylands.v 
Fletcher objects l i t t l e objection was raised to t h i s extension of the 
pr i n c i p l e to an escape caused by the thing brought on to the land. I n 
the case of f i r e i t met with sterner opposition, opposition which i f 
successful would have severely limited the eff i c a c y of Rylands v Fletcher 
as a form of tortious l i a b i l i t y where f i r e i s involved. Romer L . J . 
pointed out the apparent inconsistency of t h i s i n Collingwood v Home and 
28 
Colonial Stores and Mackenna J . considered that matter at greater length 
29 
i n Mason v Levy Auto Parts. The judge acknowledged that he was bound 
27 
to follow the precedent of Musgrove v Pandelis but did not accept the 
reasoning i n that case. Mackenna J . said that since i n Musgrove v 
Pandelis the thing brought on to the land had not escaped^ the rule i n 
Rylands v Fletcher could not apply ;which i s l o g i c a l but contrary to 
23. 1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 733* 
2k. 1908 24 T.L.R. 868. 
25. 1939 3 A.E.R. 253-
26. 1956 1 W.L.R. 85. 
27. 1919 2 K.B. 43. 
28. 1936 2 A.E.R. 200 at 208-209, 




precedent. He concluded as a r e s u l t that Musgrove v Pandelis must have 
been decided on the wider princi p l e on which, he said, Bylands v Fletcher 
i t s e l f was based - s i c utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. He further 
stated that for the defendant to be l i a b l e for the escape of f i r e under 
the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher he must 
1. have brought something onto his land l i k e l y to do mischief i f 
i t escaped. 
2. have done so i n the course of a non-natural user of the land. 
3* the thing must have ignited and the f i r e spread. 
This argument i s l o g i c a l l y a t t r a c t i v e but there are grave 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n accepting i t . The r e i t e r a t i o n of the s i c utere maxim 
i s of l i t t l e value but what i s more important i s that t h i s argument 
could much reduce the scope of l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v Fletcher - such 
26 
cases as Perry v Kendricks Transport and Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co. 
could no longer be decided under that p r i n c i p l e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y Mackenna 
J.'s views on escape have nowhere met with acceptance. 
V/e must now study the effect Rylands v Fletcher had on the 177^ 
Act. The courts as we have seen t r i e d to reconcile the Act with the 
modern concept of negligence and i n Rylands v Fletcher too attempts at 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n were made. I f Mackenna Ji'is view of the law i s accepted 
there i s no d i f f i c u l t y for i f the defendant l i t the f i r e intentionally 
the Act would be inapplicable. Where however the source of the f i r e i s 
the Rylands v Fletcher object there can be circumstances i n which the f i r e 
i t s e l f could be said to have begun accidentally. 
27 
Such a case was Musgrove v Pandelis. The defendant kept a car 
i n h i s garage. While his chauffeur was trying to s t a r t the engine a f i r e 
broke out i n the carburettor for some reason never adequately explained. 
I t was found that the chauffeur was negligent i n not preventing the f i r e 
from spreading and so the defendant r e l i e d on 586 and claimed that the 
f i r e began 'accidentally*. The Court of Appeal decided i n favour of the 
p l a i n t i f f , holding that §86 was not a good defence to an action i n Rylands 30. 3k T.L.R. 500 , 9 
v Fletcher, following on t h i s point Lush J.'s decision at f i r s t instance. 
32 
Bankes L . J . distinguished three forms of l i a b i l i t y e xisting at common 
law: ( i ) for the mere escape of f i r e , ( i i ) for f i r e caused deliber-
ately or negligently by the defendant or hi s servant and ( i i i ) under 
the p r i n c i p l e i n Rylands v Fletcher which was, he said, an existing 
prin c i p l e of the common Law. Bankes L . J . said that the object of the 
Act was to give protection under the f i r s t head, that l i a b i l i t y under 
19 
the second head was not affected following F i l l i t e r v Phippard where 
i t was held that the Act did not apply to a f i r e caused either deliber-
ately or negligently. He then went on: "Why, i f that i s the law as to 
the second head of l i a b i l i t y , should i t be otherwise as to the t h i r d 
head; the l i a b i l i t y on the pri n c i p l e of Rylands v Fletcher? I f that 
l i a b i l i t y existed, there i s no reason why the statute should a l t e r i t 
and yet leave untouched the l i a b i l i t y for f i r e caused by negligence or 
design." 
I t should be f i r s t remarked that i t i s i l l o g i c a l to argue from 
head ( i i ) to head ( i i i ) , to argue that because i t i s accepted that 
'accidentally' does not apply where the f i r e was caused by negligence i t 
should not apply i n a Rylands v Fletcher s i t u a t i o n where the essence of 
l i a b i l i t y i s that negligence need not be proved. Mackenna J . in Mason v 
33 
Levy Auto Parts s a i d that " i n holding that an exemption given to ac-
cidental f i r e s does not include f i r e s for which l i a b i l i t y might be 
imposed upon the principle of Rylands v Fletcher, the Court of Appeal 
went very f a r . " I t i s submitted that i t went too f a r . I n addition 
Bankes E . J . showed a lack of understanding of the nature of the rule i n 
Rylands v Fletcher. He said that i t was plain that the princip l e of 
Rylands v Fletcher existed long before the case i t s e l f was decided. As 
evidence of t h i s he offered a statement of Tindal C.J. i n Vaughan v 
32. At page 46. 
33. 1967 2 Q.B. 530. 63. 
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Henlove where the Chief Just/sa i d : "there i s a rule of law which says 
you must so enjoy your own property as not to in j u r e that of another." 
Here again i s the fault of assuming from that very general and, in 
practice, almost meaningless p r i n c i p l e the far more s p e c i f i c form of 
l i a b i l i t y espoused by Blackburn J . The precise prin c i p l e i n Rylands v 
Fletcher did not exi s t before the Act of 1774. 
Thus Bankes L.J.'s reasons for saying that $86 does not apply 
35 
to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher are inadequate. Ogus suggests that 
Bankes L.J.'s conclusion was right but that i t should be based on the 
ground that since l i a b i l i t y at common law rested only on 'the mere escape 
of f i r e ' , the statutory defence was relevant only to that form of l i a b i l i t y . 
The best view, i t i s submitted, i s that i t i s pointless to attempt to 
reconcile $86 with the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. Each of these two 
principles of law was introduced without thought to the other and they are 
i n p r i n c i p l e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e for Rylands v Fletcher i s e s s e n t i a l l y concerned 
with l i a b i l i t y for non-negligent escape while $86 says that there s h a l l be 
i s 
no l i a b i l i t y i n those circumstances. The fact/that l i a b i l i t y for the 
escape of f i r e existed before such categories as negligence and Rylands v 
Fletcher were thought of. No sa t i s f a c t o r y solution can be found while 
r i g i d categories are maintained. We w i l l however return to t h i s question 
a f t e r considering further arguments of Ogus which have a bearing on i t . 
Inevitably the limi t a t i o n s engrafted on the rule i n Rylands v 
Fletcher i n cases concerned with other Rylands v Fletcher objects came 
to be applied to f i r e . Thus the lighting of a f i r e for domestic cooking 
or for the heating of a room was held to be a natural user of land and 
the defence of statutory authority was held to apply where a f i r e was 
l i t i n c i d e n t a l l y to an enterprise carried on under that authority. The 
3^. 1837 3 Bing. N.C. 
35. at P.116. 
6k. 
widespread use of the f l e x i b l e concept of non-natural user of land meant 
that Rylands v Fletcher l i a b i l i t y only applied where the f i r e created an 
unreasonable r i s k and i t can thus be seen that we had a concept very 
s i m i l a r to those of negligence and nuisance. Further the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher has been used more sparingly i n a l l cases since the House of 
Lords decision i n Read v Lyons.^ As a r e s u l t of these factors recent 
cases on the escape of f i r e have tended to be decided on principles of 
negligence and nuisance rather than under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. 
37 
Ogus says that because of the extra f l e x i b i l i t y of those two torts over 
Rylands v Fletcher i t would be best to use one of them exclusively i n a l l 
cases concerned with the escape of f i r e . 
Although nuisance i s defined as "an unlawful interference with a 
person's use or enjoyment of land or of some right over, or in connection 
38 
with i t " , i t was never applied to the escape of f i r e u n t i l Job Edwards v 
39 
Birmingham Canal Navigations i n 1924. There i s also the case of Spicer v 
40 
Smee where defective e l e c t r i c wiring in the defendant's house caused a 
f i r e which escaped and destroyed the p l a i n t i f f ' s adjoining bungalow. There 
was held to be l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance although not for the f i r e but for i t s 
source, the defective wiring. Ogus says that t h i s approach was introduced 
when the courts became unwilling to extend the ambit of Rylands v Fletcher 
to include a l l sources of f i r e as 'dangerous things'. This case, i t i s 
submitted, i s no evidence for the proposition that nuisance i s a more 
sat i s f a c t o r y form of l i a b i l i t y than Rylands v Fletcher i n such cases. 
The unreasonable user' of land i n nuisance; i s the same as 'non-natural 
user' i n Rylands v Fletcher. The point Ogus makes about dangerous things 
i s of l i t t l e v a l i d i t y since although ordinary e l e c t r i c wiring could not 
be c l a s s i f i e d as a Rylands v Fletcher object, defective e l e c t r i c wiring 
such as existed i n t h i s case would be very much a Rylands v Fletcher 
object on the same princip l e as was seen i n Prosser v Lev^ where a small 
piece of pipe which was part of a domestic water supply system which, 
36. 1947 A.C.156. 
37. Pages 116-117. 
38. Winfield 8th Ed. p. 353. 
39. 1924 1 K.B. 341. 
{«?• tttt 1 AER 489. 65. 
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according to Rickards v Lothipn, would ordinarily be a natural user 
I 
of land, was held to be a non-natural user of land and also a dangerous 
thing because i t s position under the wasi basin created an increased 
danger. 
In another type of case the f i r e i t s e l f has been held to constitute 
k3 
a nuisance. Thus i n Goldman v Hargrave nuisance was held applicable 
where lightning ignited a f i r e on the defendant's land and he negligently 
f a i l e d to extinguish i t . The importance of establishing negligence i n 
cases of t h i s type again suggests that there would be l i t t l e point i n 
making nuisance the sole form of l i a b i l i t y for the escape of f i r e . 
Negligence on the face of i t would be a sa t i s f a c t o r y tort to act 
as the sole form of l i a b i l i t y for the escape of fire. Two d i f f i c u l t i e s 
would exist however. F i r s t , there i s the old problem of 586 of the F i r e s 
Prevention (Metropolis) Act 177*+» Lord Denman C.J.'s interpretation i n 
F i l l i t e r v Phippar&Sias never gained general acceptance. Another attempt 
to avoid the section was seen i n Musgrove v Pandelis where the court 
distinguished the f i r e which originated inexplicably i n the carburettor -. 
and i t s continuance which resulted from the chauffeur's negligence i n not 
turning off the tapto the petrol tank. These were regarded as two separate 
f i r e s and i t was the second on which l i a b i l i t y was based. This a r t i f i c i a l 
reasoning was approved by the Judical Committee of the Privy Council i n 
Goldman v Hargrave . A better solution to the d i f f i c u l t y was that provided 
by Scrutton L . J . i n the Job Edwards case where he said: " I should r e s -
pectfully have thought that i t was safer to say that the f i r e was continued 
by negligence, and that the cause of action was not for a f i r e accidentally 
begun, but for negligence i n increasing such a f i r e . " 
The second d i f f i c u l t y i s that i t would no longer be possible to 
apply a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y i n cases which seem to merit i t . Thus 
i n Australia the climate accounts for the continuing s e n s i t i v i t y to the 
kZ. 1913 A.C. 263. 
43. 1967 1 AC 6k5. 
kk. 18^7 11 Q.B. 3^7 
45. 1919 2 K.B. ^3. 
kS. 1967 1 A.C. 6^5. 6 6 
r i s k of f i r e and the corresponding retention of a s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y 
as an added incentive to f i r e prevention. This d i f f i c u l t y can perhaps be 
overcome by varying the severity of the duty of care or by the application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa l o q u i t u r . 
The best view, i t i s submitted, i s that we should avoid a reli g i o u s 
a f f i n i t y to labels such as 'negligence', 'nuisance' and 'Rylands v Fletcher.' 
As we have seen the requirement of non-natural user of land i n Rylands v 
Fletcher means that that r u l e can become almost indistinguishable from 
negligence and equally negligence can be a f a i r l y s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y 
where a severe duty of care i s insisted upon or where res ipsa l o q u i t u r i s 
applicable. The fact i s that we are i n a mid-way position between neg-
ligence and a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - a state of a f f a i r s j u d i c i a l l y noted as 
48 
long ago as 1957 i n Balfour v Barty-King and which gained recent emphasis 
49 
i n the Court of Appeal decision i n Emanuel v Greater London Council where 
Lord Denning remarked^ that i t i s unnecessary to put l i a b i l i t y f o r the 
escape of f i r e i n t o any of the three categories of negligence, nuisance 
and Rylands v Fletcherj i t goes back as he said to the time when such 
categories were unheard of. 
The incidence of f i r e insurance plays an important part i n t h i s 
view. In cases of escape of f i r e between adjoining properties i t i s 
invariably the p l a i n t i f f who insures against the r i s k and according to 
modern principles of l o s s - d i s t r i b u t i o n i t i s he who should bear the loss. 
For t h i s reason there i s no need to resurrect a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y . 
As f a r as categorisation i s necessary a wider conception of negligence w i l l 
be s u f f i c i e n t l y precise provided i t i s realised that negligence too i s a 
f l e x i b l e p r i n c i p l e and not a r i g i d category; i t can mean almost any stan-
dard of care that the judge wants i t to mean. 
48. 1957 1 AER 156. 
49. 1971 2 A.E.R. 835. 
50. At page 839. 67 





The rule i n Rylands v Fletcher may be excluded by statute although 
t h i s does not happen as often as i s sometimes supposed. Whether or not 
the rule i s excluded depends on the construction of the p a r t i c u l a r statute 
concerned. S t r i c t l i a b i l i t y has to a large extent been removed from 
undertakings carried out under statutory authority such as public services 
which supply water, e l e c t r i c i t y and gas and the railways. The protection 
provided by such l e g i s l a t i o n i s interpreted as extending not only to the 
l e g a l i s i n g of the enterprise i t s e l f , thus preventing i t being regarded as 
a nuisance, but also to any harmful consequences occurring during the 
normal operation of the enterprise where negligence can not be proved. 
Several cases concerned with the operation of railways have estab-
l i s h e d that the statutory protection applies where the harm suffered i s 
a necessary incident of the a c t i v i t y expressly authorised. Thus i n Vaughan 
2 
v The Taff Vale Railway Co. the Court of Exchequer Chamber held that a 
railway company, authorised by the l e g i s l a t u r e to use locomotive engines, 
was not responsible for damage from f i r e occasioned by sparks emitted from 
an engine t r a v e l l i n g on t h e i r railway, provided they have taken every 
precaution i n the i r power and adopted every means which science can suggest 
to prevent injury from f i r e , and are not guilty of negligence i n the 
management of the engine. Cockburn C.J. summarised the rule as follows:^ 
"Although i t may be true, that i f a person keeps an animal of known dan-
gerous propensities, or a dangerous instrument, he w i l l be responsible 
to those who are thereby injured independently of any negligence i n the 
mode of dealing with the animal or using the instrument; yet when the 
1. See i n p a r t i c u l a r Fleming page 293. 
2. 1860 5 Hand N.679. 3 At page 685. 68. 
l e g i s l a t i n g has sanctioned and authorised the use of a p a r t i c u l a r thing, 
i s 
and ityused for the purpose for which i t was authorised, and every pre-
caution has been observed to prevent injury, the sanction of the l e g i s -
laticre c a r r i e s with i t t h i s consequence, that i f damage r e s u l t s from the 
use of such thing independently of negligence, the party using i t i s not 
responsible." Similar decisions were reached i n Hammersmith Railway Co. 
k 5 v Brand and i n Canadian P a c i f i c Railway Co. v Roy. 
Protection has also been extended to cases where the damage would 
not appear to have been a necessary incident of the authorised a c t i v i t y . 
Thus s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was held not to apply where e l e c t r i c i t y wires 
became dislodged i n Thompson v Bankstown Corporation nor where a water 
7 
main burst i n Benning v Wong nor where a gas main burst i n Dunne and 
g 
another v North-Western Gas Board and another and the Court of Appeal 
held that although the Board was acting, as water undertakers, under 
Private Acts of Parliament which gave permissive powers only and which 
contained no clause excluding l i a b i l i t y i n nuisance, the Board, against 
which negligence v/as not established, was; not l i a b l e either under the 
rule i n Rylands v Fletcher or i n nuisance. 
That s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s removed by the existence of statutory 
authority i s undeniable from the case law but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see why 
t h i s should be so. The l i a b i l i t y connotes something unlawful about the 
a c t i v i t y i t s e l f . A c t i v i t i e s to which s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y applies are 
generally those which e n t a i l extraordinary r i s k to others but which 
must be tolerated despite t h i s because of t h e i r value to society. Thus 
one of the most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s that i t 
i s imposed on a c t i v i t i e s which are both lawful and non-reprehensible. 
I f s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y does not i n any way suggest that there i s anything 
unlawful about the a c t i v i t y then l o g i c a l l y there i s no reason why statu-
authority 
tory should imply that an3SC*£v£By i s absolved from s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . 
4. 1869 L.R. 4 H.L. 171. 
5. 1902 A.C. 220. 
6v 1953 8? fi.L.R.619. 
7.' 1969 43 A.L.tf.R. 467. , a 
8. 1964 2 Q.B. 806. b 9 . 
The reason for statutory authority excluding the application 
of the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher i s not that i t l o g i c a l l y should but 
g 
that, as Cockburn C.J. said i n Vaughan v The Taff Vale Railway Co., 
" I t i s consistent with policy and j u s t i c e that i t should be so." Thus 
gas, water and e l e c t r i c i t y are brought into an area for the general 
benefit of the members of the public for whom such f a c i l i t i e s are 
provided. Gas, water and e l e c t r i c i t y can be regarded as n e c e s s i t i e s 
of modern l i f e and i f the companies which provide these services were 
to be held l i a b l e for accidents i n connection with t h e i r provision i n 
the absence of negligence then the public need would be endangered. 
This i s of course equivalent to the nineteenth century opposition to 
imposing negligence on the ground that i t inhibited enterprise. 
The statutory protection i s l o s t i f the corporation f a i l s i n 
i t s duty of care to avoid unecessary danger*- I t must observe standards 
of safety i n proportion to the high degree of r i s k involved. Thus a l l 
available s c i e n t i f i c aid and knowledge must be used. Im Manchester 
10 
Corporation v Farnworth the corporation was held to be l i a b l e when 
fumes escaped from a generating station because i t s responsible o f f i c e r s 
did not direct t h e i r minds to the prevention of nuisances which i t was 
obvious might occur but were rather under the impression that, for a l l 
p r a c t i c a l purposes, so long as t h e i r plant was e f f i c i e n t l y and success-
f u l l y run, the neighbours must endure any consequent i n j u r i e s . 
There i s disagreement, however, as to the burden of proof when 
seeking to establish negligence i n such cases. Whereas the burden of 
supporting a defence of statutory authority by proving due care i s cast 
on the defendant i n nuisance ( t h i s was established by the House of Lords 
10 
i n the Manchester Corporation v Farnworth case) , i t i s uncertain 
whether the same rule applies to Rylands v Fletcher. This view that for 
the defence to apply the defendant must est a b l i s h affirmatively that the 
re q u i s i t e care was exercised was seen i n the decision of the J u d i c i a l 
Committee of the Privy Council i n North Western U t i l i t i e s Ltd. v London 10. 1930 A.C. 171. 70 9- At page 685. 
Guarantee and Accident Company and in pa r t i c u l a r i n the judgment of 
12 
Lord Wright i n that case . A s i m i l a r view has been consistently taken 
13 
i n the Commonwealth cases on t h i s point. 
11. 1936 A.C. 108. 
12. At pages 119. 121. 
13. Benning v Wong (1969) 43 A.L.J.R. 467. 
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Part I I . 
Act of a Stranger 
L i a b i l i t y under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher can be avoided 
i f i t can be shown that the escape was caused by the deliberate act of 
a stranger. The defence was hinted at i n the judgment of Blackburn J . 
2 
i n Rylands v Fletcher and, i n spite of the fact that Blackburn J . i s 
generally regarded as having expounded a princi p l e of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y 
i n that case, i t i l l u s t r a t e s more than any other single defence to the 
tort the fact that l i a b i l i t y under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher i s 
not as s t r i c t as i s generally asserted since i t enables a defendant to 
escape l i a b i l i t y even though the act causing the damage was committed 
on h i s own land by human agency and though the p l a i n t i f f had no know-
ledge of the act and so could not have consented to i t . Nor i n the 
application of t h i s defence does any statute come to the aid of the 
defendant. 
I f i t i s to be regarded as a to r t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y one would 
expect that the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher would be applicable to a l l 
p e r i l s a r i s i n g from situations created or caused by the defendant, i n -
cluding the r i s k that others may act stupidly or with malice. The 
position remains however that the defence of act of a stranger i s firmly 
established as an excuse from l i a b i l i t y . The defence must now be studied 
i n some depth i n order to discover to what extent i t s p r a c t i c a l applica-
tion bears out the assumption that here i s a serious retreat i n the di r e c -
tion of negligence from true p r i n c i p l e s of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . 
The origin of t h i s type of defence to the tort l i e s , as indicated 
above, i n the case of Rylands v Fletcher i t s e l f and, more prec i s e l y , i n 
2 
the Judgment of Blackburn J . i n the Court of Exchequer Chamber where the 
1. See Goodhart 'The Third Man'k C.L.R. 178-183, 
2. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex .265. 
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judge, typifying the often excessively cautions approach of our ju d i c i a r y , 
weakened the effect of the firm rule he had just l a i d down by adding^ that 
the defendant "can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s default; or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence 
of v i s major, or the act of God; but as nothing of t h i s sort e x i s t s here, 
i t i s unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be s u f f i c i e n t . " This 
changed the whole emphasis of the rule from being based on a conception 
of r i s k to being based on one of f a u l t and was quickly seized upon by 
the courts i n 1879 i n the case of Box v Jubb and another 
In that case the defendants possessed a reservoir with s l u i c e s 
connected with a main drain or watercourse, from which the reservoir 
was supplied, and with other s l u i c e s by which the surplus water was 
returned into the drain at a lower l e v e l . The combined effect of the 
emptying of a reservoir belonging to a t h i r d person above the defendant's 
premises, and of an obstruction i n the drain below them, was to force 
water through the s l u i c e s into the defendant's reservoir and so cause 
an overflow from there on to the p l a i n t i f f ' s land. In an action for 
damage caused thereby i t was shown that the defendants had no control 
over the main drain or the other reservoir, or knowledge of the circum-
stances which caused the overflow, and that the s l u i c e s were maintained 
so as to prevent overflow under ordinary circumstances. Kelly C.B. saw 
5 
the crux of the matter as being : "What was the cause of t h i s overflow? 
Was i t anything for which the defendants are responsible -did i t proceed 
from t h e i r act or default or from that of a stranger over which they had 
no control?" The answer he gave to t h i s question was that "the matters 
complained of took place through no default or breach of duty of the 
defendant, but were caused by a stranger over whom and at a spot where 
they had no control" and so the defendants were excused from l i a b i l i t y . 
3. At pages 279, 280. 
k. 1879 4 Ex. D. 76. 
5 . At pages 78, 79. 
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This i s c l e a r l y reasoning based on pr i n c i p l e s of fault and negligence 
and i n no way based on pri n c i p l e s of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y for s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y , while l e s s than absolute, i s founded more on a r i s k than on 
a f a u l t concept. 
The f a u l t doctrine i n what i s generally regarded as a tort of 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y was taken to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion by the decision of 
the J u d i c i a l Committee of the Privy Council i n Rickards v Lothian^. I n 
that case a wash-basin, i n rooms occupied by the defendant on the top 
floor of h i s house, was maliciously plugged by an unknown thi r d person, 
with the r e s u l t that the water overflowed and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
property on the second floor. The Court held that there v/as no l i a b i l i t y 
under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher because i t wass a natural user of 
land but the important part of the decision for the purposes of t h i s 
7 
chapter i s that i t was also held that "a defendant i s not l i a b l e on the 
prin c i p l e of Fletcher v Rylands for damage caused by the wrongful acts 
of t h i r d persons", because a defendant cannot "be properly said to have 
caused or allowed the water to escape i f the malicious act of a t h i r d 
person was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without any fault on the part 
of the defendant." Thus the court drew no di s t i n c t i o n between the malic-
ious and negligent acts of the thi r d person. Salmond was thus led to 
state the position as follows: " I t would not appear that i t 
matters whether the novus actus be j u s t i f i a b l e , lawful, negligent or 
criminal or whether i t be the act of the p l a i n t i f f or of a t h i r d party ." 
One of the more recent of the few cases concerned with t h i s 
q 
defence was Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd., I n that case the defendants 
had placed a motor-coach on a parking ground a f t e r emptying the tank of 
petrol and screv/ing a cap on the entrance pipe. As the p l a i n t i f f was 
returning from school he saw two small boys standing near the coach; 
6. 1913 A.C. 263. 
?. At page 278. 
8 . 10th Ed. page 1^2. 
9 . 1956 1 A.E.fi. 154. 
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they jumped away and immediately afterwards there was an explosion i n 
the petrol tank which injured him severely. At the t r i a l Lynskey J . 
found as a question of fact that the cap had been removed by some unknown 
person, and that one of the boys had thrown a lighted match into the 
petrol tank. The case reached the Court of Appeal where Jenkins L . J . 
10 
held that: " i f the act bringing about the escape was the act of a 
stranger, and not any act or omission of the occupier himself or h i s 
servant or agent" then the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher does not apply. 
11 
S i m i l a r l y Parker L . J . s a i d : " I t has for a long time been an exception 
to the rule i f the defendants can show that the act which brought about 
the escape was the act of a straager, meaning thereby, someone over 
whom they had no control." Thus the courts again came down on the side 
12 
of a fault rather than a r i s k concept. 
Although the defence of act of a stranger has been with us for a 
long time, there i s no c l e a r definition of the word 'stranger' i n t h i s 
k 
context. As Box v Jubb t e l l s us, the category of strangers c e r t a i n l y 
includes trespassers and any others who, without actually entering the 
defendant's premises, commit an act that causes the escape. A servant 
acting i n the course of h i s employment w i l l not be a stranger. When a 
13 
servant i s a trespasser as i n Stevens v Woodward where the servant 
used a private lab^ltory and wash-basin to which he had been forbidden 
access and f a i l e d to turn off the tap then he i s not acting i n the course 
of h i s employment and can, i t i s submitted, be regarded as a stranger 
for the purposes of t h i s defence. That the occupier w i l l be l i a b l e 
for the acts of h i s independent contractors i s apparent from the case 
1 if 
of Rylands v Fletcher i t s e l f although there i s a recognised exception 
which stated that an employer w i l l not be l i a b l e for the c o l l a t e r a l or 
casual negligence of an independent contractor; that i s , negligence in 
some c o l l a t e r a l respect as d i s t i n c t from negligence with regard to the 
10. At page 159. 1  1612 This question i s f u l l y discussed i n Chapter VTII. 3 1881 6 Q.B. 318. Ik. 66 L.R.  Ex. 265. 75. 
15 matter delegated to be carried out. 
An occupier w i l l a l s o be l i a b l e under the rule i n Rylands v 
Fletcher for the acts of any members of h i s family on the premises 
16 
over whom he has control. I n Hale v Jennings i t was held that he 
i s l i a b l e for the acts of invitees - i n that case an in v i t e e tampered 
with a potentially dangerous machine provided for h i s amusement. There 
i s some dispute between the textbook writers on the question of whether 
an occupier i s l i a b l e for the acts of licensees on h i s land. There i s 
17 18 
no actual decision on t h i s point but Charlesworth and Salmond both 
consider that an occupier w i l l not be able to disclaim r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
19 
for the acts of li c e n s e e s . Winfield however claims that " i t would be 
harsh to hold a person l i a b l e for the act of every casual v i s i t o r who 
has bare permission to enter h i s land and of whose propensities to e v i l 
he may know nothing" and suggests that the true test may be: "Can i t be 
inferred from the facts of the p a r t i c u l a r case that the occupier had 
such control over the licensee or over the circumstances which made h i s 
act possible, that he ought to have prevented i t ? I f so the occupier i s 
l i a b l e , otherwise not." 
20 
Fleming argues that the conclusions of Salmond and Charlesworth 
are supported by the analogy of l i a b i l i t y for f i r e . This reasoning i s 
not v a l i d however for the defence of act of a stranger i s in practice 
applied d i f f e r e n t l y to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher than to f i r e ( a l -
though there i s no l o g i c a l reason why t h i s should be s o ) . Thus we have 
already seen that an occupier w i l l be l i a b l e for the acts of an invitee 
under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher but i t was held i n a case concerned 
21 
with the escape of f i r e , Erikson v C l i f t o n , that where an invitee on 
impulse set gorse alight the absent occupier was to be excused from 
l i a b i l i t y . 
15- Pickard v Smith 1861 10C.B. (N.S.) 470 
16. 1938 1 A.E.R. 579 
17. Negligence 4th Ed. pages 258 to 263 
18. 14th Ed. page 451. 
19. Page 426. 
20. Page 292 note 33. 76 21. 1963 N.Z.L.R. 705. 
I t i s submitted that the most r e a l i s t i c way of explaining the 
case law on t h i s point i s to say that the true test i s not concerned 
f u l 
with d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between categories of law/visitors as they are 
now c a l l e d under the Occupiers' L i a b i l i t y Act 1967 but i s rather a 
t e s t of f o r s e e a b i l i t y . This f o r s e e a b i l i t y test i s consistent with the 
tendency we have noticed to r e l y i n the defence of act of a stranger 
on a fault rather than on a r i s k concept and would explain why i n 
Perry v Kendricks the defence was held to apply when the act was not 
forseeable and why i n Hale v Jennings there was l i a b i l i t y under the 
rule i n Rylands v Fletcher i n circumstances where the act could c l e a r l y 
have been forseen. 
I t i s worth reminding ourselves at t h i s point that the occupier 
w i l l not be l i a b l e for the acts of h i s predecessor i n t i t l e since the 
rule i n Rylands v Fletcher makes i t necessary that the defendant should 
have brought the danger on to h i s own land. Thus i n Whitmores (Eden-
22 
bridge)Ltd. v Stanford Eve J . s a i d : "The rule ( i n Rylands v Fletcher) 
so stated does not appear to me to extend to make the owner 
of land l i a b l e for consequences brought about b y t h e c o l l e c t i n g and 
impounding on h i s land, by another, of water, or any other dangerous 
element." 
The defence of act of a stranger w i l l not be applicable i f 
there has been any negligence on the part of the defendant since the 
essence of the defence i s that the defendant was i n no way responsible 
for the act or for the damage caused thereby. I t appears further, 
however, that the defence w i l l not be v a l i d i f the stranger's act was 
negligent because i t seems that the possessor of a dangerous thing i s 
bound to guard against the negligence of t h i r d p a r t i e s . This state of 
a f f a i r s i s contrary to common sense for the defendant's a b i l i t y xbocx 
22. 1909 1 Ch. h27 at page 438. 
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to anticipate cannot depend on the stranger's state of mind. Never-
theless there i s c l e a r authority for the proposition that the occupier 
w i l l be expected to anticipate negligent but not deliberate acts of 
23 
strangers. Thus i n Box v Jubb Ke l l y C.B. held that the act which 
2k 
caused the escape was a malicious act and went on " I think the defen-
dants could not possible have been expected to anticipate that which 
25 
happened here." Lord Moulton i n Rickards v Lothian stated the position 
26 
as follows: "A defendant cannot i n t h e i r Lordship's opinion be properly 
said to have caused or allowed the water to escape i f the malicious act 
of a t h i r d person was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without any f a u l t 
on the part of the defendant" and i n Dominion Natural Gas Co. v C o l l i n s 
27 
and Perkins the question was put: "Have the defendants been able to show 
affirmatively that the true cause of the accident was the conscious act 
of another vol i t i o n " ? The matter was again considered by the J u d i c i a l 
Committee df the Privy Council i n North Western U t i l i t i e s Ltd. v London 
28 
Guarantee and Accident Co. where Lord Wright held that malicious i n 
t h i s context meant merely conscious or deliberate. 
The fact that defendant w i l l be l i a b l e for another's negligence 
i s an important r e s t r i c t i o n on the scope of the defence and i s in i t s 
small way a reversion to the e a r l i e r acceptance of the rule i n Rylands 
v Fletcher as constituting a r i s k rather than a f a u l t concept. I t 
cannot a l t e r the fact , however, that the defence of act of a stranger 
constitutes a s i g n i f i c a n t erosion of the r i s k concept i n Rylands v 
Fletcher and a s s i s t s i n the move towards a narrowing of the boundaries 
between Rylands v Fletcher and the to r t of negligence and the creation 
of one all-embracing tort based on a principle lying somewhere between 
23. 1879 k Ex. D .76. 
2k. At page 79. 
25. 1913 A.C. 263. 
26. At page 278. 
27. 1909 A.C. 6k0. 
28. 1936 A.C. 108. 
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f a u l t and r i s k . As we have seen, the more l o g i c a l conclusion and that 
reached i n the relevant American cases i s that s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s based 
on the pri n c i p l e of the allocation of r i s k and that a person who has 
created an unusual r i s k i s l i a b l e i f harm r e s u l t s from i t even though 
the immediate cause was an act of God or of a thi r d party. Thus para-
graph 522 of the American Law I n s t i t u t e ' s Restatement of the Law of Torts 
reads as follows.: 
Contributing Actions of Third Persons, Animals and Forces of 
Nature. 
One carrying on an ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t y i s l i a b l e for harm 
under the rule stated i n paragraph 5191 although the harm i s caused by 
the unexpectable. 
(1) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a thi r d person, or 
(2) action of an animal, or 
(3) operation of a force of nature. 
Comment: 
Rationale. The reason for imposing absolute l i a b i l i t y upon those 
who carry on ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t i e s i s that they have thereby for t h e i r 
own purposes created a r i s k which i s not a usual incident of the ordinary 
l i f e of the community. I f the r i s k ripens into injury i t i s immaterial 
that i t i s made effective i n harm by the unexpectable action of a human 
being, an animal or a force of nature. This i s so, ir r e s p e c t i v e of 
whether the action of the human being which makes the ultra-hazardous 
a c t i v i t y harmful i s innocent, negligent or even r e c k l e s s . 
Caveat: 
The I n s t i t u t e expresses no opinion as to whether the fact that 
the harm i s done by an act of a thi r d person, which i s not only deliberate 
but i s intended to bring about such harm, r e l i e v e s from l i a b i l i t y one 
who c a r r i e s on an ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t y . 
29. See Chapter V I I I . 
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Despite the caveat i t can be seen that the American law-
makers in t h i s matter have followed principles of logic far more 
than have the English courts. This tendency of the English judges 
to r e s t r i c t the severity of the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher can be 
traced to those oft-quoted words of Lindley L . J . i n Green v Chelsea 
"50 
Waterworks Co. when he sa i d of the case of Rylands v Fletcher; 
"That case i s not to be extended beyond the legitimate prin c i p l e 
on which the House of Lords decided i t . I f i t were extended as far 
as s t r i c t logic might require, i t would be a very oppressive decision." 
The question of v/hich i s the preferable approach w i l l be considered 
i n depth i n a l a t e r chapter. 
30. 1894 70 L.T. 547. 
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PART I I I 
Act of God 
2 
The defence of act of God was, as we have noted, recognised 
3 
by Blackburn J . i n h i s judgment i n Rylands v Fletcher . However the 
defence has been r a r e l y invoked and indeed there i s only one reported 
English case i n which i t has been successfully pleaded, that of 
Nichols v Marsland i n 1875 where the Court of Appeal seized on 
Blackburn J.'s 'exclusion clause' for l i a b i l i t y i n Rylands v Fletcher. 
The facts of the case were that there were ornamental pools 
on the defendant's land which contained large quantities of water. 
These pools had been formed by damming up with a r t i f i c i a l banks a 
natural stream which rose above the defendant's land and flowed 
through i t , and which was allowed to escape from the pools successively 
by weirs into i t s o r i g i n a l course. An extraordinary r a i n f a l l caused 
the stream and the water i n the pools to swell so that the a r t i f i c i a l 
banks were carr i e d away by the pressure, and the water i n the pools 
being thus suddenly l e t loose, rushed down the course of the stream 
and injured the p l a i n t i f f ' s adjoining property. The p l a i n t i f f 
having brought an action against the defendant for damages, the jury 
found that there was no negligence i n the maintenance or construction 
of the pools and that the flood was so great that i t could not 
reasonably have been anticipated. The Court of Exchequer decided'' 
that the escape of water was caused by an Act of God and that the 
defendant was thus not l i a b l e for the damage caused. 
The case came before the Court of Appeal consisting of 
Cockburn C.J., James and Mellish L . J . J , and Baggallay J.A.,^ the 
judgement of the court being read by Mellish L . J . The Court held 
1. See Goodhart k C.L.P.178 to 183. 
2 . See Chapter 1 page 3 
3 . 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
4 . 1876 2 Ex. D .1 . 81 . 
5 . 1875 L.R. 10 Ex . 255 . 
£ A Fourth judge. Archibald J . , died before judgment was delivered. 
that act of God was a v a l i d defence, Lord J u s t i c e Mellish saying 
7 
that "a defendant cannot, i n our opinion, be properly said to 
have caused or allowed the water to escape, i f the Act of God or 
the Queen's enemies was the r e a l cause of i t s escaping without 
any fault on the part of the defendant." He i s c l e a r l y talking 
here i n terms of f a u l t and causation and not i n terms of allocation 
of r i s k ; a mode of reasoning i d e n t i c a l to that of Bramwell B. i n 
5 8 
the Court of Exchequer at f i r s t instance when he said: "What has 
the defendant done wrong? What right of the p l a i n t i f f has she 
infringed? She has done nothing wrong, she has infringed no ri g h t . 
I t i s not the defendant who l e t loose the water and sent i t to destroy 
the bridges." 
Nichols v Marsland would appear at f i r s t sight to be precisely 
the sort of case that the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher was designed to 
cover since the rule can have no p r a c t i c a l effect i f the defendant i s 
allowed to escape l i a b i l i t y except where the embankment gives way 
under ordinary r a i n f a l l for then the defendant would normally be l i a b l e 
i n negligence for f a i l i n g to avoid a consequence which i s reasonably 
forseeable. The only explanation for t h i s case, and indeed for the 
9 
si m i l a r case seen i n the chapter on Act of a Stranger, Box v Jubb , 
i s that the courts completely f a i l e d to r e a l i s e that the case of 
Rylands v Fletcher had established a new princip l e of tortious l i a b i l i t y 
separate from and independent of negligence. 
The only other case which revolved around the v a l i d i t y of the 
defence of act of God was the Scottish case of Greenock Corporatibn 
10 
v CaledonianRailway. I n that case the o r i g i n a l defendants, the 
municipal authority, while laying out a park, constructed a concrete 
7. At page 5* 
8 . At page 259* 
9 . 1879 k Ex. D .76. 
10. 1917 A.C. 556. 82. 
paddling pool for children i n the bed of a stream and altered the 
course of the stream and obstructed the natural flow of water 
therefrom. Owing to an extraordinarily violent rainstorm the stream 
overflov/ed at the pool and, as a result of the municipal authority's 
acts, a great volume of water, which would have been carried off by 
the stream i n i t s natural course without damage, poured down a public 
highway into the town and damaged the property of two railway companies. 
The case came to the House of Lords which comprised the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Finlay, and Lords Dunedin, Shaw, Parker and Wrenbury. 
11 
Lord Finlay, c i t i n g the judgment of Lord Cockburn i n Samuel v 
12 
Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway Co. , accepted the view that the authority 
was bound "to provide against the ordinary operations of nature but 
not against her miracles." He did not say what consisted a miracle 
13 
but he did say "What s h a l l be considered a damnum fatal e in such a 
case I need not inquire, but of t h i s I am very c l e a r , that a great 
f a l l of r a i n and consequent accumulation and weight of water i s not 
a damnum fa t a l e which exempts the proprietor from l i a b i l i t y from 
the f a i l u r e of his operation - for i t i s against such accumulation 
and weight of water that he i s bound to provide." No case in which 
damnum fatale was successfully pleaded was ci t e d i n the judgments 
and the term i s not familiar to English lawyers but Lord Denedin i n 
the Greenock case did equate the phrase with act of God and i t seems 
that the two can reasonably be regarded as synonymous. Lord Shaw 
14 15 4 held, using the exact words of Mellish L . J . in Nichols v Marsland, 
that the defendant was not l i a b l e even though the " f a l l was extra-
ordinary or even unprecedented i n quantity" while Lord Parker made i t 
c l e a r that although he questioned the finding of the jury i n Nichols 
v Marsland he accepted that that case had c l e a r l y established the 
11. At page 572. 
12. 13 D. 312 at page 314. 
13. Pages 573, 574. 
14. At page 579-
15. See note 7> o, 
03. 
existence of the defence of act of God. 
I t can thus be seen that to a cer t a i n extent the decision 
in the Greenock case discredited that i n Nichols v Marsland. Goodhart 
16 
considered that because of t h i s and because of the fact that the 
Nichols case i s the foundation of the defence of act of God on which a l l subsequent cases are b u i l t the defence of act of God cannot be 
supported i n r e l a t i o n to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. He c i t e s as 
authority for t h i s proposition the statement of law made by Lord 
17 
J u s t i c e -Clerk Hope i n Kerry v E a r l of Orkney where he sa i d : "The 
dam must be made perfect against a l l extraordinary f a l l s of r a i n -
else the protection i s not afforded against the operation which the 
party must accomplish." I t i s submitted however that the tone of 
the judgments and i n pa r t i c u l a r that of Lord Parker suggests only that 
they saw the requirements of the defence of act of God as being more 
18 
severe than did the judges i n Nichols v Marsland. Thus i t was 
considered i n the Greenock case than r a i n f a l l , no matter how great 
i t s volume, was in essence so natural a thing that i t could not cons-
t i t u t e an act of (Sod whereas i n the Nichols case i t was considered, 
r i g h t l y i t i s suggested, that a freak rainstorm could constitute an 
act of God. Thus, i t appears, i s the only way i n which the two cases 
can be l o g i c a l l y reconciled. Suffice i t to say that subsequent 
decisions, some of which are c i t e d below, have not accepted the 
Greenock case as having eaten away at the very roots of the existence 
of the defence of act of God. 
Act of God i s a term e n t i r e l y devoid of theological import -
'an untheological expression' as Lord Phillimore c a l l e d i t i n The 
19 
Mostyn. Rather than being concerned with phenomena ascribed by 
some to a deity i t s i g n i f i e d the operation of forces of nature which 
are unaffected by any human intervention. I t can be j u s t l y said that 
i t would be sensible to combine the defences of act of God and act 
of a Stranger into one defence of v i s major but the cases have seen 16. k C.L.P. 177 at pag  182. „ f t „ . „ _„ 7  20 D .298. ak 1 9 - 1928 A.C.57. 8 1876  Ex. D .1 . 0 4 * 
to i t that English Law has not developed i n t h i s more l o g i c a l manner. 
The scope of the defence of act of God must be r e s t r i c t e d to such 
extremes of nature as lightning, e l e c t r i c i t y , thunderstorms, snow-
storms and hurricanes. 
In Nichols v Marsland i t was considered enough that the 
occurrence could not reasonably have been anticipated but since then 
a f a r more severe t e s t has come to be applied; that of whether human 
foresight could have recognised even the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s occurence. 
This severer t e s t , already seen i n the Greenock case, has also been 
applied i n several Australian cases. Thus, according to C o t t r e l l v 
20 
Allen, an ordinary whirlwind can not amount to an act of God and 
21 
i n Commissioner of Railways (Western Australia) v Stewart i t was 
held that a t r o p i c a l downpour of exceptional i n t e n s i t y and duration 
22 
was not an act of God by the High Court of Australia, Dixon J . saying : 
"The weather experienced was not of an unfamiliar.:kind. I t was unusual 
only i n degree, and the difference in degree arose apparently from the 
circumstance that heavy r a i n f a l l took place a f t e r saturation of the 
ground. I"do not think the occurrence i s one against which no prudent 
engineer would have provided." Thus i t can be seen that for the defence 
to be applicable there must have been, i n the words of Lord Blanes-
burgh i n the Mostyn, "an i r r e s i s t i b l e and unsearchable providence 
n u l l i f y i n g a l l human e f f o r t " . 
Act of God can thus be seen to d i f f e r from act of a stranger 
i n the lack of causal l i n k with human a c t i v i t y and from inevitable 
accident both i n that and i n the degree of unexpectability. 
20. 1882 16 S.A.L.R. 122. 
21. 1936 56 CL.R. 520. 
22. At pages 53^, 535-
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PART IV. 
Consent of the P l a i n t i f f . 
The essence of t h i s defence i s that the p l a i n t i f f has permitted 
the defendant to accumulate the thing of whose escape the p l a i n t i f f i s 
complaining then the defendant w i l l not be l i a b l e to the p l a i n t i f f 
under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher when the thing escapes. Consent 
of the p l a i n t i f f was the f i r s t j u d i c i a l l y recognised defence to an 
action i n Rylands v Fletcher a f t e r Blackburn J.'s judgment i n that 
case, i t s existence being acknowledged i n Ca r s t a i r s v Taylor i n 1871 • 
The defence has been most often worked i n cases where one 
tenant suffers damage as a r e s u l t of seepage of water from part of the 
building occupied by the landlord. Thus when a person becomes tenant 
of premises at a time when the condition of adjoining premises which 
are occuped by the landlord i s such that a Rylands v Fletcher type 
occurrence i s possible he i s considered to be consenting to the r i s k 
of the occurrence actually taking place. I t was held i n 1877 i n 
2 
Humphries v Cousins that the pri n c i p l e of implied consent applies 
only where the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant are i n a landlord and 
tenant relationship to one another although i t i s submitted that cases 
are imaginable in which implied consent would exist as between two 
tenants (Ross v Fedden established such consent between occupiers). 
The value of the defence w i l l i n any case be greatest when the claim 
i s against a landlord because of the established pri n c i p l e that a 
tenant takes the premises from the landlord i n the condition they 
are i n at the time and i s e n t i t l e d to complain only of negligent 
injury emanating from beyond the demised premises unless there i s a 
3 
covenant affording additional protection. 
1. 1871 L.R. Ex. 217. 86. 
2 . 1877 2 C.P.D. 239. 
3 . See Bottomlev y Bannister 1932 1 K.B. 458, 468. G. Williams i n Duties of Non-uccupersin Respect of Dangerous Premises 5 M.L.R. 
'IHH a t ttafes AY\ T.n riWi afivoriar.pR a rnitv t o warn ncra-inst. known Haneper. 
The defence, as stated above, was f i r s t seen i n C a r s t a i r s v 
Taylor . I n that case the p l a i n t i f f s hired the ground floor of a 
warehouse from the defendant, the upper part of which warehouse the 
defendant himself occupied. The water from the roof was collected 
by gutters into a box, from which i t was discharged by a pipe into 
the drains. A hole was made in the box by a r a t , as a r e s u l t of 
which water entered the warehouse and damaged the p l a i n t i f f ' s goods. 
I t was found as a fact that the defendant had used reasonable care 
i n examining and seeing to the safety of both the gutters and the 
box. The case came before the Court of Exchequer which consisted of 
Bramwell, Martin and Pigott B.B. They unanimously agreed that no 
k 
action l a y under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher, Bramwell B. saying: 
"But I am c l e a r l y of the opinion that there i s a material difference 
5 
between the cases. In Rylands v Fletcher the defendant, for h i s own 
purposes, conducted the water to the place from which i t got into the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s premises. Here the conducting of the water was no more 
for the benefit of the defendant than of the p l a i n t i f f s . I f they had 
been adjacent owners, i t would have been for the benefit of the adjacent 
owner that the water from his roof was collected, and the case would 
have been within the decision i n Rylands v Fletcher; but here the roof 
was for the common protection of both, and the c o l l e c t i o n of the water 
running from i t was also for th e i r j o i n t benefit Here the 
p l a i n t i f f s must be taken to have consented to t h i s c o l l e c t i o n of the 
water which was for t h e i r own benefit, and the defendant can only be 
l i a b l e i f he v/as guilty of negligence." Another case where the defence 
was successfully pleaded was Kiddle v City Business Properties Ltd. 
4. At page 221. 
5. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
6. 19^2 1 K.B. 269. 
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where an overflow of rainwater from a blocked gutter at the bottom of 
a sloping roof in the possession of the landlord, and above the tenant's 
premises, damaged the stock i n the tenant's premises. I t must be remem-
bered i n t h i s context that i f the damage i s caused by a domestic water 
supply then the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher w i l l i n any event be inapplicable 
since the domestic supply w i l l be regarded as being a natural user of 
land. 
I t w i l l be seen from the judgment of Bramwell B. i n C a r s t a i r s v 
1 
Taylor , quoted above, that the existence of a 'common benefit 1 plays a 
7 
s i g n i f i c a n t part i n t h i s defence. Winfield treats consent of the 
p l a i n t i f f and common benefit as two separate defences although he 
accepts that they are very cl o s e l y linked. The best view, i t i s sub-
mitted, i s that if, the accumulation benefits both the p l a i n t i f f and the 
defendant then that i s an important factor i n determining whether the 
p l a i n t i f f can be regarded as having consented as having consontod. This 
was made c l e a r i n the judgments of the Court of Appeal i n Peters v Prince 
g 
of Wales Theatre (Birmingham) Ltd., where the occupants of the premises 
were thus deemed to have consented to the r i s k and where a water closet 
9 
was i n s t a l l e d i n Ross v Fedden and also where water pipes were f i t t e d 
10 
i n Anderson v Oppenheimer. That common benefit i s not a defence i n 
i t s own right but merely a factor, a l b e i t an important one, i n estab-
l i s h i n g consent can be further seen from the fact that the defence i s 
not available where the i n s t a l l a t i o n was set up a f t e r the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
11 
tenancy had commenced nor where the p l a i n t i f f has i n no way consented 
to the r i s k i n sp i t e of deriving a benefit from the i n s t a l l a t i o n as 
12 
was the case i n North West U t i l i t i e s v London Guarantee Corp. where 
a consumer of gas suffered damage to his house as a r e s u l t of pipes i n 
the control of the supplier exploding i n an adjacent road. 
7. pages ^23 and h'2k. 
8 . 19^3 K.B.73- 00 12. 1936 A.C. 108. 
9 . 1872 L.R. 7 Q.B. 661. ° 0 , 
10. 1880 5 Q.B.D. 602. 
11. See the comment on the Western Engraving Co. v Film Laboratories 1936 
1 AER 106 i n the Peters case at 19V5 K".B. '?} at page V9. 
I t should be remarked f i n a l l y that although consent of the 
p l a i n t i f f i s a defence to an action i n Rylands v Fletcher the p l a i n t i f f 
w i l l s t i l l be able to succeed i f he can establish negligence. Thus, 
13 
f o r example, i t was held i n Prosser v Levy that a p l a i n t i f f could 
not be held to have consented to the existence of a dangerous water 
supply connection. 
13. 1955 3 A.E.R. 577. 
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Part VggE 
Default of the P l a i n t i f f 
1 This defence was noted by Blackburn J. i n Rylands v Fletcher 
i t s e l f and was shortly afterwards pleaded successfully i n a case of 
2 
s i m i l a r facts, Dunn v Birmingham Canal Co., when a mine-owner, knowing 
that there was danger of his mine being flooded by his neighbour's 
operations on adjoining land, courted the danger by working a mine 
under the defendant's canal. 
By analogy with nuisance there w i l l be no action i n the absence 
of negligence i n cases where the damage occurred only because of the 
unusual s e n s i t i v i t y of the p l a i n t i f f ' s property or the use to which i t 
3 
i s put. Thus i n Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v Cape Town 
i+ 
Tramways Companies the p l a i n t i f f s , who complained that the defendant's 
tramways caused e l e c t r i c a l interference with the receiving of messages 
through t h e i r submarine cable, f a i l e d because no damage to the cable 
i t s e l f was occasioned and "a man cannot increase the l i a b i l i t i e s of 
his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether 
for business or pleasure". ^  This need f o r there to be no element of 
special use would suggest a need f o r natural user by the p l a i n t i f f as 
well as by the defendant as was suggested i n the Scottish case of 
Western Silver Fox Ranch Ltd., v County Council of Ross and Cromarty 
where Lord Patrick said: "The 'special use' of land by a neighbour 
to which the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher w i l l not apply muBt be a 
non-natural use, and I do not regard the use of land f o r the breeding 
g 
of s i l v e r foxes as a non-natural use of land." This decision i n the 
Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. case must have been affected 
1. 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
2. 1872 L.R. 7 Q.B. Mt. 
3. For nuisance see Robinson v K i l v e r t 1889 41 Ch. D.88. 
4. 1902 A.C. 381. 
5. At page 393. 
6. 1940 5 L.T.lMt. 90. 7. At page 147. 8 c.f. Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v EmmefrE. 
by considerations of policy as i t would have seriously hampered a wide-
spread and beneficial a c t i v i t y i f the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher was 
applied to the use of earth as a return f o r e l e c t r i c currents. 
1 
I n Rylands v Fletcher Blackburn J. c l e a r l y considered that any 
default on the part of the p l a i n t i f f excluded the defendant's l i a b i l i t y 
altogether. I t seems now however that apportionment under the provisions 
of the Law Reform (Contributory NegligenceO Act of 1?A5 w i l l apply i n 
such circumstances. Under t h i s Act opportionment i s authorised whenever 
1. the defendant's f a u l t consists i n 'negligence, breach of 
duty or other act or omission which gives r i s e to a 
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t ' and 
2. the p l a i n t i f f ' s f a u l t 'would, apart from the Act, have 
given r i s e to the defence of contributory negligence.' 
The f i r s t requirement clearly includes a l l t o r t i o u s claims 
including those of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . The second requirement l i t e r a l l y 
exempts from apportionment a l l cases where contributory negligence was 
not a defence at common law. However t h i s requirement i s generally 
interpreted i n a l i b e r a l fashion and there seems to be l i t t l e doubt that 
9 
the Act i s applicable to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. 
9« The textbook writers are i n agreement on t h i s point. See e.g., 
Fleming P.228, Street P. 253-
91. 
CHAPTER V I I I 
Risk and Fault 
The existence of a law of t o r t s i n i t s present form i s due to 
the need of society to reconcile two basic but c o n f l i c t i n g interests of 
men. On the one hand there i s the interest which w e i a l l share i n the 
welfare of the indi v i d u a l and i n his r i g h t not to suffer harm at the 
hands of other men and on the other there i s the r i g h t to ind i v i d u a l 
freedom of action which i s an inherent part of the democratic state. 
The int e r e s t i n in d i v i d u a l welfare and safety requires that i f one man 
causes damage to another then he must pay compensation to the victim 
regardless of whether the damage was caused i n t e n t i o n a l l y , recklessly 
or by negligence or indeed accidentally. The interest i n individual 
freedom i n cases of t h i s nature, accepting that for the benefit of society 
as a whole t h i s freedom can never be complete, requires that compensation 
should be paid only i n cases v/here the causer of the harm acted i n a 
deliberate, reckless or negligent manner. The f i r s t i n terest results i n 
a 'r i s k ' concept of damages - we must accept any r i s k of damage that our 
actions may involve - and the second int e r e s t results i n a ' f a u l t ' concept 
of damages - compensation i s payable only where f a u l t can be established. 
I t i s these c o n f l i c t i n g concepts of r i s k and f a u l t that the law of t o r t s 
i s constantly attempting to reconcile. 
We have noted i n our study of the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher that 
that r u l e started o f f i n the 1860s as a rule of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y as f a r ,. 
2 
as the jud i c i a r y were concerned . This, as we saw, was less than the 
complete t r u t h . Blackburn J. i n his judgment in" Rylands v Fletcher^ said 
that the defendant "can excuse himself by showing that the escape was 
owing to the p l a i n t i f f ' s default^ or, perhaps, that the escape was the 
consequence of vis major, or the act of God." Not only did the judge 
ensure i n t h i s sentence that the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher could never 
1. See i n p a r t i c u l a r Fleming pages 7 - 9 and 271 - 276. 
2. See CJhapter 1 page 1 © 1866 L.K. 1 Ex. 2h*. Q2. k. At uaees 279 - 280. 
be regarded as one of absolute l i a b i l i t y but he ensured also, i t i s 
submitted, that the rule could only with d i f f i c u l t y be regarded as one 
of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . This d i f f i c u l t y was subsequently accentuated by 
the gradual development of the f i v e defences of Act of God, statutory 
authority, consent of the p l a i n t i f f , f a u l t of the p l a i n t i f f or contributory 
negligence and, most p a r t i c u l a r l y , act of a stranger. The strictness of 
the l i a b i l i t y has also been affected by such factors as the doubt over 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of recovering damages f o r personal i n j u r y and the supple-
mentary requirement imposed by the House of Lords that thereimust be some 
non-natural user of land. As a result i t i s suggested that i n 1973 the 
rule i n Rylands v Fletcher, i f we return to the terminology of the f i r s t 
paragraph, while s t i l l tending to be based more en a r i s k than on a f a u l t 
concept, must be regarded as resting at some stage i n between these two 
extremes. 
I t has been said by various writers on a large number of occasions 
5 
i n recent years that t h i s move away from a 'ris k ' basis of l i a b i l i t y i n 
Rylands v Fletcher has coincided with a marked s h i f t of emphasis i n the 
t o r t of negligence away from f a u l t and i n the direction of r i s k . This, 
i f t r u e , would c l e a r l y mean a far closer alliance between the two t o r t s 
than has ever been the case since Blackburn J.'s judgment and indeed, i f 
taken to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, would result i n a merger between them. 
I f t h i s took place the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher, surrounded as i t i s by 
such t e c h n i c a l i t i e s as, for example, the necessity for there to be an 
escape, would be a redundant rule and we .-would have reached a s i t u a t i o n 
where there was one rule of law to cover a l l non-intentional t o r t s of t h i s 
nature. The occurrence of t h i s s h i f t of emphasis i n the t o r t of negligence 
i s thus of cru c i a l significance to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher and must 
be considered at some length. F i r s t , however, i t would be as well^to 
remind ourselves of some relevant aspects of the h i s t o r i c a l background 
and development of the two t o r t s . 
5. See Fleming i n .particular. 93-
Early lav;, as Winfield has shown, never accepted a p r i n c i p l e of 
absolute l i a b i l i t y . L i a b i l i t y was s t r i c t , however, and the presence of 
any notion of f a u l t was d i f f i c u l t to discern although i t was not wholly 
excluded. The need fo r a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i n early law i s apparent when 
we realise that the existence of t h i s p r i m i t i v e law was due to the desire 
to provide an alternative to private vengeance and to give society some 
means of keeping i t s own peace and order. 
As time went on man became less violent and more c i v i l i s e d - to 
use the words of Hobbies he was less ' s o l i t a r y , poor, nasty, brutish and 
short' - and moral factors came to play a greater part i n the interpreta-
t i o n of the law. Principles of natural law came to be quoted once more 
i n England i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor should the 
influence of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution be underestimated f o r i n t h i s age 
of the as yet undisciplined machine the growth of industry would have 
been s t i f l e d i f i t had been l i a b l e for the occurrence of unavoidable 
accidents f o r t h i s would have meant that the enterprise would have either 
had to cease to function or to bear the cost of a l l accidents at a stage 
7 
i n i t s development when i t could not easily shoulder t h i s burden. 
Another reason for the nineteenth century move towards a f a u l t 
concept was that the role of the t o r t remedy was seen then as being penal 
rather than compensatory. The law of t o r t s was regarded as an extension 
of the criminal law, exacting fines on those who were at f a u l t . This 
view seems to have been f i r s t put forward by Jeremy Bentham who main-
tained that the underlying object of c i v i l and criminal law was the same. 
Austin agreed, saying i n Lecture 27 that "although the proximate end of 
a c i v i l sanction is, generally speaking, redress to the injured party, 
i t s remote and paramount end, l i k e that of a criminal sanction, i s the 
prevention of offences generally." This b e l i e f i n a deterrent t o r t law 
6. 'The Myth of Absolute L i a b i l i t y ' . k2 L.Q.R. 37. . 
7. Woodward 'Reality and Social Reform: Transition from Laussez Faire 
to Welfare State.' 72 Yale L.J. 286. (1962). J 
9k. 
i s philosophically unreliable f o r , as Glanville Williams t e l l s us, 
u t i l i t a r i a n philosophy of which both Bentham and. Austin were exponents 
required that a punishment must not be greater than i s necessary to 
repress the mischief i n question. Damages may, however, be f a r greater 
than i s required as a deterrent f o r they can be based on losses© far i n 
excess of those forseeable at the time of the tortious act. 
Today the nineteenth century process i s being reversed and the 
law of negligence i s coming more and more to be based on compensatory 
factors and thus on concepts of r i s k rather than of f a u l t . The classic 
d e f i n i t i o n of negligence, given by Alderson B. i n Blyth v Birmingham 
9 
Waterworks Co. i s that "negligence i s the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided upon these considerations which o r d i n a r i l y 
regulate the conduct of human a f f a i r s , would do, or doing something which 
a prudent and reasonable man would not do." This objective standard of 
care has l i t t l e connection with notions of personal f a u l t for accident 
victims frequently obtain damages f o r accidents caused by those who did 
the best they could to avoid the accident but f a i l e d to l i v e up to the 
highest standards of care. In these cases society c l e a r l y puts the 
need fo r compensation above the deterrent value of the law. 
I t i s useful at t h i s stage i n our analysis of the recent develop-
ments i n negligence to study various rules whose opecation imposes v/hat 
i s i n r e a l i t y a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y although'they are disguised 
as ordinary rules applying to the t o r t of negligence. The most important 
of these rules i n res ipsa l o q u i t u r . This i s a rule of evidence whereby 
a p l a i n t i f f i s permitted to establish negligence on the part of the 
defendant without having to prove any specific act or omission. The 
rule w i l l apply where there i s an absence of any other explanation, the 
harm i s of such a kind that i t does not normally occur i f proper care i s 
8. k e . L . P . 137 at page i V t . 
9. 1856 11 Exch. 781 at page 78^. 
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taken and the cause of the accident was within the exclusive control of 
the defendant. The use of the maxim i s intended t o establish only a 
prima facie case but where i t i s applicable' the p l a i n t i f f w i l l almost 
invariably succeed. Res ipsa l o q u i t u r has come to cover a wide range 
of situations and plays an important part i n modern accident l i t i g a t i o n . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that New Zealand has a statutory equivalent to 
res ipsa loq u i t u r i n the Coal Mines Act of 1923 where there i s a provision 
that any accident occuring i n a mine i s to be treated prima facie as 
occurring because of some negligence on the part of the owner of the mine. 
Also of much importance i s the j u d i c i a l device of construing a 
large number of criminal safety statutes as sources of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y . 
S*+5(8) of the Copyright Act 1936 enacts that certain contraventions of 
the statute are actionable 'as a breach of statutory duty' and there i s 
a similar provision i n the Factories Acts but such provisions are not 
found i n many statutes. The majority of penal Acts of Parliament do 
not take the p o s s i b i l i t y of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i n t o account but neither do 
they exclude i t and the courts have frequently considered the unexcused 
v i o l a t i o n of a safety statute as tantamount to negligence per se. This 
doctrine i s often said to be based on a presumed inten t i o n of the l e g i s -
lature but i t i s i n r e a l i t y a f i c t i o n for the silence would rather 
suggest either than c i v i l l i a b i l i t y was not intended or that the p o s s i b i l i t y 
was never even considered. 
Insurance has also had a part to play, a l b e i t a lesser one, i n 
the move towards a negligence without f a u l t . English law has for the 
most part adhered to the f i c t i o n that insurance has no influence on the 
mind of a judge when determining l i a b i l i t y but i t does have an effect 
both i n the fact that i t s presence may make the judge more l i k e l y to 
f i n d i n favour of the p l a i n t i f f and because i t provides new guidelines 
96. 
f o r the settlement of claims between insurance companies so th a t , f o r 
example, compromises are often reached i n motoring cases without regard 
to whether negligence could be established. 
The affect of these devices i s to a l t e r the established principles 
of the t o r t of negligence. They show the increasing r e a l i s a t i o n that with 
the number of accidents our advanced technological age makes inevitable 
we can no longer r e a l i s t i c a l l y t a l k i n terms of the deterrent toalue of 
t o r t law. The real deterrents to the causing of accidents are penal 
sanctions and insurance premiums and the law of t o r t i s becoming more and 
more compensatory i n function. This trend can be seen also i n certain 
areas of the recent case law as we w i l l now see. 
We have already noted the trend towards making l i a b i l i t y s t r i c t e r 
10 
by raising the standard of care i n certain circumstances. I n addition 
to t h i s there are p a r t i c u l a r areas of substantive law i n which modern 
developments have led to a wider and s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y i n 
negligence and a move towards a r i s k rather than a f a u l t basis of 
l i a b i l i t y . One of the more important of these areas i s that covered by 
11 
the case of Donoghue v Stevenson which l a i d down a general p r i n c i p l e 
of l i a b i l i t y for a r t i c l e s which are dangerous when negligently manu-
factured. In that case the o r i g i n a l p l a i n t i f f drank a b o t t l e of ginger 
beer which a f r i e n d had bought from a r e t a i l e r and given to her. The 
b o t t l e was alleged to contain the decomposed remains of a s n a i l which 
could not be detected because of the opacity of the b o t t l e . She was i l l 
as a result and sued the manufacturer f o r damages. The House of Lords, 
by a three to two majority, held that the manufacturer was l i a b l e , Lord 
12 
Atkin saying: "a manufacturer of products which he s e l l s i n such a 
form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer i n 
the form i n which they l e f t him with no reasonable p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r -
mediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable 
10. See page «|5 
11. 1932 A.C. 562. 
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care i n the preparation of putting up the products w i l l result i n an 
i n j u r y to the consumer's l i f e or property, owes a duty to the consumer 
to take that reasonable care." Prior to t h i s case the courts had followed 
13 
the decision i n Winterbottom v Wright i n 19^2 which was interpreted as 
deciding that conduct which constitutes a breach of a contractual obliga-
t i o n to B could not at the same time furnish a cause of action for breach 
of a t o r t i o u s duty to A. I n 18^2 the court f e l t that the growth of 
industry should not be impeded by increasing i t s potential range of 
l i a b i l i t y ; i n 1932 the House of Lords f e l t that i n cases such as t h i s 
i t was r i g h t that the manufacturer should bear the r i s k of i n j u r y 
i n j u r y to the ultimate consumer. 
Clearly i n such a case as Donoghue v Stevenson i t w i l l be almost 
impossible f o r the p l a i n t i f f to prove the defendant's knowledge. Lord 
Macmillan however said that "there i s no presumption of negligence i n 
such a case as the present nor i s there any j u s t i f i c a t i o n for applying 
the maxim, res ipsa l o q u i t u r . " The legal position was seen i n Grant v 
15 
Australian K n i t t i n g M i l l s as being that " i f excess sulphites were l e f t 
i n the garment, that could only be becuase someone was at f a u l t . The 
appellant i s not required to lay his finger on the exact person i n a l l 
the chain who was responsible, or to specify what he 61x1 wrong. Negligence 
iS found as a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken 
i n connection with a l l the known circumstances." I n Daniels and Daniels 
16 
v White and Sons Ltd. and Tarbard where the contents of a lemonade 
acid 
b o t t l e included carbolic/ scA i t was held that the defendants had not 
rebutt.ed.r the inference of negligence. This c l e a r l y establishes a rule 
of evidence for cases of t h i s nature which i s , despite what Lord Hac-
Millan said, the equivalent of res ipsa l o q u i t u r . This pr i n c i p l e 
stemming from Donoghue v Stevenson now has wide application - manufacturer 
for example includes assembers and repairers and products includes hair-
dye and even motor cars. 
13. 1842 Mand W 109. *\k. At page 6225 936 A.C. 85 at page 101. 98. 6 938 k A E.R. 258. 
The intervention of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n recent years has also shown 
a desire to create s t r i c t e r l i a b i l i t y i n the law of t o r t . Thus the 
employer's common law duty of care to his workmen was summed up by 
17 
Lord Wright i n Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v English as being "a duty 
which rests on the employer and which i s personal to the employer, to 
take reasonable care f o r the safety of his workmen, whether the employer 
be an i n d i v i d u a l , a firm or a company, and whether or not the employer 
takes any share i n the conduct of the operation." The duty according to 
the House of Lords i n that case i s threefold - the provision of a com-
petent s t a f f of men, adequate material, and a proper system and effective 
supervision. The duty i s personal but any l i a b i l i t y i s s t i l l f o r negligenc 
and i s not imposed regardless of f a u l t - "the obligation i s f u l f i l l e d by 
the exercise of due care and s k i l l " (Lord Wright). The l e g i s l a t i v e 
considered that i n one important respect t h i s common law duty was not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y severe f o r the Adequate protection of workmen and thus i n 
1969 the Employers' L i a b i l i t y (Defective Equipment) Act was put on the 
Statute book. This Act applies only to defective equipment which includes 
plant and machinery, vehicles, a i r c r a f t and clothing provided by the 
employer for the purpose of his business. Even where the defect can be 
att r i b u t e d to the negligence of a t h i r d party or independent contractor 
the employer w i l l be l i a b l e for personal i n j u r i e s suffered by the-
employee i n the course of his employment. This, then, i s one small 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the legislature's inew that i n modern times a s t r i c t e r 
form of l i a b i l i t y should be applied i n certain circumstances than was 
previously the case. 
L i a b i l i t y for the acts of animals i s another area i n which statute 
has recently strengthened the old law of negligence. There has always 
been a duty to take care that an animal under one's control does not 
become a source of harm to others. Thus the House of Lords held i n 
17. 1958 A.C.57 at page 84. 
18. 1932 A.E.R. 81. 
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1932 i n Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington that "quite apart faom the l i a b i l i t y 
imposed upon the owner of animals or the person having control of them 
by reason of knowledge of t h e i r propensities, there i s the ordinary 
duty of a person to take care either that his animal or his ch a t t e l i s 
not put to such a use as i s l i k e l y to in j u r e his neighbour " 
There was however an exception to t h i s l i a b i l i t y for negligence which 
flowed from the anomalous rule that an owner o r occupier of land owes 
no duty to users of an adjoining highway to maintain fencing and prevent 
his livestock from straying i n t o the road. This rule originated before 
the inclosure movement of the eighteenth century reshaped the English 
countryside and before the advent of the motor car which increased the 
threat of roaming c a t t l e to the t r a v e l l i n g public. As l a t e as 19^ +6, 
19 
i n Searle v Wallbank, the House of Lords refused toieconsider t h i s r u l e . 
Thus when the leg i s l a t u r e codified a large part of the law r e l a t i n g to 
animals i n the Animals Act of 1971 the Act both made existing l i a b i l i t y 
more s t r i c t i n many cases by, for example, imposing s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y 
f o r damage done by an animal which belongs to a dangerous species (S2(1)) 
and f o r damage caused by any other animal i n consequence of i t s mischievous 
propensity of which the keeper i s aware and also introduced for the f i r s t 
time l i a b i l i t y f o r animals straying on to the highway. S8(1) Animals Act 
thus states that 'so much of the rules of the common law r e l a t i n g t o 
l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence as excludes or r e s t r i c t s the duty which a person 
might owe to others to take such care as i s reasonable to see that damage 
i s not caused by animals straying on to a highway i s hereby abolished.* 
This then i s another example of modern reform of the law of negligence 
re s u l t i n g i n both a widening of the l i m i t s of the law and i n an increasingly 
s t r i c t form of l i a b i l i t y . 
A further example of t h i s new type of negligence i s the recent 
18. 1932 A.E.R. 81. 
19. 19^7 A.G. 3^1. 
20. 1971 P q n . r'ljr Cc . f l . ) 1972 2 w , L . n . i a i ? ( I L L . ) 
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development i n the f i e l d of vicarious l i a b i l i t y . Vicarious l i a b i l i t y 
exists where one person i s held l i a b l e f o r the misconduct of another 
although he himself i s free from f a u l t . Thus, although f a u l t i s present, 
as f a r as the person held l i a b l e i s concerned t h i s i s an instance of 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . Vicarious l i a b i l i t y has been a part of the English 
20 
law f o r many years but the recent case of Morgans v Launchbury has 
brought i t to the forefront as a means of extending r i s k rather than 
f a u l t concepts i n t o an area of law which had previously been the domain 
solely of t r a d i t i o n a l principles of negligence. I n Morgans v Launchbury 
the defendant owned a motor car which v/as insured i n her name but which 
was driven regularly by her husband. On the night i n question he asked 
a friend of his to drive the car because he had had too much to drink 
and had promised his wife that i f he was u n f i t to drive he would get some-
one else to do so. Due to the friend's negligence there was an accident 
i n which both husband and friend were k i l l e d and the p l a i n t i f f , who was 
a passenger i n the car, was injured. The t r i a l judge ^bund i n favour 
21 
of the p l a i n t i f f . 
Normally i n such cases as t h i s the court asks whether the driver 
was drivi n g as the owner's agent - with the owner's permission and f o r a 
purpose which v/as at least p a r t l y the owner's purpose. On t h i s basis 
22 
Megaw L.J., who dissented i n the Court of Appeal, considered that the 
husband was using the car for his own purpose - a pub-crawl - and there-
fore the wife could not be l i a b l e . The majority disagreed, however, and 
upheld the verdict of the t r i a l judge. In doing so they put l i a b i l i t y 
on a risk-bearing basis and they did t h i s for reasons of policy; i n t h i s 
case because of certain factors r e l a t i n g to insurance. 
Under the insurance policy i n force the insurers were obliged to 
indemnify only the wife. Thus by holding the wife l i a b l e the court 
secured the benefit of the insurance policy f o r the victims of the 
20. 1971 2 Q.B. 2^5 (C.A.), 1972 2 W.L.R. 1217 (H.L.) 
21. See 1971 C.L.J. 195 and 1972 L.Q.R. M*9. 
22. 1971 2 Q.B. 2^5 at page 261. 
accident and also saved the wife from criminal l i a b i l i t y and from 
potential c i v i l l i a b i l i t y (against which she was not insured) under 
23 
the rule i n Monk v Warbey (the policy did not contain the usual 
extension to persons drivin g on her orders or with her permission and 
under S.201 of the Road T r a f f i c Act 196O i t i s unlawful for one person 
to permit another to use a motor vehicle on a road unless there i s i n 
force a policy of insurance i n r e l a t i o n to the user of the vehicle by 
that other person). 
S t r i c t l y speaking these principles of insurance should have no 
relevance when deciding such cases as Morgans v Launchbury and that was 
the approach taken by Megaw L.J. , Edmund Davies L.J. avoided any discus-
sion of the insurance but he did appear to bend his interpretation of 
Zh 
the facts to take account of the insurance position. Lord Denning 
was more r e a l i s t i c i n admitting the affect of insurance on his judgment. 
He stated, r i g h t l y i t i s submitted, that the policy behind vicarious 
l i a b i l i t y i s "to put the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on to the person who.ought i n 
25 
j u s t i c e to bear i t . " He then went on to say that the owner should 
usually bear t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because i t w i l l be he or she who put 
the car on the road and should be insured i n respect of i t . I t seems, 
though, that t h i s i s an unjust burden to put upon the wife for she 
cannot reasonably be expected to be insured f o r a l l eventualities. The 
real reason for putting t h i s burden on the wife was revealed when Lord 
Denning said that since the wife owned the car "when her husband was 
using i t , he was using i t as her 'agent' i n the sense that, i f he was 
involved i n an accident, she ought to bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , especially 
26 
as she was the one who was insured." Thus Lord Denning clear l y put the 
moral pr i n c i p l e of a l l o t t i n g the r i s k to whoever could best afford to 
bear i t above principles of substantive law. This then i s an outstanding 
example of a court deciding a case on the basis of who i t thinks ought 
to bear the r i s k and not on whether the wife was i n any way at f a u l t 
according to the recognised principles of negligence. 23. 1935 1 K.B. 75. %\ it fail III'. 102. 2 6 ' ^ page 257. 
However the House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and 
rejected Lord Denning's 'modern' approach to the question. Their Lordships 
recognised the inadequacy of the law i n modern conditions but considered 
that i t was beyond the power of the courts to a l t e r the legal position by 
taking such factors as insurance i n t o account - that can be done only by 
27 
Parliament. Jolowicg, w r i t i n g i n the Cambridge Lav; Journal, considers 
that Parliament should act on t h i s matter and that the owner of the car 
should be made c i v i l l y l i a b l e f o r the negligence of a l l permitted drivers. 
The Lords also decisively rejected such references to substantive law made 
by Lord Denning as his statement that "the owner of h i r e r i s at common 
law responsible for a l l i n j u r y or damage done by his permitted driver i n 
28 29 the negligent drivin g of the car." Lord Wilberforce said that " i t has 
never been held that mere permission i s enough to establish vicarious 
l i a b i l i t y " and that the car was c l e a r l y being used f o r the husband's pur-
poses at the time of the accident. Thus the Court of Appeal's decision 
i n Morgans v Launchbury i s not good law but that does not a l t e r the fact 
that Lord Denning, with assistance from Edmund Davies L.J., attempted to 
restate substantive law so that i t would f i t i n with risk-bearing rather 
than f a u l t theories. This l i n k between policy, insurance and new principles 
of t o r t law w i l l be studied again i n the next chapter but i t i s worthy of 
note at t h i s stage as an example of the ease with which the courts can 
increase (and therefore also decrease) the strictness of l i a b i l i t y i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r case. 
We can thus see that we are returning to a s i t u a t i o n i n which the 
emphasis i s placed on the compensatory function of the law of t o r t . 
Negligence i s i n many ways a s t r i c t e r form of l i a b i l i t y than i t has ever 
been; i t i s , as v/e have attempted to show, quite frequently as s t r i c t as 
i s l i a b i l i t y under the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher and negligence has, of 
27. 1971 CL.J. 195. 
28. At page 255-
29. 1972 2 W.L.R. 1217 at page 1220. 
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course, the additional advantage of lacking the a r t i f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s 
which such concepts as escape and non-natural user of land impose upon 
the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. Negligence has gained for i t s e l f a 
position of pre-eminence i n the law of t o r t and Rylands v Fletcher has 
had l e f t to i t only a l i m i t e d f i e l d of serai-strict l i a b i l i t y whose 
independence from the principles of negligence i s constantly lessening. 
Negligence has shown i t s e l f to have a capacity for growth and adaptability 
which i s e n t i r e l y foreign to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher. 
I r o n i c a l l y , just at the time when negligence has attained such 
30 
growth, the f i r s t signs of i t s decline are discernible. As Millner 
puts i t so aptly: "fostered by the individualism of the nineteenth 
century, whose needs and s p i r i t s i t accurately r e f l e c t s , negligence i s 
i n some ways basically unsuitable to the paternalistic society of the 
twentieth century." Negligence, despite i t s recent changes, s t i l l l i n k s 
the r i g h t to compensation f o r the p l a i n t i f f with the proof of f a u l t on 
the part of the defendant. Legal f a u l t .can perhaps be shown more easily 
ifc-i II U s y0 UerMiiiket. ~TJiy Mere. /s a favcf-A fkei^ &Jb<&*f*i* 
than i n the past but i t ^ s l o u l d be a r i g h t of the injured party - a feeling 
31 
voiced among others by Lord Kilbrandon i n 1966 and recently i n Parliament 
during the thalidomide controversy. This whole area of the law of t o r t , 
negligence and Rylands v Fletcher included, i s ripe f o r change and the 
f i r s t signs of a new approach are nov; evident. 
30. 'Negligence i n Modern Law' pages ZJ>h and 235* 
31. Hamlyn Lectures 'Other People's Law'. 
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CHAPTER IX 
The New Approach 
The i n i t i a l interest i n t h i s new approach came with the increasing 
rea l i s a t i o n that a victim's loss could be deemed to be an inevitable 
expense of a p a r t i c u l a r enterprise and should therefore i n j u s t i c e be 
di s t r i b u t e d to a l l those sections of the public which benefit, from the 
a c t i v i t y . This w i l l result i n the function of the law of t o r t being 
altered from that of s h i f t i n g to that of d i s t r i b u t i n g losses. The 
established rules pertaining to negligence are of course concerned with 
the apportionment of f a u l t and r e l y for t h e i r moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n on the 
premise that the person who i s held to be negligent i s genuinely at f a u l t 
and ought i n j u s t i c e to have his interest subordinated to that of the 
p l a i n t i f f . The new approach, where i t i s applied, i s more r e a l i s t i c and 
so more so c i a l l y acceptable^ for inherent i n i t i s the view that i n carrying 
on the a c t i v i t y which resulted i n the accident the p l a i n t i f f i s usually 
taking part i n a s o c i a l l y desirable but hazardous a c t i v i t y , whose inevitable 
by-product i s the occurrence of such mishaps and that therefore i t i s r i g h t 
that these expenses of the a c t i v i t y should be borne; not by t h i s one 
unfortunate p l a i n t i f f alone but by a l l those who benefit from the a c t i v i t y 
concerned. This selection of 'defendants' by reason of t h e i r social res-
p o n s i b i l i t y and f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y to absorb the costs of the a c t i v i t y may 
be termed 'loss d i s t r i b u t i o n ' . This l i n e of reasoning was seen a good 
many years ago when, i n the r e a l i s a t i o n that i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r i e s were the 
inevitable product of modern industry and despite the protests of the 
leg a l profession that to compensate employees regardless of f a u l t would 
make them less careful and result i n an increase i n accidents. Canada, 
beginning i n 1912, abolished the p r i n c i p l e of f a u l t - f i n d i n g so f a r as 
i n d u s t r i a l accidents were concerned. Industry i n Canada now bears the 
cost of a l l accidents to workmen regardless of f a u l t and a l l redress to 
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the courts has been abolished. 
Loss d i s t r i b u t i o n does not mean, however, that there w i l l be no 
circumstances i n which i t i s not best that one of the parties involved 
i n the accident should bear the loss. Thus as long ago as 1951* i n White 
2 
v White , Denning L.J., as he then was, said that "recent l e g i s l a t i v e and 
j u d i c i a l developments show that the c r i t e r i o n of l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t i s not 
so much c u l p a b i l i t y , but on whom should the r i s k f a l l . " The r i s k , as 
t h i s statement implies, should not always f a l l away from the participants 
i n the accident. Although we must accept that the primary function of 
the law of t o r t i s compensatory i t also has i t s use as a means of discouraging 
the person responsible from committing further such acts although i t s effect 
i n t h i s respect i s less than i s the effect of the l i k e l y increase i n 
insurance premiums following the accident. There w i l l be certain cases i n 
which i t i s r i g h t that the sufferer should bear the burden - f o r example 
householders invariably carry f i r e insurance and thus the courts consider 
that i t i s unwise to s h i f t the loss as the householder i s the best bearer 
of i t ^ - but i n the majority of cases i n which i t i s r i g h t that one party 
should accept the loss that party w i l l be the one whose conduct caused the 
accident. I n any event English Lav; has decided, at least i n part, to 
follow Canada over the question of workers' compensation for i n response 
to the growing feeling that workers were having to subsidise industry by 
frequently bearing the costs of accidents to themselves a system of social 
insurance was inaugurated i n 1 9 ^ following the Beveridge report so tha t 
a workman i s now e n t i t l e d to compensation for i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y regardless 
of f a u l t . 
Large changes, then, have taken place i n the apportionment of 
l i a b i l i t y for tortious acts i n recent year, changes v/hich frequently go 
1 . See Wright 'The Adequacy of the Law of Torts' 1961 C.L.J, page kk at page 5 1 . 
2 . 1950 P. 39 at page 59 . 
3 . See Atkinson v Newcastle Waterworks 1877 2 Ex. D. 4 *+1. 
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beyond simple statements i n law reports i n t o the realms of j u d i c i a l and, 
where applicable, jury psychology. By f a r the most s i g n i f i c a n t influence 
on these changes has been the steady growth of insurance against l i a b i l i t y . 
The presence of insurance has the effect that a judgment against the defen-
dant does not s h i f t the loss from the p l a i n t i f f to the defendant but rather 
di s t r i b u t e s the loss amongst a l l those persons who are insured against t h i s 
type of r i s k . Thus i n any case i n which the defendant i s insured with 
regard to the claim being made against him he i s i n r e a l i t y no more than 
a nominal party to the l i t i g a t i o n . 
One of the major results of t h i s general insurance i s the removal 
of any punitive effect which an adverse judgment and r e s u l t i n g damages 
might have on the defendant. We have noticed that fears were expressed 
i n Canada as to whether t h i s would lead to an increase i n the number of 
if 
accidents. Fleming quotes s t a t i s t i c s to show that t h i s has not been the 
case i n England but i t i s suggested that with the large number of factors 
influencing accident s t a t i s t i c s these figures prove very l i t t l e and that 
i n fact the deterrent value of the fear of paying large sums of money i n 
damages has been replaced, although perhaps with less e f f e c t , by the fear 
of having to pay increased insurance premiums following an accident, and, 
more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , by the fear of incurring penalties under the criminal 
law, i n p a r t i c u l a r for drivin g offences where drink i s involved. 
The influence which the absence or presence of insurance has on 
the minds of j u r i e s i n those countries following the common law system 
which s t i l l employ ju r i e s i n personal i n j u r y cases i s considerable. 
5 
Fleming makes the point that j u r i e s i n Australia are well aware, part i c u -
l a r l y i n cases involving motoring accidents, that i f they f i n d i n favour 
of the p l a i n t i f f the defendant, for whom they might otherwise f e e l equal 
sympathy, w i l l not be greatly out of pocket and that they can be generous 
4-. At page 1 1 . 
5 . At page 12. 
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i n the award of damages for the money w i l l come not from the defendant 
but from the seemingly l i m i t l e s s pocket of an insurance company. This 
has led to recent suggestions that the assessment of damages should be 
taken altogether out of the hands of j u r i e s and made an exlusive respon-
s i b i l i t y of the ju d i c i a r y - indeed the Winn Committee on Personal I n j u r i e s 
6 
L i t i g a t i o n went so far as to suggest that i n certain circumstances the 
question of damages should be assessed only by appellate courts. 
This does not a l t e r the fact that judges have been at least as 
much influenced by the growth of insurance as have j u r i e s . This v/as 
seen i n the consideration in'the l a s t chapter of the Court of Appeal 
7 
judgments i n Launchbury v Morganfrs where Lord Denning and Edmund Davies 
L.J. were greatly influenced by the presence of insurance. This interest 
g 
i n insurance was seen also i n the Court of Appeal i n S.C.M. v W h i t t a l l 
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd., v Martin and Co. 
9 10 (Contractors) Ltd. where Lord Denning said that the previous tests of 
negligence should be discarded and that the court should instead "consider 
the public relationships of those concerned i n the pa r t i c u l a r circumstances 
and see whether, as a matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable." 
I t can therefore be said with some certainty that factors r e l a t i n g to 
insurance now have a considerable influence on judgments i n personal i n j u r y 
cases. 
From a l l t h i s emerges the fact that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of losses 
between members of a section of society has become increasingly prevalent 
i n recent years. This system, though, i s s t i l l linked to the existence 
of t o r t l i a b i l i t y - before deciding how the loss i s to be distributed a 
decision has to be reached as to whether there i s i n fact any l i a b i l i t y 
on the facts of a pa r t i c u l a r case. The system v/hich i s becoming increas-
ingly favoured as the ultimate answer to compensation f o r accidents i s a 
system of f u l l and direct compensation payable to the victim without 
regard to v/ho caused the i n j u r y or to the allotment of resp o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the accident. This new system would mean that the sufferer would auto-
7". 1971 2 Q.B. 245. (? 0*nJ.U1i 9 . 1972 3 W.L.B. 502. 
8 . 1971.1 Q.B. 337. 108. 10. At page 508. 
matically obtain his damages without the need to go through the long and 
costly procedures of l i t i g a t i o n . The law of t o r t would be e n t i r e l y 
removed from personal i n j u r y cases for the purposes of compensation and 
the p c i n i t i v e element i n damages would be replaced by increased insurance 
premiums and by present and perhaps new criminal sanctions where appropriate. 
The arguments f o r and against such a system of direct compensation 
11 
were analysed at length i n the Woodhouse report i n New Zealand, a country 
whose laws at that time were very similar to the present position i n England. 
12 
This report was the work of a Royal Commission which was set up i n New 
Zealand i n 1966 to inquire i n t o the law r e l a t i n g to compensation and claims 
for damages fo r incapacity or death arisin g out of accidents suffered by 
persons i n employment. The Commission was to investigate any need for 
change i n the law, the administration of any new scheme suggested and the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of adopting any system of compensation i n operation elsewhere. 
The Woodhouse Committee considered the common law action of neg-
ligence i n some depth. They f e l t that the guiding principles f o r a system 
of compensation are community r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , comprehensive entitlement, 
13 
complete r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , r e a l compensation and administrative efficiency. 
I t was f e l t that the common law action of negligence f a i l e d to achieve 
13 
these objectives i n four major respects. These were that the moral 
basis of the action i s false i n that i t i s i n fact not the nature of the 
defendant's conduct but i t s results which dictate the question of damages, 
that l i t i g a t i o n so often results i n the f a i l u r e of an award to accurately 
r e f l e c t the losses i t i s supposed to be compensating f o r , that the procedure 
i s slow and costly and that the whole process acts as an impediment to the 
obtaining of compensation and to r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The members concluded 
that the common law process leads to a state of a f f a i r s where few of the 
many persons who are injured are ever able to benefit under i t and where 
1 1 . 'Compensation f o r Personal I n j u r y i n New Zealand.' 
12. The members were Mr. Justice Woodhouse (Chairman), H.L. Brockett and 
{p.A. Parsons. 
13. paragraph 55« 
only a small proportion of these receive a f u l l indemnity - Lord 
Parker has said that of those injured on the roads only three out 
of ten recover compensation. The Committee f e l t that the f a u l t p r i n c i p l e 
i s e r r a t i c and cannot l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f y the existence of the Common law 
remedy, the adversary system hinders the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of injured persons, 
the remedy i t s e l f provides a f u l l indemnity f o r very few and the system 
as a whole i s cumbersome and i n e f f i c i e n t . 
wanted to see i n force. This was a scheme which would provide *a 
uni f i e d and comprehensive system of accident prevention, r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
and compensation which w i l l avoid the disadvantages of the present 
processes and w i l l i t s e l f operate on a basis of consistent p r i n c i p l e . ' 
This scheme, amounting to a comprehensive system of social insurance, 
was i n the main part implemented i n New Zealand i n the Accident Compensa-
16 
t i o n Act 1972 . We w i l l consider now to what extent English Law already 
has such a scheme as t h i s , to what extent we can and should t r y to evolve 
a similar .system to that now applying i n New Zealand and, most important, 
where, i f at a l l , Rylands v Fletcher situations would f i t i n to the scheme 
for while we must accept that the cr i t i c i s m s which can be made of personal 
i n j u r y l i t i g a t i o n include Rylands v Fletcher actions there are elements 
peculiar to the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher which may mean that a d i f f e r e n t 
type of approach would be desirable. 
The only important reppect i n which English law already operates 
a scheme comparable to that envisaged by the Woodhouse Committee i s i n 
the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l accidents. By the end of the nineteenth century 
common law negligence was no longer able to cope with the social problems 
created by the vast volume of i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r i e s . The view took hold 
that industry's f i r s t charge was the welfare of i t s workers and that 
compensation ought to be given by industry and to be regarded as part of 
the costs of production. Thus the Workmen's Compensation Acts introduced 
the f i r s t system of social insurance i n t h i s country with entitlement as 
The Committee then went on to recommend the scheme which they 
14. IQfiS C.L.P.1 
^ «-M-l 
16. See 3*f H.L.R. 5*f2. 
of r i g h t without regard to the proof of f a u l t . Workers' compensation 
i s now the f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of industry, although i n practice 
the increased costs are di s t r i b u t e d even more widely through being 
passed on to the public. I t i s worth noting i n addition that accidents 
involving automobiles have attracted a new approach i n recent years. 
Technically they are s t i l l governed by common law negligence but the 
presence of insurance and i n p a r t i c u l a r of compulsory t h i r d party 
insurance has had a profound p r a c t i c a l influence and has led to a s i t u a -
t i o n where very few cases reach the courts and i n those that do there i s 
a v i r t u a l abandonment of the f a u l t p r i n c i p l e . 
Despite these instances of social insurance England has a long 
way to go before i n reaches the state envisaged i n New Zealand i n the 
Woodhouse report. That i t should do so i f reasonably practicable i s , i t 
i s submitted, desirable f o r the arguments put forward i n the report against 
the present system of compensation (common law damages i n p a r t i c u l a r ) and 
i n support of a comprehensive system of social insurance are strong. 
We must now b r i e f l y study the recent developments i n England which 
have increased the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a system being implemented i n the 
not too distant future. Committees have been set up i n t h i s country to 
consider the question. Notably there was the 1966 Committee on Personal 
17 
I n j u r i e s under Winn L.J. whose terms of reference were too narrow, which 
came to the remarkable conclusion that i t was-: the human element i n the 
system, and not the system i t s e l f , which was at f a u l t and which i n t o t a l 
did more to r e f l e c t than to reconcile the differences of opinion. Just 
before the Winn Report Lord Parker, i n his Presidential address to the 
18 
Bentham Society , said that the time had come for us to recognise the 
inadequacy of the present methods and to seek some new approach and i t 
i s strange that only i n recent months has the type of action been taken 
which seems as i f i t may lead to positive r e s u l t s . Something was needed 
to provide the i n i t i a l impetus, to turn the Government thoughts i n t o 
17. Cmnd. 3691. 
18. Reprinted i n 1965 C.L.P. Page 1 . 1 1 1 . 
action and to concentrate public opinion on t h i s matter and t h i s came 
i n l a t e 1972 with the controversy over the thalidomide children where 
the prospect of a long and complicated legal tussle between the parents 
and the D i s t i l l e r s Company which manufacturered the drug led to demands 
for a state compensation scheme to be introduced to meet such cases and 
to by-pass the common law process. At the height of the controversy the 
Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons on December 19th 1972 
the s e t t i n g up of an inquiry i n t o the basis of c i v i l l i a b i l i t y for the 
19 
causing of death or personal i n j u r y . The terms of reference of the 
Royal Commission are: to consider to what extent, i n v/hat circumstances 
and by what means compensation should be payable i n respect of death or 
personal i n j u r y (including ante-natal i n j u r y ) suffered by any person 
(a) i n the course of employment 
(b) through the use of a motor vehicle or other means of transport 
(c) through the manufacture, supply or use of goods or services 
(d) on premises belonging to or occupied by another 
(e) otherwise through the act or omission of another where 
compensation under the present law i s recoverable only 
on proof of f a u l t or under the rules of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y . 
Mr. Heath envisaged a committee of fourteen or f i f t e e n people 
including insurance actuaries, doctors, economists and representatives 
of employers and Trade Unions - the type of body which succeeded i n New 
Zealand as opposed to the disappointing Winn Committee which was composed 
almost e n t i r e l y of lawyers. The Chairman of the inquiry i s to be Lord 
Pearson. I t i s to be hoped that the Pearson Commission w i l l i n t e r p r e t 
i t s terms of reference as widely as seems intended. I t w i l l be some time 
before the results of i t s deliberations are known but what sort of view 
are the members l i k e l y to take of the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y and a d v i s a b i l i t y of 
implementing i n England a scheme along the lines of that now i n force i n 
New Zealand? 
19. The Times. December 20th 1972. 
I t i s important to realise that d i f f e r e n t social and economic 
conditions prevail i n t h i s country to New Zealand. England i s a far 
more densely and heavily populated country with a correspondingly f a r 
greater number of accidents involving personal i n j u r y . The administra-
t i o n of a comprehensive scheme of eompensation i n England would be 
expensive and, almost inev i t a b l y , slow. I f lawyers are to be briefed 
to appear before the tribunals assessing compensation, i f expense 
necessitates that tribunals are kept r e l a t i v e l y few i n number thus 
causing a large backlog of hearings; and i f appeals, even i f only on 
a point of law as the Woodhouse report recommended, are to be allowed 
as they must be, then i t i s possible that the whole process i n terms of 
time and cost w i l l not be greatly d i f f e r e n t from the common law process 
i t i s designed to replace. I t i s worth noting also that the common law 
system of l i a b i l i t y i s f a r more entrenched i n our society than i t was i n 
New Zealand where i t was transplanted i n i t s l a t e r stages of development. 
This, though, i s a less effective l i n e of argument fo r i f the common 
law process i s r e a l l y as deficient as i t i s made out to be then we must 
be prepared to accept some iconoclasm. Then there i s the problem of the 
presence of vested interests i n the common law process i n t h i s country 
which have a far greater r e s t r i c t i v e influence on change i n our more 
s t a t i c society than i n the developing nation of New Zealand. This, again, 
i t i s submitted, i s of l i t t l e importance; f i r s t because lawyers and most 
of the others involved i n the common law process may s t i l l have t h e i r 
parts to play i n the new system of compensation and secondly because 
•R 
such factors must not be allowed to i n t e r f e r e with ou|g endeavour to f i n d 
the best possible system f o r the population as a whole. 
Vested interests of certain groups i n society w i l l have to be 
appeased, but accepting t h i s and that the new system of compensation 
w i l l i n procedure be only marginally better than the common law process, 
113. 
i t i s ultimately on the merits of the two alternatives that our decision 
must re s t . I t was not because of social or economic conditions that 
New Zealand accepted the compensation system but because of the manifest 
f a i l i n g s of the l i a b i l i t y process. The time has come, i t i s submitted, 
to throw o f f the r e s t r i c t i v e shackles of our common law system and to 
venture in t o the new, more equitable and more easily understandable 
realms of a system of compensation for a l l i n j u r i e s . Many further 
d e t a i l s on the precise extent of the scheme and on the qu a l i f i c a t i o n s 
for entitlement would have to be worked out but i n pr i n c i p l e such a 
scheme must be most strongly recommended. 
Having said t h i s one must confess that the Pearson Commission, 
i f i t adopts the usual attitudes taken by committees i n t h i s country, 
may be far too cautious i n i t s recommendations. I t might for example 
recommend that the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher should be l e f t out of 
the scheme. Such caution would be disastrous as we v / i l l now see. 
The cr u c i a l question then, having accepted the p r i n c i p l e of 
such a scheme, i s where the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher w i l l f i t i n 
20 
to i t , i f at a l l . The element i n the rule which i s the major reason 
for i t being a t o r t of s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y i s the 'dangerous' quality of 
Rylands v Fletcher objects. There i s no doubt that a reasonable case 
can be made out f o r the proposition that whereas i n most accidents i t 
i s f a i r that the state should bear the loss, i n cases i n which the de-
fendant brings onto his land and keeps there some dangerous object i t 
i s r i g h t that the defendant should personally accept re s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the consequences. Thus i t can be argued that while i t i s f a i r that the 
State should accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an accident caused during the 
manufacture of lemonade we should not c o l l e c t i v e l y accept res p o n s i b i l i t y 
for an accident caused i n the manufacture of explosives or i n a nuclear 
establishment. 
20. The proposition that the rul e i n Rylands v Fletcher does not apply 
to i n j u r i e s to the person has been rejected - see Chapter I I I . 
The f a l l a c i e s i n t h i s argument are numerous however. F i r s t 
there i s the point, that we would s t i l l have to distinguish betv/een 
dangerous and non-dangerous objects - t h i s might lead to two separate 
processes of law, f i r s t the hearing before a t r i b u n a l under the new 
compensation scheme which might result i n a decision that the circum-
stances are outside the scheme and then i n t h i s case a hearing before 
the courts under the present system with a l l the disadvantages pointed 
out by Woodhouse and with the wastage i n time almost doubled. And then 
what i f the court considered that a dangerous object was involved but 
that the user of land was natural or that there had been no escape? 
Surely i n t h i s case we can not say that no damages are recoverable or 
are we to say that i f the Rylands v Fletcher action f a i l s , compensation 
w i l l be automatically payable under the new scheme i n which case the 
victim must f i r s t go to a t r i b u n a l to determine whether he prima facie 
comes within the compensation scheme, then go to court to sue i n Rylands 
v Fletcher and then, i f unsuccessful, go back to the tribunal? The 
t h i r d stage could be avoided by the t r i b u n a l making an award conditional 
on the Rylands v Fletcher action f a i l i n g but nevertheless the p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s are enormous. And what i f the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher 
c l e a r l y covers a s i t u a t i o n but negligence can also be established? For 
the state to give compensation would be absurd i f we are going to d i s -
tinguish Rylands v Fletcher for t h i s w i l l mean that the defendant w i l l 
himself have to pay damages unless he i s negligent i n which case the 
state 1; w i l l pay for him. Thus such an 'overlapping' action would have to 
go to the ordinary courts of law which would immediately mean that the 
many negligence actions now brought to which the rule i n Rylands v 
Fletcher would also be applicable would be excluded from the system of 
compensation. The only sensible conclusion one can come to from t h i s i s 
that a l l actions should be heard by the tribunals under the system of 
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compensation and i f any d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s required to discourage extra-
hazardous a c t i v i t i e s that must come from some other source. 
I t i s thus submitted that there are compelling reasons for bringing 
the rule i n Rylands v Fletcher i n t o t h i s new system of compensation f o r 
personal i n j u r y . The prospect of having two p a r a l l e l systems of redress 
- one for negligence ar.d the other for s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y - i s unedifying 
and smacks indeed of a return to the medieval forms of action which 
s t u l t i f i e d our legal system for so long. To have only one system of 
conipensation f o r personal i n j u r y makes sense; i t i s simple, unambiguous 
and understandable by the population as a whole. This however leaves 
the argument that some deterrent may be required against firms who indulge 
i n ultra-hazardous a c t i v i t i e s which are not f o r the public benefit. Such 
a deterrent could be created i n two ways; f i r s t by making such firms pay 
a higher contribution to the state insurance fund and secondly by widening 
criminal l i a b i l i t y so that i f there i s a breach of duty i n such circum-
stances a prosecution can be brought while the injured party w i l l s t i l l 
be allowed the advantages of the new scheme of compensation. Many details 
w i l l clearly have to be worked out - f o r example w i l l the new scheme apply 
to purely f i n a n c i a l loss and to damage to property? (Logically i t ought 
to or the unsatisfactory common lav/ system w i l l s t i l l be carried on i n 
those respects although t h i s scheme cannot be l i m i t l e s s for defamation 
damages, for example, should not for reasons of policy be paid out of a 
state fund and criminal penalties would riot be an appropriate substitute) 
but i n p r i n c i p l e i t i s suggested that the advantages of a comprehensive 
system of compensation such as that outlined are great. "We are now i n 
England at the stage New Zealand had reached seven years ago when the 
Woodhouse Committee reported. Let us hope that the Pearson Committee 
w i l l have as beneficial results for our law as one anticipates that the 




1. The rule i n Rylands v Fletcher as expounded by Blackburn J. 
2 
and modified on appeal by the House of Lords was a new pri n c i p l e 
of lav/ not d i r e c t l y related to the case lav; which preceded i t . 
2 . For the rule to apply there must be an escape of or caused by 
the dangerous object from land under the control of the defendant. 
In j u r i e s to the person as well as i n j u r y to property are actionable 
per se under the r u l e . 
3. The escape must have taken place i n the course of a non-natural 
user of the defendant's land. The defendant can be l i a b l e under the 
rule for things which are brought on to his land or a r t i f i c i a l l y 
created or cultivated there with his knowledge or through his negligence 
but can not be l i a b l e f o r things naturally on the land v/hich resu l t i n 
a spontaneous escape. 
k. The rule applies only to something which i s l i k e l y to do mischief i f 
i t escapes. Any object i s capable of being dangerous and thus the true 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s not between the dangerous and non-dangerous character of 
the thing but between those circumstances i n which the defendant w i l l be 
able to deny the dangerous quality i n his act and those i n which he w i l l 
not. 
5 . The rule i n Rylands v Fletcher i s cer t a i n l y not one of absolute 
l i a b i l i t y and can only with d i f f i c u l t y be termed a rule of s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y . I t s basis of l i a b i l i t y now l i e s at some stage i n between 
the f a u l t concept found i n negligence and the r i s k concept of s t r i c t 
l i a b i l i t y . 
6. The t o r t of negligence has recently shown signs of moving from a 
fa u l t concept of l i a b i l i t y i n the direction of a r i s k concept. Res 
ipsa l o q u i t u r and the growth and increasing awareness of the presence 
1 . 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265. 
2 . L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
of insurance have played a leading part i n t h i s s h i f t i n emphasis. 
Today a powerful feeling i s developing that compensation should 
be a r i g h t of the injured party. Loss d i s t r i b u t i o n between, members 
of a section of society has become increasingly prevalent but the 
system which i s becoming more and more favoured as the ultimate 
answer to the problem of compensation fo r accidents involving personal 
i n j u r y i s a system of f u l l and direct compensation payable to the 
victim without regard to re s p o n s i b i l i t y for the accident. 
A Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Pearson has 
now been set up to consider the whole question and i t s findings w i l l 
have a great influence on the future of a l l t o r t s of t h i s nature. 
The rule i n Rylands v Fletcher has now been with us for more than one 
hundred years but the end of i t s existence as an independent part of 
the law of t o r t may now be i n sight. 
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